South Africa's Telkom: a fighting chance?

Telkom Direct stores: a vital channel to market as the company faces challenging times?

DevelopingTelecomsWatch is picking up lots of chatter today about Telkom, the incumbent wireline operator of South Africa. This started when this morning's daily roundup from TeleGeography included the news that the company is planning to re-enter the mobile space in 2010 after only a brief period with no cellular presence.

Until almost exactly one year ago, Telkom and Vodafone had each owned 50% of Vodacom, the pan-African mobile operator with 35 million customers in South Africa, Tanzania, Lesotho, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Earlier this year, the UK-headquartered mobile giant secured a controlling interest in Vodacom with the purchase of an additional 15% stake from Telkom. The remaining 35% owned by the South African incumbent was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and unbundled to the company's shareholders.

When plans for this transaction were first announced late last year, Lloyd Gedye of South Africa's Mail & Guardian reported the stated rationale for Telkom's sale of its stake in Vodacom and noted that many analysts "had expressed skepticism at Telkom's ability to make a success of going it alone in the mobile space and have questioned how Telkom will survive without the Vodacom cash cow."

Back in November 2008, then, Gedye wrote that Telkom CEO Reuben September was arguing that the deal would unlock significant value for the company's shareholders because its fixed-line business had "been undervalued while it clung on to its 50% stake in Vodacom".

How much validity is there in that notion of Telkom's wireline property being undervalued? The notion is, at the very least, open to question according to An Ovum note issued this week in response to Telkom's announced plans to roll out its own mobile services. Ovum examine the background to this strategy and observe that fixed-line penetration (currently under 9%) is continuing to fall in South Africa so "mobile is clearly the communication mode of choice, and this is where [Telkom] needs to be for its customers."

However, the note continues, establishing a new mobile operation in South Africa won't be easy, as mobile penetration is already above the 100% mark and because Telkom will be competing with two large, well-established players in Vodacom and MTN.

A third mobile operator, Cell C, has achieved a 15.57% share (according to WCIS) of the country's mobile market since its commercial launch in late 2001. For other mobile service providers, South Africa has offered a very challenging competitive environment. Back in March, in an article on the prospects for MVNOs in both Africa and India, DevelopingTelecomsWatch noted that Virgin Mobile South Africa had failed to capture even 1% of the country's mobile subscriptions by the end of 2008. The significance of the recently-launched CDMA mobile offering from Neotel, Telkom's principal challenger in the fixed-line arena, remains to be seen.

While Ovum's note politely points out the level of challenge facing Telkom's proposed new mobile offering, others have responded with far less restrained language. An article by Tiisetso Motsoeneng of Reuters today quotes one analyst who certainly pulls no punches.

"To be targeting the retail market in that industry, I think it will be suicide for Telkom," Jan Meintjes, an analyst at Gryphon Asset Management said. "I fail to see how a converged strategy of fixed and mobile is going to be earning significant margins," Meintjes said. "Unless they can show to the market that there's a specific niche that they're targeting and how they can exploit that in terms of earning margins on that business that will give them an accepted ROE on their capital expenditure, I don't see how that can be value enhancing."

The Ovum note, however, reminds us that in South Africa, Telkom claims not to be starting a mobile network operation from scratch. The note points out that the group already has fixed core network assets, which are used by both Vodacom and MTN for backhaul, and an established channel to market through over 134 Telkom Direct shops. Ovum contend that Telkom can choose to "develop a new brand and associated lifestyle concept to target some of the high-spending customers". Also, the Ovum note continues, Telkom could potentially have greater appeal to enterprise customers due to an ability to bundle services across fixed and mobile networks.

Lloyd Gedye's article late last year indicated that another use of the Telkom's Vodacom windfall might be to acquire a number of new mobile licences in numerous African countries. These would be in addition to the company's existing interest in Nigeria. According to Candice Jones of ITWeb, however, Multi-Links, the Nigerian telco in which Telkom has had a controlling interest since 2006, "is in dire straits, knocking Telkom's annual results set with a R1.7 billion net loss."

Let's see if this difficult experience discourages Telkom from further international expansion. My sense all this year is that African mobile markets are more likely to consolidate than they are to offer rich opportunities for new entrants.

While mobility in South Africa offers a new source of revenue for Telkom, Ovum argue that any new revenue streams from mobile - or from enhanced ICT services currently being developed - "are unlikely to significantly bolster its financials in the near term." Of more immediate concern, Ovum contend, is Telkom's rising cost base. Ovum's note expresses the belief that by implementing best-practice approaches in its own transformation, Telkom is giving itself a fighting chance in the challenging times ahead of it.

South Africa's Telkom: a fighting chance?

Unsurprising news of the week

India's Communications & IT Minister: summoned to explain falling revenues at BSNL

To my mind, the least surprising news item so far this week comes from Mansi Taneja of India's Business Standard, who reports that state-owned Indian state-owned telco BSNL is likely to exit a consortium that has been aiming to acquire a 46% in pan-MEA mobile group Zain. According to Taneja, MTNL, the other public sector operator party to the consortium, is also likely to exit since it had agreed to follow BSNL’s lead in the deal.

DevelopingTelecomsWatch has no axe to grind with regard to these two telecoms enterprises, but it won't have escaped the notice of regular readers that this blog has observed some pretty strong criticisms of their performance in their domestic market, most notably in an article written in August.

It was partly with these criticisms in mind that DTW was unsurprised when Etisalat rather than BSNL prevailed in the scramble to acquire the Sri Lankan mobile operator previously owned by Millicom International Cellular. It would, then, cause raised eyebrows at DTW HQ were MTNL to win what looks to be a hotly contested scramble to buy a controlling interested in Zambia's soon-to-be-privatised incumbent fixed line operator, Zamtel. As a recent Cellular News item points out, the list of other interested parties contains some formidable names including Orascom Telecom, Telkom of South Africa and Russia's pan-CIS cellco Vimpelcom, which has recently expanded its footprint into Southeast Asia.

Lest anyone feel that this blog returning quite regularly to the troubles of India's two major state-owned telecoms enterprises is somehow unwarranted, it is worth noting that concern about their prospects has been expressed in the highest circles in the south Asian country. Monday's Economic Times, for example, reported that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is likely to meet the BSNL's management along with Communications and IT Minister A. Raja to look into the causes of the company's falling revenues and to find ways to improve its performance.

According to the Economic Times, BSNL says the loss in net profit and revenue is due to huge wage costs and customers deciding to terminate their fixed line subscriptions. The article states that the company has been struggling with the problem of landlines being surrendered for years now, due to a combination of the increasing popularity of mobile phone and its own service levels falling below customer expectations. In the past three years, the article reports, 6.3 million landline connections have been terminated.

This blog has also documented the company's struggles to capitalise on first-mover advantage in the 3G mobile services space or to take make much of a similar head start with WiMAX broadband services.

In light of all this, DTW remains wary of any claims that BSNL makes about ambitions to grow its business into unfamiliar overseas territories.

Unsurprising news of the week

Canada's 'thirdworldish' policies to stifle wireless competition?

Naguib Sawiris: planning to shake up Canada's wireless market

DTW’s recent article on international ambitions of India’s two major state-owned telecoms operators mentioned that one opportunity they are considering is the acquisition of a controlling stake in Zamtel, the incumbent fixed-line operator in Zambia. It remains to be seen if this joint bid from BSNL and MTNL will succeed and it does look as though some formidable players are also interested.

According to a recent Cellular News article, other interested parties include Telecel Globe (a subsidiary of Orascom Telecom), Telkom (South Africa’s incumbent fixed-line operator) and Russia’s increasingly expansionist Vimpelcom, all of which, the article states, officially began due diligence this week.

Interest in Zamtel is by no means the biggest recent news item about Orascom Telecom and might well have escaped the notice of North American readers whose attention has probably been drawn more readily to the challenges the Egyptian firm is facing in Canada.

Globalive Communications Corp. of Toronto was established in 1998, since which time it has offered competitive long distance plans. Ten years later, the company successfully made a purchase in Industry Canada's radio spectum auction, which paved the way for the creation of a challenger - Globalive Wireless - for the country's established mobile operators, including Telus Mobility, Rogers Wireless and Bell Mobility. The joint efforts of these three major carriers and regional players such as SaskTel have failed to drive national mobile penetration beyond 66.65% according to WCIS. This seems very low for a G8 country that ranks among the world's top ten trading nations. In an interview for Huawei's Communicate magazine earlier this year, Bell Mobility CTO Stephen Howe attributed this state of affairs to three factors: the relatively late licensing of digital wireless spectrum in Canada; Canada' s huge geographical area; the country's robust and unlimited-usage wireline networks.

Globalive Wireless, backed by Orascom Telecom and which had earlier this year announced its intention to launch services under the Wind brand familiar in Italy and Greece, has been led by CEO Ken Cambpell since October 2008. Cambell, whose former roles include a stint running the BITĖ Group, the Vodafone partner network in Lithuania and Latvia, would take issue with Stephen Howe's explanation for Canada's status as a wireless industry laggard. Speaking with Michael Bettiol of Boy Genius Report last month, Campbell lays the blame squarely with the country's wireless carriers:

"Here we’ve got a situation where we pay twice as much as they do in the US, our minutes of use are half of what they are in the US, and wireless penetration is at 65%. Clearly it is a market that is under-developed and where customers simply overpay. The other thing is that in Canada our customer saturation numbers are extremely low. We’ve got a very disenfranchised and very frustrated customer base that is really ripe and in need of competition. The other thing you should know is that this country is dominated by three carriers, but if you look regionally, it is typically two carriers that dominate regional markets. Canada is effectively an oligopoly and in many regions pretty much a duopoly. There is definitely an opportunity with consumers and the numbers speak for themselves."

If, as Michael Bettiol contests, Canadians have "long craved for a new wireless carrier to bust onto the scene and break up what is often described as the anti-competitive practices of [the] incumbents", there must surely be much excitement in the country about the market debut of Wind.

For now, however, any excitement must be deferred a while. Globalive Communications has been in a state of limbo since late last month, when the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ruled that the company is effectively under the control of its Egyptian-based financial backer (Orascom Telecom) and is therefore in breach of rules on foreign ownership and control.

Terence Corcoran of the National Post despairs of the resulting "wireless mess":

"Globalive Wireless has just pumped more than half a billion dollars into the Canadian economy. That includes paying Ottawa $442-million last year for the right to new wireless spectrum, cash now already spent by the federal government stimulating road work in Saskatchewan and writing giant cheques to constituents in Nova Scotia," writes Corcoran, who also notes that "Globalive has also invested another hundred million or more preparing a new Canadian wireless network".

"Having taken Globalive's money", Corcoran continues, "Canada is now telling the company the deal is off."

Corcoran argues that the large spectrum auction fees collected by the Canadian Government would have been far more modest had the participation of Orascom Telecom supremo Naguib Sawiris not been authorised in the first place. Corcoran says that Sawiris has every right to feel mightily aggrieved:

"Whether or not it's possible to sue Ottawa over this thirdworldish policy switch and bureaucratic camel-trading, complete with secret meetings and rule-bending approval processes, it certainly looks like Globalive and its owner, Mr. Sawiris, have a case of some kind, politically and morally, if not legally. Ottawa led Globalive into bidding for spectrum and a major role in the Canadian wireless market, and then it pulled the carpet out from under the company.

This wrangle is a fascinating one for me. In the course of my work, I have spent considerable time networking with telecoms executives from Europe, North America and the Middle East who make their living running operations in less developed countries. I have lost count of the number of times I've heard (doubtless justified) complaints about the complexities and pitfalls of doing business in such markets - regulatory agencies that can be erratic and less than even-handed; taxation policies which stifle growth and innovation; foreign ownership rules which can prove limiting. It is with interest, then, that I read of a company rooted in Egypt encountering in Canada some of the problems I usually hear attributed to much less affluent and developed societies.

Canada's 'thirdworldish' policies to stifle wireless competition?

South Africa, East Africa gear up for vastly improved capacity

Back in April, I wondered about the impact of the three undersea cables set to land in East Africa - SEACOM, EASSy and TEAMS. I explored the question of whether it really mattered which cable would land first. I also thought about whether the region's hitherto inadequate broadband supply means that there is room for all three. I was quite attracted to the line of argument that there is.

With a few related news items popping up this week, I thought it was high time I had another look at these questions.

SEACOM appears to be very close to completion, with the company's website currently indicating that the service will be fully operational in sixteen days' time. The company has also received warm words of support from a South African customer excited about a "shift towards a high speed, high capacity Internet connectivity environment".

Hillel Shrock, Business Solutions Director at ISP/telecoms service provider Internet Solutions, believes that "Seacom is an important milestone for the local telecommunications industry as it is the first time that South African service providers, other than Telkom, will be able to make a long term investment in the provisioning of high speed, high capacity international connectivity."

In Kenya, meanwhile, telecoms sector players are working out strategic partnerships designed to take full advantage of TEAMS becoming operational. Cedric Lumiti of East African Business Week, wrote this week about the deal struck between market-leading Kenya MNO Safaricom and Jamii Telecommunications, whereby the latter will become the cellco's preferred broadband infrastructure provider. Safaricom CEO Michael Joseph explains that his company has now formally migrated to the new technology-neutral unified licensing regime set out by the Communications Commission of Kenya and can therefore offer a broader spectrum of data services using any technology platform.

All very upbeat - in line with the positive noises I heard at April's East Africa Com conference in Nairobi. If my travels take my back to that part of the world once all the cables have landed and have brought vastly greater capacity online, I'll be interested to learn about how quickly this begins to stimulate economic activity. It will also be good to get a faster connection in my hotel. VPN access was just impossible last time - and there was a lamentable slowdown in Developing Telecoms Watch blogging activity.

South Africa, East Africa gear up for vastly improved capacity

A naked giant in a perfect storm

I enjoyed constructing the title of today's offering. The image of a stoic titan leaning into a howling maelstrom of wind and rain, bereft of protective clothing, is a colourful one, not least on a rare day of hazy sunshine and light Spring breezes here in the north London suburbs (when I started this; the rain is now hammering down). I don't expect it's at all obvious what the title refers to, however. I just looked back at recent post headings and thought they've all been a little too prosaic. That Spring feeling just seems to have me waxing lyrical. Dont' worry. What follows is the usual sensible stuff... and the nude giant in the story makes an appearance before the end of this piece.

The giant concerned is South Africa's former land-line monopolist Telkom, which continutes to adapt to a range of changes in its home market. The managed liberalisation of the country's telecoms sector was catalysed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001, which paved the way for a second national fixed-line operator. With the exception of full mobility, that second wireline player, Neotel, provides a wide range of products including basic voice and data services, high-speed Internet access, VPNs, and network management and hosting.

The new kid on the block, however, has not found competing with Telkom to be without challenges. South African telecoms and tech news portal MyBroadband yesterday picked up a newspaper article whose broad theme is that although the Neotel provides a "welcome" alternative to Telkom, "it doesn't quite offer all the answers."

Penned by Barrie Terblanche of the Mail & Guardian, the article focuses on particular difficulties faces by Neotel in the business telecoms market. Terblanche writes that "years after Neotel received its license to provide South Africa with an alternative to Telkom, by far the majority of small businesses are still forced to depend on the old behemoth for basic fixed telephony – even those businesses situated in the middle of Neotel’s coverage areas in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban."

One reason for this, argues Terblanche, is the lack of fixed-line number portability.

The country's telecoms regulator, ICASA, launched a Mobile Number Portability system in Q4 2006, the first instance of MNP on the African continent. This might have happened even earlier had South Africa's three mobile operators not twice asked the regulatory agency to postpone the introduction of the MNP platform. As my former colleague Matthew Reed (editor of Middle East and Africa Wireless Analyst) noted in a South Africa market update some months later, Cell C, MTN and Vodacom claimed more than once not to be "ready to implement portability" on the earlier scheduled launch dates of March and September 2006. This aroused the ire of no less an individual than billionaire industrialist Sir Richard Branson, whose Virgin brand is used by more than 360 companies worldwide - as I write this, I am still aching as a result of my most recent session in a Virgin Active gym and have yet to pay off the credit card bill for my recent trip to the USA on Virgin Atlantic Airlines.

Branson's interest in South Africa's delayed implementation of MNP stemmed from attempts of the country's Virgin Mobile-branded MVNO to carve out a share of the cellular market. Early last month, when discussing the prospect for MVNOs gaining traction in Africa and India, I observed that this has not been an easy task, noting that Virgin Mobile South Africa had signed up just 600,000 subs by end-2008, of which only 200,000 were active. Back on September 27 2006, a member of Matt Reed's MEAWA team quoted Branson as saying "South Africa's mobile players are dragging their heels on this issue, because it isn't in their best interests... they want to lock their customers in. You shouldn't be held hostage by your mobile phone company."

In the same article, this was refuted by a Vodacom spokesman, who said that the delays had been caused by "the technically complex nature of MNP, which requires new business processes to be designed and implemented."

The article, however, also contended that Cell C, then (and now) the country's third placed mobile operator had lobbied for MNP to be introduced more quickly but that Vodacom and MTN had insisted on a longer delay.

Whichever operator(s) may or may not have been behind any alleged MNP foot-dragging, the MEAWA article of the time raised the question of whether number portability would really have any very significant market impact. "Local analysts have played down the likely effect of MNP on the market," stated the article, which reported the view that fewer than half a million subscribers would be likely to change networks within a year.

I don't have to hand a detailed analysis of to what extent MNP may have driven customer churn in South Africa. There was, however, a little jostling in the year which followed the implentation of number portability. Market-leading Vodacom lost ground a little, but maintained a significant lead over it rivals. The bigger winner over that period Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007 seems to have been Cell C, though not to such a degree that the market changed dramatically. Cell C has, however, coninued to make up ground on its competitors since then - according to the World Cellular Information Service, the Oger Telecom-backed MNO now owns 13.80% of South Africa's mobile subscriptions, up significantly from the 8.61% logged in September 2006. I am absolutely not qualified even to speculate to what degree this is due to MNP. That said, my sense is that number portability has not massively changed the South African mobile market.

What, then, is behind Barrie Terblanche's claim for the degree to which the non-availability of fixed-line number portability has hampered Neotel's efforts to compete with the incumbent wireline opearator? He contends "that only business start-ups really have a choice between Neotel and Telkom, because established businesses can ill afford to give up an existing number."

Terblanche goes on to say that it is not only in the small business space that Neotel is finding the going tough. "Another huge hurdle in the full-scale adoption of Neotel by slightly larger businesses", he writes "is its lack of line-hunting facilities. This provides a business with one public telephone number linked to several lines in the business. When a customer phones the number, the exchange hunts for the first available line and puts the call through." The lack of line hunting, apparently to be solved in the next few months, "means that a business with a PABX still has to rent Telkom lines for incoming calls", continued this Tuesday's Terblanche article.

Tuesday was a good day for commentary on the South African telecoms market. Carried the very same day by MyBroadband was another article taken from the country's Financial Mail. This one, penned by a Duncan McLeod, zeroes in on the former fixed-line monopolist. While Barrie Terblanche contends that Telkom is better positioned than its rivals to compete in the enterprise telephony markets, McLeod constructs an interesting piece around the large number of challenges faced by the incumbent.

The article begins by noting that Telkom is soon to dispose of its 50% stake in market-leading cellco Vodacom, which, despite the advances of Cell C, continues to own slightly more than half of the country's mobile subscriptions. McLeod feels that "the divestiture will reshape SA’s telecommunications landscape for the better" and asserts that "it's sink or swim time for Telkom." Despite Neotel's struggles in the business telephony space, McLeod feels that the incumbent's fixed-line business "is going nowhere fast and, with new competition, it is going to have a hard time defending its top-line revenue and profit margins."

Given the powerful position of Vodacom in its home country, and given its valuable collection of subsidiary opcos in Tanzania, Mozambique, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo, why would Telkom seek to get rid of its stake in the business?

Let me turn once again to MEAWA's Matthew Reed, who in November last year wrote that the sale would free Telkom "from an unsatisfactory relationship with Vodacom." Matt stated "Telkom had hoped that Vodacom would help it to expand into the fast-growing mobile sector and into new markets in Africa, but it has been disappointed by the level of cooperation."

As Matt noted then, Telkom has begun a wireless play of its own. Earlier this month, as reported by TelecomPaper, the operator launched its new Mobi service, which offers mobile voice over a WCDMA network. The mobile service is currently available in Gauteng and Cape Town only.

My understanding is that the shareholder agreement with Vodacom prevents Telkom from building a national mobile network. Instead, to establish a nationwide presence, Telkom must sign a roaming agreement with with MTN and/or Vodacom. Cell C does not fit the bill, having not yet established a 3.5G network.

Beyond the home country, Telkom may also be working to find its own route into the mobile arena. Matt Reed observed in November that the operator had, in 2007, "acquired a 70% stake in Nigerian CDMA operator Multi-Links... and... is thought to have had separate talks with both Zain and Nigeria's No. 2 mobile operator, Globacom, about the possibility of forging partnerships."

Will Telkom's sale of its stake in Vodacom prove, then, to be a smart move? According to Duncan McLeod's article, one vocal supporter of the decision is the incumbent's CFO Peter Nelson, who has praised CEO Reuben September, saying "it showed a lot of leadership and courage... the new Telkom is standalone — I call it the naked Telkom."

This naked giant, McLeod contends, looks set to be caught in "a perfect storm" with the telecoms sector wide open to new competition. Cellcos MTN and Vodacom are free to compete in the wireline area, McLeod writes, also inviting readers to "consider also that new undersea cables will finally end Telkom’s control of international bandwidth."

McLeod reports that Mr. September is, however, "clearly relishing the company’s imminent divorce from Vodacom and the demands of a competitive market" and expresses admiration for the Telkom CEO's willingness to take tough decisions, such as shutting down Telkom Media, the pay TV unit for which a buyer could not be found.

Duncan McLeod wonders whether September will "take flak" for deciding to postpone a project that was set to outsource 19,000 jobs, questioning whether this has resulted from political pressure ahead of the country's elections. CFO Nelson, however, has defended the postponement thus: "We won’t outsource problematic and poorly engineered areas because what happens is you lock in inefficiency and you pay for it forever." McLeod conceded that this is a fair argument, going on to say that "Telkom is still SA's most important communications operator. It is critical for the economy that it doesn’t stumble and fall. Whatever South Africans might feel about Telkom — and it’s often not flattering — September deserves their encouragement."

A naked giant in a perfect storm

East Africa Com musings: Does it matter which submarine cable lands first?

The socio-economic impact of undersea cables in East Africa: the SEACOM view

Blogger Clement Nthambazale Nyirenda is a lecturer, researcher and consultant in Electronics and Computer Engineering at the Malawi Polytechnic, a constituent college of the University of Malawi. He is currently studying for a PhD in Japan at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. In February Clement wrote about the broadband speeds he enjoys in Tokyo and expressed his hope that a similar service might one day be available in his home country.

Malawi, as Clement noted, while usually considered to be part of Southern Africa, also lies in the easterly part of the continent, which is "the only region in the world that has neither intra-[continental] nor direct access to worldwide international cable networks." The region, Clement observes, "instead relies on expensive satellite communication" with "data costs... among the highest in the world."

Clement discusses the progress of the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy), "the first initiative proposed to connect countries of eastern Africa via a high bandwidth fibre optic cable system to the rest of the world." According to the EASSy website, the level of international telephone traffic per main line in sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in any region in the world, which is proof of there being "considerable demand in East Africa due to insufficient supply for telecommunications within the region." My own single experience of visiting that part of the world - last week's trip to the East Africa Com conference in Nairobi - does lead me to concur, as does the business of simply trying to make calls to other East African countries from the UK. As I noted in my most recent post here, the only frustrating aspect of my short trip to Kenya was finding it fairly difficult to stay on top of my day job via our company VPN. At both my hotel and the conference venue, Internet access was slow and unreliable.

My understanding is that there exists the hope that providing East African countries with improved connectivity could prove to be an effective catalyst for economic development in the region through the expansion of businesses based on the Internet, the provision of call centre services and the outsourcing of other back office functions.

EASSy is set to run from South Africa to Sudan, with landing points in six countries, and will be connected to several landlocked countries. A number of telecoms operators have invested in EASSy via WIOCC (West Indian Ocean Cable Company), which had a visible presence at last week's conference. These include state-owned wireline incumbent operators such as Botswana Telecommunications Corporation, Djibouti Telecom, Telecomunicacoes de Mocambique and soon-to-be-privatised ONATEL of Burundi.

Others in the WIOCC contingent are Orascom Telecom-backed MNO U-Com (of Burundi), Telkom Kenya, Dalkom (Somalia), Zantel, Uganda Telecom, Israel's Gilat Satcom and the Lesotho Telecommunications Authority.

From South Africa, direct investors in EASSy include Neotel, MTN and a consortium of Telkom (SA) and Vodacom. Futher direct investors in the project are Telecom Malagasy, Mauritius Telecom, SUDATEL, Tanzania Telecommunications Company, Comores Telecom and Zamtel (no, that's not a repeat of Zantel). From beyond the region, other backers are BT, Saudi Telecom, Bharti Airtel, Etisalat and France Telecom.

In his February blog post, Clement Nyirenda notes that EASSYy was once expected to be ready for commercial use in Q2 2007 but that construction did not get underway until March 2008. Clement reports (confirmed by a more recent Compterworld Kenya article) that the project is now slated for completion and commercial service in the second half of 2010 - three years behind schedule. "EASSy has not been EASY", comments Clement.

In Clement's opinion, "the major problems hampering the progress of the EASSy project stem from the fact that it is a joint venture of more than 20 largely monopolistic parastatal telecommunication bureaucracies." I shall leave it to individual readers to decide which (if any) of the project's backers fit this rather critical description. "In Africa," says Clement, "the culture of working together in such a large grouping is not common."

Wrangles between partners do seem to have been a feature of the project, at least as far back as June 2006, when a meeting of ICT ministers from Eastern and Southern African countries helped resolve disagreements among project participants, according to Sammy Kirui, the chairman of EASSY's project management team.

Regarding the most recently announced delays, the Computerworld article quotes WIOCC CEO Chris Wood, who said late last month that "the delays have been caused due to optimizing the cost structures and finalizing the agreements between all participating carriers". Wood, states the article, is not worried about the delays because the most important thing is the long-term stability of the financial structure of the cable system. "Time and again", Wood said, "the telecom industry has seen private equity financed companies build cables and then go bankrupt within a few years as their business model, hit by high costs, proved unattainable."

EASSy is just one of three submarine cables set to improve the region's connectivity. Another is TEAMS (East African Marine System). Etisalat appears to be spreading its bets in the race to connect the region, having a 15% stake in TEAMS in addition to its investment in EASSy. The other 85% of the ownership of the TEAMS project is split between a diverse group of interests including the Kenyan Government, Telkom Kenya (another one which is backing two horses) and Kenya's market-leading cellco Safaricom. Also involved from Kenya are the country's largest private data carrier Kenya Data Networks and most recent mobile market entrant Essar Telecom Kenya, whose billboards I saw all over Nairobi last week. The advertising of another TEAMS backer, the cable MSO Zuku, was also very prominent as I caught a glimpse of the city during cab rides between meetings.

Kenyan players dominate the consortium, with ISP AccessKenya and Jammii Telecommunications (which provides access to the Internet Backbone to telcos, ISPs, and large enterprises) also involved.

One more Keynan TEAMS backer is Flashcom, an integrated telecommunications solutions provider offering voice, data and SMS services with a collection of network assets including a CDMA2000 WLL and ISDN services over Fibre. Flashcom's CEO Joe Kimani was on the speaker panel at last week's conference, but unfortunately I didn't get the chance to catch what he had to say. From beyond Kenya, a small stake in TEAMS is held by Africa Fibrenet of Uganda.

The other submarine cable on the East Africa scene is SEACOM, whose investors state that the project will ensure access to low cost bandwidth, thereby encouraging the growth of existing and new industries, as well as education and e-government.

Does the region need three undersea cables? If all of this is thought of as a race to land the cables and start doing business first, will whichever project finishes last find itself out of the game? A Business Times (Tanzania) article of last Friday contends that the answers to these questions are, respectively, 'yes' and 'no'.

In this article, the scene is set with an illustration of the degree to which the current paucity of connectivity impacts upon businesses in the region. The claim is made that a large corporation in Tanzania can pay about USD 3000 a month just to ensure a reliable Internet connection for its network. According to the article, this figure rises to USD 7000 to cover a megabyte of bandwidth per computer in a medium-sized office in Kenya. "A business connection in an urban center in the US," continues the article, "can cost as little as USD 25 a month".

The article compares the economics of the VSAT and undersea cable industries and adds that "fiber optic cables are low latency: they can carry information more than ten times faster than a VSAT to satellite to cable connection."

When making a comparison between the three submarine cables, the article contends that they all have "roughly the same capacity", but notes that "each connects a different combination of countries and ownership."

The article acknowledges that "there has been much hype in the media about which cables will land first" but makes the argument that "the success of one cable does not render the others useless." The view expressed is that redundancy is needed to ensure the security of broadband supply and to stimulate competition, thereby reducing prices for users. "Tanzania will be able to make room for both the EASSy and the SEACOM cables, as well as any connectivity provided by TEAMS", concludes the piece. Plenty of room for all, then, it seems.

East Africa Com musings: Does it matter which submarine cable lands first?