Afrique Occidentale & Centrale Com: De retour au Sénégal par demande générale

The Zain-Bharti transaction: How will West African mobile markets be affected?

Mais non! DevelopingTelecomsWatch has not become a francophone blog. The frenchified title of today's offering is in honour of the fact that a noted West African telecoms conference is, after two years in Nigeria, to be hosted in Senegal in June.

Geopolitically, West Africa is defined by the UN as consisting of: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Of these, just four are countries where English is an official language. Of the others, two are Lusophone states and ten are French-speaking.

The organisers of the aforementioned conference have found that this linguistic diversity in the region creates certain challenges for them. Nigeria, as by far the largest market in West Africa, seemed to be the logical place in which to host the event for the last couple of years. Certainly, relocating the conference to Abuja (from its previous venue of Dakar, Senegal) two years ago paid tremendous dividends in terms of boosted attendance numbers and a good buzz of activity at the 2008 and 2009 iterations of the gathering. This was achieved, however, at the cost of making the event a tad less attractive for delegates from the numerous French-speaking markets. This effect was somewhat mitigated by ensuring that simultaneous English-French translation was available during all conference sessions, but perhaps not as much as was hoped given that this year Informa Telecoms & Media have moved the show back to Dakar again.

Given that delegates from telecoms operators attend for free, Informa monetises its Com World Series events (of which West & Central Africa Com is one) largely by selling sponsorship packages and exhibition space to the telecoms technology vendors that do business with those operators. These vendors will doubtless remain keen on the potential of the large (and fragmented) Nigerian telecoms market and might be concerned about not having a good tradeshow route-to-market to address this now the conference has headed back to Dakar.

With this in mind, I guess, Informa are also running a specifically Nigerian event in Lagos this year. This will make its debut in September.

In the meantime, what can we expect to be discussed at the Dakar gathering?

I guess one hot topic - addressed via offline chitchat if not via presentations and panel discussions - will be the effect of Zain's withdrawal from the region. The Kuwaiti group currently controls opcos in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone - as well as others in markets elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed ad nauseum in DTW posts passim., all of these are now set to be in the hands of giant Indian cellco Bharti Airtel. DTW's most recent article, mainly a brief exploration of whether India's mobile market is set to consolidate, did a little to talk up the ways in which Bharti Airtel might be able to reinvent Zain Africa by introducing the low-cost business model which it has empoyed on home turf. So let's see how much tougher sub-Saharan markets are set to become for Zain/Bharti's competitors.

This acquistion, however, may yet take a little while longer to conclude. One reason for this could be resistance from the governments of the countries in which the Zain-owned opcos are set to change hands. That said, there have been recent signs of these obstacles being overcome.

Back in March, for example, as reported by India's Economic Times, the Government of Gabon said it "disapproves" of the sale of Zain's Gabonese assets to Bharti Airtel and reserves the right to take "all necessary measures". Late last week, Reuters was reporting that this objection had been resolved.

It will be interesting, then, to see how long it takes to deal with any further problems of this kind. If the difficulties do continue into June, it should be interesting to connect with Tiemoko Coulibaly, Vice President of Zain's Western Africa operations at West & Central Africa Com in Dakar.

There will be many other reasons to attend the event - but connecting with the likes of Mr Coulibaly could be motivation enough for anyone who does business with Zain in Africa and now needs to keep on top of how the change of ownership is set to change the game.

Afrique Occidentale & Centrale Com: De retour au Sénégal par demande générale

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 12

Zain share price: massive spike since the rumour mill started turning

One loyal reader has suggested it's high time that this blog revisited its most regularly explored theme - the ongoing not-so-mini-series that is Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch.

Note the parentheses around the word 'Africa', a set of punctuation marks that, for good reason, crept into the title of this series in Episode 11. Bracketing 'Africa' in this way was to denote that while this continuing investigation into developments at the Kuwaiti MEA telecoms group was initially focused on the rumours about the sale of Zain's African operations, the focus needed to become a bit wider, i.e. speculating about the future of the whole company. This was due to the UAE's Etisalat informing reporters of its interest in buying a 51% stake in the Kuwaiti group.

Since then, that loyal reader I mentioned has urged me to take note of a couple of possibly quite significant elements of the Zain story.

The first of these is the news that a major Zain shareholder is likely to consider selling its stake in the telecoms company if it receives the right price. That shareholder, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) (the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund), owns a 24.61% stake in the operator. According to Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai, "the KIA has no objection to discussing any offer to buy its stake in Zain whether made by the UAE’s Etisalat or others under the condition that the offer would be serious and with attractive returns."

That, then, looks like pretty positive news for the Emirati telecoms group if its interest in Zain really is very strong.

The other bit that my friendly reader brought to my attention is much more cloak-and-dagger.

My friend tells me he's heard whispers that "the whole Zain thing" has been a ruse set in motion with the sole intention of driving up the Kuwaiti group's share price. By way of support for this assertion, my pal urged me to take a look at Zain's stock chart from March to July. "It's quite amazing what transpired", my correspondent reminds me. Kuwaiti blogger 'Alpha Dinar' concurs, having noted back on July 13th that Vivendi’s USD 12 billion rumored proposal to acquire Zain’s African operations "has stolen headlines for the past few weeks, sparked large volumes, and resulted in a huge spike in Zain’s stock price."

I asked my correspondent whether he felt that the likes of Vivendi (and other rumoured Zain Africa suitors like France Telecom) could really be tempted into declaring their interest and thereby enabling any such ruse to succeed. My friend's response: "If the new buyers weren't really aware of the game, and if the game was well-played, I don't think they would have been able to keep the genie in the bottle. In any case, if Party A wanted to manipulate the share price, they would be the ones leaking and Party B wouldn't have been able to stay in stealth mode. I don't know how likely it is. I'm not saying that's what happened. I'm just saying that the price did indeed jump up quite a bit, and despite the talks having failed, it hasn't gone down that much at all."

My correspondent concedes that games of the kind being alleged here are not terribly common in Bahrain or Kuwait. He asserts, however, that this is a game often played in other parts of the world and that the fact remains that "the stock was even and then - BOOM - a ninety degree angle."

Who knows? Not me, that's for sure.

One company whose talks with Zain could be said to have "failed" is Vivendi, which announced on July 20th that it was "interrupting" the discussions. No reason was given at the time. Since then, however, Kui Kinyanjui, writing for Kenya's Business Daily Africa, has alleged that the French telecoms and media conglomerate's interest cooled following a disappointing trip to her home country. Kinyanjui writes that "a dozen senior Vivendi officials jetted into the country to view close hand one of the Zain operations their company hoped to purchase" and that "they came, they saw, were disappointed, and in the process, a multi-million dollar deal was scuttled." The article describes Zain's struggle to compete with Kenya's market-leading cellco Safaricom and cites unconfirmed information from Kenyan sources which indicates that Zain is "keen to sell its Kenyan, DR Congo and Sierra Leone units, and could consider separate bids from disparate telecommunications firms for those operations."

Such rumours of Zain breaking up its African portfolio and selling off operations piecemeal have been far less prominent than stories of that whole portfolio being sold to a single buyer. One prospective purchaser, however, has expressed an interest in buying up only those Zain-owned opcos which would complement its own existing African footprint.

In a recent Reuters note on France Telecom's need to limit margin erosion, Finance Director Gervais Pellisier is quoted as saying that the French incumbent telco "might look at some of the African assets of Kuwait's Zain if the latter decided to sell them in parts." Any willingness on the part of Zain to consider a piecemeal sell-off of some African assets - as alleged by Kui Kinyanjui - would presumably, then, be music to the ears of Mr. Pellisier and his colleagues.

Were a sale of Zain itself or just of Zain's African assets to go ahead, one stumbling block could come in the form of legal action brought by Econet Wireless, the telecoms group led by Zimbabwe-born businessman Strive Masiyiwa. As a recent Guardian article reminds us, in late 2000, Masiyiwa led a consortium that won a licence to operate a mobile phone network in Nigeria. Econet Wireless had a 5% stake in the consortium and claims it had a right of first refusal to buy out the rest of the network in the event of any bid emerging. A bid did emerge from Mo Ibrahim's Celtel International, but, writes the Guardian's Richard Wray, "a series of legal obfuscations blocked Econet from ever getting the chance to bid."

Celtel was, of course, subsequently acquired by Zain and Wray states that the fast-growing Nigerian mobile phone business now accounts for about half of all the Kuwaiti group's African revevnues. In court, says Wray, "Masiyiwa's lawyers are arguing he should be allowed to buy back Zain's Nigerian business at the price set in 2006, in effect blasting a hole straight through Zain's plans to sell its whole African operation with Nigeria as the jewel in its crown."

Well, another episode of Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch has probably left you not much the wiser. It was ever thus. Let's see what happens in the next installment. Don't touch that dial etc.

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 12

Millicom's global emerging markets strategy examined

Following my recent posts here regarding 2008 results and 2009 forecasts from the emerging markets components of the Telenor and TeliaSonera businesses, I would like to examine the performance of a company whose main focus is to provide affordable, widely accessible and readily available prepaid cellular telephony services in developing countries.

In April 2008, I spent an enjoyable two weeks visiting a very diverse range of telecoms service providers in four South American countries. At the time, I was responsible for the development of the Informa Telecoms & Media-produced annual Americas Com conference and exhibition, part of the Com World Series, a global suite of emerging markets-focused telecoms sector networking and discussion events. In the case of Americas Com, which under my watch was held twice in Rio de Janeiro, we were working to broaden the audience. Formerly known as GSM Americas, the event had a strong track record of gathering executives from mobile operators, particularly from Brazil and the Cono Sur countries of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. I was keen to connect with prospective speakers and delegates from less well-represented countries. Another priority was to reach out to wireline operators of various kinds. Across the four countries I visited, therefore, I had meetings with people from national incumbent long-distance carriers, several cooperative-owned LECs and a cable MSO - as well as with MNOs on every stop of the tour.

In Paraguay and Bolivia, I met with very friendly people working for the Tigo-branded mobile operations of Luxembourg-headquartered Millicom International Cellular. For someone trying to secure top-level conference speakers, Millicom is a tough nut to crack. Having their executives speak in a public forum about company strategy or the company's view of technology choices is not something the group seems enthusiastic about.

This week, as picked up by Telecompaper, Millicom released Q4 2008 results and discussed its plans for the year ahead. The company reported fourth-quarter EBITDA up 31% percent from a year earlier to USD 406 million and revenues up 18% to USD 907 million.

Millicom met its target for an EBITDA margin of 45% in the period, but net profit fell to USD 66 million from USD 113 million a year ago, due to a net charge of USD 55 million for tax and forex losses. Total subscribers rose to 32.0 million at year-end from 30.6 million in the third quarter.

The company plans capital spending of USD 1 billion in the current year, down from USD 1.4 billion in 2008. Millicom says that it also plans to lower OPEX due to the challenging economic environment, and also expects a continued impact on results this year from the stronger US dollar. The cellco is also aiming to scale back its promotions in Latin America to focus more on higher value customers. Millicom says this is due to slowing subscriber growth in increasingly penetrated markets.

For me, this is very familiar territory. I have lost count of the number of presentations I have heard from companies in the broad customer management/billing/CRM space which urge operators in developing countries to be ready for market maturity. The mantra tends to go something like this: identify the highest-value customers, decide if you want to keep the less profitable ones (or have your competitors handle them), maximise the value of every customer, prevent churn.

In a number of the Latin American countries in which Millicom competes, market conditions do indeed seem to be at the stage where these kinds of issues need to be treated with some urgency. El Salvador broke the 100% mobile penetration barrier in December, up from 77.59% a year before. Other highly penetrated markets in the Millicom footprint include Guatemala (84.49%), Honduras (79.25%), Paraguay (81.21%) and Colombia (90.71%). In the Latin American arm of the Millicom empire, Bolivia stands out as a market with rather more room for growth, mobile penetration having reached 51.32% by December 2008, up from 40.96% one year earlier.

I am not clear whether Millicom intends to sharpen the focus on higher-value customers even in somewhat under-penetrated Bolivia - or whether reaching less affluent, lower ARPU population segments remains a priority there. If Tigo Bolivia does not go after these segments, there are other players who may be keen to step in.

It was in Bolivia that I met representatives of telecoms cooperatives. Collectively, these co-ops are the leading providers of local fixed telephony, ahead of recently renationalised national incumbent long-distance carrier Entel. The two co-ops we visited also bundle pay-TV services with fixed voice. Several of them offer mobile services as MVNOs. For me, the visits to co-ops in Santa Cruz (COTAS) and Cochabamba (COMTECO) were as much about fact-finding as about banging the drum for our Americas Com conference. I knew little about how these purely local telcos are organised and what their strategies are. I learned that a component of those strategies is to reach outlying settlements and bridge the urban-rural digital divide.

Moving north, Central America is home to the one Millicom holding which bucks the trend of building and buying mobile operations only. In this week's report, the company said that the fixed-line business it acquired in July last year is performing as expected.

This asset, the triple play cable TV group Amnet, operates coaxial and FTTH networks in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. When this acquisition was confirmed, Global Mobile Daily speculated that "the move would appear to be aimed at Tigo being able to offer quadplay services in Latin America."

This week's report from Millicom indicates that the company is enjoying improving margins in Africa, where it plans to sell its Sierra Leone operation. I was curious about why Millicom would want to sell one African operation so soon after buying a licence in another market - in November the company announced it has been awarded the third national mobile licence for Rwanda.

On the face of it, Sierra Leone does not appear to be a wholly unattractive market. Mobile penetration has grown strongly in recent years - from 5.45% at year-end 2005 to 29.87% by December 2008, a figure which leaves good growth potential to be exploited. However, Sierra Leone is the lowest ranked country on the Human Development Index and seventh lowest on the global Human Poverty Index, and is known to suffer from endemic corruption - a challenging place to do business. Millicom has also fared less well than most of its rivals in the Sierra Leone market. Currently, the Tigo operation lags far behind market-leading Africell (36.04% market share), 2nd placed Comium Sierra Leone (31.78%) and 3rd placed Zain Sierra Leone (24.80%). Tigo's market share? Just 7.38%, ahead of only chronic laggard Datatel (0.01% ).

Millicom is not really going in the right direction in the battle for market share in Sierra Leone. In December 2005, Tigo had 9.15% of subscriptions. This fell to 7.92% a year later, rose to 9.17% by December 2007 and then dropping off again over the last twelve months.

Millicom generally does rather better in the smaller markets it serves, enjoying the top spot in El Salvador (pop. 7 million), Guatemala (pop. 13 million), Honduras (pop. 8 million) and Paraguay (pop. 7 million). It looks to me as though the combination of a small overall market size and a long struggle to carve out a decent chunk of that has finally made Millicom go cold on Sierra Leone in these challenging times.

Another market in which the company faces challenges is Senegal. In November, Global Mobile Daily reported that Millicom had begun arbitration proceedings with the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against the Senegalese Government, which had suspended the operator's license.

It was in the same month that Millicom announced the USD 60 million purchase of 15 year licence to operate in Rwanda. There is certainly room to grow there. Mobile penetration is low at around 13.5% and the population is only served by two incumbent operators, RwandaTel and the market-leading subsidiary of South Africa's MTN.

According to the GMD article, Marc Beuls, President and CEO of Millicom, notes that the Rwandan company can forge some synergies with its Congo and Tanzanian operations and also says that the country has a well developed road and grid infrastructure, which will enable the company to build out a network quickly and cost-effectively.

In these challenging times, Millicom seems to be an example of a telecoms group with far-flung operating units that is looking hard at these various operations and making context-specific business decisions rather than pursuing a one-size-fits-all approach to emerging markets worldwide.

Millicom's global emerging markets strategy examined