The road to hell...

... is paved, as Dr. Johnson didn't ever say, with good intentions.

One such intention was set out here in the most recent DTW post, namely that this blog would review some of the predictions made in the Industry Outlook report that is made available for free downloading by Informa Telecoms & Media. The plan was to zero in on any predictions relating specifically to emerging markets and developing countries.


Two months have passed since that rash promise was made and not a peep has been heard from this once prolific blog - no fewer than 147 posts saw were published here in 2009.

Apologies, then, to anyone who has found DevelopingTelecomsWatch to be a useful source of news, commentary and speculation and who now wonders whether the blog has fizzled out of existence. Happily, for anyone that cares, this is not the case. That said, I do not expect to be writing anything like as often in 2010 than was the case last year. My commercial activities are, I am pleased to report, taking up far more time now, suggesting that this year will be more profitable than the one we have left behind us. I do hope that regular readers are facing this first year of a new decade with similar optimism.

Failure to deliver on good intentions notwithstanding, then, perhaps DTW and its writer are not on that proverbial road to hell.

What of our industry and its interests across emerging markets? Hellbound? Or good times ahead?

Belatedly, then, with two months of the new year having already passed, let's attempt to answer those questions by taking a look at a couple of the predictions made by the crystal ball gazers at Informa:

'So-called emerging markets will transition into a new phase of competition based on services and bring into question the validity of the term "emerging market" as it is understood in the telecoms sector today.'

Informa's report notes that "Until now, the term 'emerging market' in the context of the mobile sector has been used as a catch-all phrase to describe markets characterised by low penetration rates, a proliferation of mobile network operators, steep drops in the price of basic communications and resulting explosive mobile subscription growth."

This is familiar territory here at DTW. Numerous times, reference has been made to markets in which the price of mobile services has been squeezed down to a level that makes life very hard for some of the competing cellcos. In July last year, for example, this blog covered the decision of Millicom International Cellular to withdraw from all the Asian markets in which it once did business - Sri Lanka, Laos and Cambodia. The latter country certainly matches the Informa's report's reference to "a proliferation" of MNOs. No fewer than nine (!!) cellcos are currently fighting for business in a country with just 14.8 million inhabitants. Here they all are, with market share figures from Informa's WCIS product:

1. Cellcard (GSM, 42.12% market share - the operator in which Millicom had a stake)
2. Metfone (GSM, 18.86%, owned by Viettel of Vietnam)
3. Mfone (GSM/W-CDMA, 15.52%)
4. Hello (GSM, 13.38%, controlled by Axiata)
5. Star-Cell (GSM, 3.56%, part of the TeliaSonera group)
6. Beeline Cambodia (GSM, 2.90%, owned by Russia's Vimpelcom)
7. qb (W-CDMA, 1.95%)
8. Latelz (GSM, 1.32%)
9. GT-TELL/Excell (CDMA, 0.39%)

Regular readers may have spotted that from time to time I like to share video clips of telecoms operators' TV advertisments from around the world. Latelz (AKA Smart Mobile), as the list above suggests, is one player that may need some pretty compelling advertising if it is to become a more significant player. You decide how powerfully the Smart Mobile case is made by these:





Cambodia is a pretty extreme case, perhaps, but DTW has also examined a number of African markets which seem to be ripe for mobile market consolidation. I daresay there are many more around the world in much the same state.

While I am insinctively in favour of competitive environments which offer value and choice to consumers of mobile services, I do also sympathise when I speak with employees of operators that are struggling to improve shareholder value in the context of dramatically slashed prices. These guys, it sometmes seems to me, can feel as if they are on that proverbial inferno-bound round. If Informa's prediction is on the money, however, perhaps that fiery destination need not be reached this year.

On to the next prediction with an emerging markets/developing countries angle...

'Mobile banking efforts will continue to proliferate in emerging markets, but in the short-term these will be more important as a customer acquisition and retention tool than as a genuine driver of significant new operator revenue streams.'

The efforts made to date in this area got some coverage here last year. In May we noted that giant cellco Bharti Airtel was looking to tap into the big opportunity presented by the fact that 85% of the citizens of its Indian home market do not have bank accounts. By August, readers were invited to consider whether mobile operators would necessarily dominate the market for mobile banking services aimed at turning a profit while going some way to alleviating the poverty of subscribers in developing countries. An alternative that we discussed was the possibility of operator-neutral solutions gaining traction.

The chaps at Informa were have not been alone in keeping discussions of this sort on the agenda for 2010. Indeed, mobile banking in emerging markets got a mention during the plenary session of last month's Mobile World Congress. Simon Rockman of the Register noted, however, with some distaste, "that transforming the lives of millions of people by giving them bank accounts – something that can make the difference between eating and starving - didn't garner the same round of applause" as that received by the GSMA project aimed at making every mobile phone use the same charger."

Writing up his notes from the Congress the following week, Rockman also wondered at some of the number crunching around the scale of the m-banking opportunity. He noted that day four of event saw an assembly of the mobile money working group that has received USD 12.5m from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and is working towards the GSMA's target of getting 20 million of the billion people who have a mobile phone but do not have a bank account onto the first rung of the financial ladder.

Ignacio Mas, writes Rockman, gave a detailed account of what the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation wants to achieve: "They wanted the very poor and insecure to be able to save", targeting people living on less than USD 2 per day. "As much as they have low subsistence incomes", reports Rockman, "the real problem is stability - they might only find work occasionally and have to eke out money until they next find work. Or if they are farmers they get paid seasonally at harvest time."

Without access to banks, continues Rockman, such people are very vulnerable: "They will often give the money to people they trust for safekeeping but these are people in a similar situation to themselves. Lack of stability means people get multiple jobs. They can't concentrate on what will get the best return and pull themselves out of poverty because they have to opt for stability."

This, and other challenges, blight the lives of so many people around the world that it does seem reasonable to suppose that a huge opportunity does exist for the telecoms industry to provide what the retail banking sector cannot in underdeveloped countries.

Well, I enjoyed finally finding the time to write something here after such a long hiatus - but will refrain from making rash promises about when the next article will appear. More soon, I hope, though.

The road to hell...

Cambodia's mobile price war: peace in sight?

Beeline Cambodia: late entrant doing battle in a fierce tariffs war

DevelopingTelecomsWatch depends on the indispensable Phnom Penh Post for news of all things Cambodian, quoting that organ quite liberally, for example, when donning a flak jacket to report on the mobile price war which has been gripping the southeast Asian country for months.

It was also via that esteemed news outlet that DTW learned this week that the Cambodian Government has tired of waiting for the country's numerous cellcos to end to their damaging tariffs battle. A long-awaited edict setting minimum tariffs was signed by the Government last Friday, telecoms Minister So Khun is quoted as saying.

"We offered free-market principles, but operators kept having conflicts with one another, so the government needs to have a hand in it," So Khun said. The government will suspend the licence of any operators that violate the minimum tariff set by the edict, he added.

The Cambodian mobile market is currently contested by no less than nine MNOs. If there is another country with a population under 15 million whose cellular sector is split so many ways, it does not spring immediately to mind. Of that crowd of cellcos, one, so far, has reacted positively to the imposition of a minimum tariff regime. The Phnom Penh Post quotes Simon Perkins, CEO of Axiata-controlled Hello, who says he supports the initiative "to bring some structure to the telecom tariffs, in the absence of the usual competition guidelines and rules that exist in a lot of markets".

This decision, of course, comes too late for Millicom International Cellular, which announced in July that its three Asian operations (in Sri Lanka and Laos as well as in Cambodia) were to be reclassified as assets held for sale. The Luxembourg-headquartered mobile group cited problems around ongoing profitability in these Asian markets as a key reason for selling up and focusing its efforts on its African and Latin American properties. As DTW reported in the summer, Millicom CEO Mikael Grahne appeared to attribute much of the blame for deteriorating profits at Cellcard, the Cambodian cellco in which Millicom has a 58.4% stake, to the disruptive market-entry strategies of latecomers to the country's mobile arena. The same DTW piece, however, noted that another major shareholder in Cellcard does not agree with Millicom's assertion that this is negatively impacting profitability: "[There are] no concerns on profitability from our side," said Mark Hanna, CFO of Royal Group, which owns a 38.5% stake in the cellco, denying in July that margins had become tighter.

Such was the confidence of the Royal Group in this assertion that the local Cambodian conglomerate agreed to acquire Millicom's stake in Cellcard. This confidence also seems to be shared now by the Royal Group's bankers. According to a Bloomberg article earlier this month, Royal Group has hired Standard Bank Group Ltd. and Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. to arrange an 18-month bridging loan to help with the purchase of Millicom's share of the MNO.

The appetite of the Cambodian authorities for intervention in the mobile market does not end with tariff control.

Again, we are indebted to the Phnom Penh Post, this time for coverage of a debate around mobile network sharing in Cambodia.

Last month, the newspaper carried news of Minister So Khun calling for the country's MNOs to share infrastructure. So Khun said the initiative would avoid duplication of infrastructure, thereby reducing costs across the sector, as well as moderating the effect that mobile base stations are having on their surroundings.

"We do not want to see too many antennas dotted along roads in the future," said the Minister. Perhaps it would be too sarcastic to respond by asking "So why did you license nine mobile operators in a country of that size?"

Given that some of these nine are well-established players feeling the effects of the later entry of certain rivals, it seems reasonable to suggest that the response to any mandatory network infrastructure sharing might be rather mixed. As the Phnom Penh Post points out, the operators with an established presence in the market have spent many millions of dollars on infrastructure as part of their efforts to gain competitive advantage.

The Government has shared a draft of a proposed telecoms law one of whose provisions would be to make infrastructure sharing obligatory. The private sector response has been to agree that while there do exist benefits around cost reduction and environmental impact, market forces in Cambodia have not been given sufficient time to work.

"Mandatory facilities sharing will reduce the incentive on operators to build such infrastructure," said these recommendations. "This may result in less than the optimal number of towers being constructed such that when the operators commence infilling their networks to improve coverage and provide better service, they are unable to do so as all tower capacity has been filled."

DevelopingTelecomsWatch finds the mobile market of this particular Asian country to be fascinating. We'll keep watching.

Cambodia's mobile price war: peace in sight?

Sri Lankan mobile market: one way or another, consolidation looks likely

Sri Lankans queue to get their hands on Airtel 's low price offers earlier this year

When Bharti Airtel's Sri Lanka operation Airtel Lanka launched its cut price services in January this year, the new cellco became the fifth operator competing for a share of the country's mobile market. The number of mobile service providers in the island nation, however, may soon be set to fall back to four. This will depend, though, on which party comes forward to snap up one operator currently sporting a 'for sale' sign.

Up for grabs is Tigo Sri Lanka, one of the Asian operations that Millicom International Cellular is keen to sell. When this blog first commented on Millicom's planned withdrawal the three Asian markets in which it has done business, Axiata (formerly Telekom Malaysia International) was mentioned as a possible purchaser of two of these operations - Tigo Sri Lanka and Cambodia's Cellcard. In both cases this would lead to market consolidation - in Sri Lanka, Axiata has a controlling stake in market-leading cellco Dialog Telekom; Cambodian MNO Hello is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Malaysian group. As discussed in the most recent DTW article, however, it was another existing shareholder in the Cambodian cellco (the Royal Group) which eventually relieved Millicom of its stake in Cellcard. Given that other organisations have been more recently and more regularly touted as potential purchasers of Tigo Sri Lanka, Malaysia's Axiata also seems to be out of the running with regard to that opportunity.

One potential suitor mentioned very recently is state-owned Indian operator BSNL, whose management committee approved a proposal to submit a bid to acquire the Sri Lankan operator company last week, according to Manoj Gairola of the Hindustan Times.

The public sector telco seems to have attracted considerable criticism of late, some of which has been reported here. Quite striking was the August 12th article written by Kunal Kumar Kundu, who feels that BSNL is crippled by political interference, poor demand forecasting, lack of effective budgetary control and a bloated payroll. This blog has also reported the very modest take-up of BSNL's wireless broadband offerings and negative feedback about the company's preferred franchisee business model for the development of both 3G mobile and WiMAX services. Almost as often, however, the state-owned operator has been linked here with possible overseas investments. Perhaps the competitive pressure from India's numerous private sector mobile players is felt so keenly by BSNL's management that foreign opportunities are seen as a much better bet in terms of realistic growth opportunities. This may explain the fact that in the few months since the inception of this blog, the Indian operator has been mentioned in connection with a stake in pan-MEA mobile group Zain and with a new telecoms licence in Tunisia. BSNL's interest in Tigo Sri Lanka, then, is perhaps not very surprising.

Also connected in media reports with the sale of Tigo Sri Lanka is the UAE's Etisalat, which in August was reported to be considering an investment in the country now that the long civil war seems to have finally reached a conclusion. Priyantha Kariyapperuma, Director General of Sri Lanka's telecoms regulator, reportedly met with a visiting official from Etisalat last month and told journalists that "with the war over in May, there is ample scope for investments into telecom services and infrastructure facilities, especially in the north and east," referring to the area of the island that was most affected by the conflict. Few of the reports on Etisalat's possible interest in Sri Lanka have stated explicitly that the UAE company's route into the country's market would be via the acquisition of the Tigo-branded MNO. All of these reports, however, mention the availability of Millicom's Sri Lankan operation, so perhaps it's not unreasonable to infer that the Emirati company might have had Tigo Sri Lanka in its sights.

The most recent name floated in connection with the opportunity, however, is one from India rather than from the Middle East. As with an Axiata purchase, this move would also lead to market consolidation - because the company concerned is Bharti Airtel, already present in the Sri Lanka market since January, as we noted at the top of this article.

It seems, then, that the management of the giant Indian telecoms firm is not completely absorbed by the ongoing negotiations about the proposed mega-merger with South Africa's MTN. That saga has been notable for the repeatedly-extended deadline for concluding the talks and for various parties weighing in with opinions about the desirability of the mooted deal. One recently expressed opion comes from South Africa's Communications Minister, Siphiwe Nyanda, who voiced caution over the proposed tie-up in an interview yesterday. The Minister told the Sunday Times that any deal should take into account that MTN was a "South African company with a footprint in Africa." I take this to mean that there exists concern over MTN potentially losing its identity as a telecoms group with its roots - and the bulk of its business - in Africa. The Minister's comments are certainly of relevance given that South Africa's Government-owned Public Investment Corporation holds a 21% stake in MTN.

Bharti Airtel's interest in Tigo Sri Lanka came to my attention earlier this week, when R. Jai Krishna of the Wall Street Journal reported comments from an unnamed person close to the development. Suggesting that any deal would be worth USD 100-120 million, the mystery source said "in Sri Lanka, if you need to be a significant player in the market, you need to do an acquisition... greenfield, you will not be successful," by way of explaining the rationale behind Bharti Airtel's rumoured move.

A strengthened presence in Sri Lanka on the part of the Indian cellco could be welcomed by consumers - certainly if the company continues to compete aggressively on price, a strategy that has yielded impressive subscriber growth. Since going to market in January, the new entrant had 900,000 subs by the end of June, according to WCIS market intelligence. Another Informa Telecoms & Media service, Global Mobile Daily, reported in late July that Airtel Lanka claimed to have reached the one million subs mark.

The Bharti-owned cellco, however, has seen some of its competitors crying foul over its tariffs. Late last month, for example, Duruthu Edirimuni Chandrasekera of Sri Lanka's Sunday Times, reported that some operators have threatened to cut their interconnection with Airtel Lanka to retaliate for the the Indian-owned company failling to withdraw tariffs not approved by the country's telecoms regulator.

This sounds oddly familiar - the most recent article here covered a very similar wrangle over tariffs and interconnect agreements in Cambodia. Competition in Asia's mobile markets, then, certainly seems to be brutally fierce right now. Again I find myself voicing the view that there may well be casualties when the going gets this tough.

What price on mobile market consolidation in Sri Lanka then?

Sri Lankan mobile market: one way or another, consolidation looks likely

Big trouble in Indochina

Cambodia's mobile operators are in for some serious wrangling and the country's consumers are in for some serious savings - for now, at least.

A week ago, courtesy of Cellular News, I learned that the southeast Asian country's cellcos have been at odds, with one MNO accusing another of offering loss-leading tariffs. The alleged offender is Sotelco, which is backed by Vimpelcom and which operates under the same Beeline brand familiar to mobile users in the CIS markets of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia and Armenia. Making the accusations, according to a TeleGeography article on the same story, is Mark Hanna, CFO of the Royal Group, a Cambodian investment and development company whose assets include a stake in Cellcard, the mobile operator whose large share of the country's cellular market (currently 48.41% according to WCIS) has been steadily eroded by newer entrants over the last couple of years.

The Cambodian mobile market is something of a paradox. One on hand we have boosters such as the Royal Group proclaiming that Cambodia has "a booming economy, second in Asia only to China in double-digit GDP growth" and that it "enjoys a stable political situation, together with the most welcoming and liberal business, investment and trade environment in ASEAN." All of this sounds very attractive. On the other hand, Millicom International Cellular, which owns a majority stake in Cellcard, has opted to quit the Cambodian market, having found the level of competition to be excessive in the country's very crowded mobile sector.

Having written back in July about Millicom's decision to exit this and other Asian markets (also Laos and Sri Lanka), the last I heard was that the company has agreed to sell its stake in Cellcard to the Royal Group. Interest in Millicom's Sri Lankan operation, meanwhile, has been expressed by Indian state owned telco BSNL, which, along with fellow public sector operator MTNL, is also said to be mulling over a 46% stake in pan-MEA giant Zain (of which more here later, no doubt).

Certainly, the intensely competitive battle between Cambodia's nine (!!!) cellcos does seem to be cited as the reason for operators' sliding revenues in the country. One example of this, as reported by Steve Finch of the Phnom Penh Post reported late last month, comes from Axiata-backed Hello. While the Malaysian parent company recorded a 44% rise in net profit overall for Q2 2009, its Cambodia operation suffered from a "challenging" business environment, a recent statement said. According to Axiata, "major operators are facing intense competition on pricing, and new operators are offering free SIM cards and free minutes to capture market share." This has affected Hello to the tune of a 17.4% slide in 2Q 2009 revenues.

While Vimpelcom's operation is just the latest disruptive new entrant, this blog has discussed similar tactics on the part of another latecomer, Metfone, a subsidiary of Viettel, an operator from neighbouring Vietnam. Since its launch late last year, the Vietnamese-backed cellco has carved out an impressive 11.66% share of the Cambodian mobile subs market according to WCIS. Last time I covered this, it was stated that Metfone's market share was 17.47% - so I think the good people at WCIS have revised some of their June 2009 figures for Cambodia, doubtless in line with more recently received market intelligence. The lower figure, though, is still very solid. So I stand by the remark I made back in July about there probably not being many precedents worldwide for an operator making such a strong impact so quickly in such an already-congested market.

As discussed here before, Metfone has rapidly built a customer base through the distribution of free SIM cards and airtime, as bemoned by the good folks at Axiata. Further, and as I discussed in a March article on the links between telcos in countries with left-of-centre government and/or centrally planned economies, Viettel Deputy General Director Nguyen Manh Hung has been quoted as saying that Metfone intends to extend services to Cambodia's lower income groups and thereby "contribute to society." I have taken this to mean that the Vietnamese company, with its roots in the military establishment of a socialist republic, is free to interpret the profit motive rather differently than those of us who are compelled to think of shareholder value when we go to work every day.

I don't know if Metfone's very aggressive pricing is now a thing of the past - but it is Beeline Cambodia's actions that have been making the headlines of late and arousing the ire of the Royal Group.

Last Wednesday, the Phnom Penh Post reported that the Vimpelcom-backed operator had been accused of reneging on a promise to avoid selling services "below the cost of connecting across networks". It seems that while Beeline has ceased to make its controvesial 'Boom' tariff plan available only to new subscribers. The Royal Group's Mark Hanna contends that this violates the agreement Beeline struck with the country's regulator. Beeline Cambodia General Director Gael Campan is unrepentant. The operator sent text messages to all users already signed up for the 'Boom' tariff that the rate would remain "forever". Campan has also argued that it is not selling below cost, and that its pricing policy is little different from a supermarket selling most products for a profit with a number of promotions added to entice customers and build loyalty.

Application forms for Beeline’s Boom tariff. Photo: Sovan Philong, Phnom Penh Post

Campan has made accusations of this own, claiming that Cellcard has limited interconnection between the two networks throughout the heated dispute.

Despite the continuing disagreement, stated last Wednesday's Phnom Penh Post article, Campan has neither threatened legal action nor received word of Cellcard planning a lawsuit. Both sides, however, continues the article, have made claims of legal infringement. While Beeline has accused Cellcard of violating an interconnection contract, interconnection standards and therefore Cambodian regulations by blocking its network, Cellcard accuses Beeline of illegally using its rival's prefixes to get around interconnectivity issues. Hanna said Beeline had "violated national security and the ITU guidelines on the use of mobile prefixes".

Undeterred by criticism from rivals, Beeline Cambodia announced this week that the über-cheap 'Boom' tariff is to be followed with another very aggressive offering. Ith Sothoeuth of the ever-indispensable Phnom Penh Post writes that customers will only be charged for the first minute of any calls they make of up to 15 minutes' duration within the Beeline network. Under the "Super Zero" plan, the per-minute charge will kick in again after 15 minutes, while calls across networks will be charged at USD 0.06 per minute, compared with USD 0.05 per minute at all times on all networks on the controversial "Boom" plan, Beeline Commercial Director Benoin Janin told a press conference last Friday. "Super Zero" SIM cards will cost just USD 0.50 under a promotion running until December 31, though the Super Zero tariff will continue for already-qualified users indefinitely, or until the company changes its pricing policy, reports Sothoeuth.

Beeline's Campan, writes Sothoeuth, also said on Friday that he hopes to resolve the dispute with Cellcard and added that the connectivity issue would not help the Royal Group-controlled MNO in the long run. "It is a very fragmented market right now, and nobody has the majority of subscribers," he said. Cellcard, he continued "is not the biggest part of the market; the majority of subscribers are with the other operators. We want to work with them as much as possible, and if [they do] not want to give their subscribers access to Beeline customers, it's their problem, not ours." Tough talk - although, as we have seen from the WCIS numbers, it's only just about true that Cellcard does not own a majority of subs.

Following earlier musings here about Metfone's pricing and its effects on market value in Cambodia, this latest wrangle strengthens my feeling that the country's mobile scene is surely bound to see some degree of consolidation soon. Observing from an admittedly long distance, I'm inclined to think a competitive war of attrition cannot continue unchecked for very much longer. I wonder what prices Cambodia's mobile users will be paying when the number of service providers shrinks.

Big trouble in Indochina

Millicom's withdrawal from Asia to prompt (much-needed?) market consolidations?

Russia's Beeline brand comes to Cambodia - and set to drive consolidation in the wake of Millicom's withdrawl? Picture (C) Roger Barlow.

Millicom International Cellular, the Luxembourg-based company which provides cellular telephony services to more than 30 million customers in across Latin America, Africa and Asia recently announced that its assets in the latter of these three regions are up for sale. The company's announcement mentioned that during Q1 2009, these Asian operations and joint ventures generated UDS 68 million in revenues and USD 4 million net profit for the group.

Even more recently - on Tuesday last week - the company announced its 2Q 2009 results, encouraging highlights of which were:

• mobile subscribers up 25% vs. 2Q 2008 - bringing total subscribers up to 30.8 million
• reported revenues up 5% to USD 814 million (2Q 2008: USD 774 million)
• EBIDTA up 14% to USD 371 million (2Q 2008: USD 326 million) - this beat the USD 361 million forecast in a Reuters poll of twelve analysts
• EBIDTA margin of 45.6% (+340 basis points vs. 2Q 2008)
  

These results excluded "discontinued operations" - this means Tigo Sierra Leone and the three Asian operators. This, then, certainly leaves little doubt that the group is committed to its exit from Asia. The three Asian operations concerned are in Cambodia, Laos and Sri Lanka.

Why is Millicom looking to get out of these markets? Zacks Investment Research offers the following explanation: "The major concerns in these markets for Millicom are increased competition and an extremely tight credit market." According to Zacks, the Asian region contributed just 8% of the company’s total revenue and its EBITDA contribution was even lower at 6% of the total. The Zacks commentary also notes that overall ARPU in Asia was just USD 6.2 in the first quarter of 2009, compared to USD 6.6 in the previous quarter and "a massive" USD 8.7 in 1Q 2008.

According to Millicom CEO Mikael Grahne, increased competition certainly does seem to have affected the profitability of Cellcard, the Cambodian cellco in which Millicom has a 58.4% stake. Steve Finch, writing on Friday in the Phnom Penh Post, observed that Millicom's Grahne appears very critical of the "disruptive market-entry strategies" of new entrants into Cambodia's increasingly crowded mobile sector. On the other hand, Finch also observes that another major shareholder in Cellcard does not agree with Millicom's assertion that this is negatively impacting profitability: "[There are] no concerns on profitability from our side," said Mark Hanna, CFO of Royal Group, which owns a 38.5% stake in the cellco, denying that margins had become tighter. As well as investments in property development and the media sector, Royal Group is very active in Cambodia's telecoms sector. In addition to its stake in Cellcard, the group has shares in Royal Telecam International (the second licenced international gateway in the Kingdom; also a joint venture with Millicom) and teleSurf, a broadband service provider.

Whichever side of this argument is the more valid, it seems undeniable to me that Cambodia is currently supporting an incredibly large number of cellcos. Millicom-backed Cellcard, which is by some margin the market leader (43.65% of subs according to WCIS) is one of three well-established players, the others being Hello (an Axiata company with 13.28% of subs) and Mfone (19.84% of subs). From 2007 onwards, a number of further entrants have piled into the market. The most recent of these is Beeline Cambodia, owned by Vimpelcom, one of Russia's big three cellcos. The arrival of this new operator, whose services were launched very recently and whose subs are not yet recorded by WCIS, brings the grand total to nine MNOs vying for business in a country of just 14.2 million people.

To me, this feels like a vastly excessive number, particularly in light of the fact that mobile market consolidation has been a recurrent theme here at DevelopingTelecomsWatch this year - we've discussed whether even a relatively large African market such as Tanzania can possibly sustain the numbers of licensed mobile operators currently competing there - and have asked the same question about much smaller markets such as Burundi and Gabon. Moreover, we have discussed this issue in broader terms, i.e. whether/when we should expect a wave of market consolidations across Africa, prompted to do so by the stated belief of MTN CEO Phuthuma Nhleko that this is set to happen.

Mobile penetration in Cambodia currently stands at 34.41%, according to WCIS. So there is room for growth. How many of this large number of cellcos, though, will be equipped to take full advantage of that opportunity? I suppose that will partly depend on their resources and the quality of their management teams - but even very solid companies could struggle if there is any truth in the Millicom allegation about the effects of new players' disruptive market entry strategies. As Steve Finch of the Phnom Penh Post explained, these strategies involve the distribution of free SIM cards and airtime - very nice for quickly building a subscriber base, but taken to its logical conclusion this can seriously erode overall market value for all players.

Has this kind of strategy worked for any of the new players in terms of rapidly building market share? The answer seems to be a resounding 'yes' in the case of one particular new entrant, Metfone, which is the Cambodian subsidiary of Vietnamese MNO Viettel. According to WCIS, Metfone has quickly carved out an incredible 17.47% of the market since its launch late last year. The current WCIS estimate for Metfone subsriber numbers is 900,000. There may be precedents elsewhere in the world for an operator arriving in an already fragmented market and amassing subscribers at something like that rate - but none spring immediately to mind for me.

How is Viettel able to do this? The answer might be that the company is simply not working to the same commercial logic as its rivals in the Cambodian mobile market. Viettel itself is owned by the army of Vietnam, a state officially committed to the creed of socialism and where all organs of government are controlled by the country's Communist Party. In a March essay here on the global links between the telecoms organisations of countries with left-leaning regimes, Metfone got a mention. That piece referenced a Saigon Times article on Viettel's foray into neighbouring Cambodia, which indicated that the new cellco would target low-income subscribers with a wide range of low-priced services and packages. Viettel Deputy General Director Nguyen Manh Hung was quoted as saying that this approach is not only about customer acquisition but is also intended to "contribute to society". Perhaps we should take that to imply a quite different interpretation of the for-profit motive than the one most of us in market economies have to live with in our jobs and lives.

Have any of Metfone's fellow recent market entrants been able to build a subscriber base at anything like the same speed? There answer here appears to be a resounding 'no'.

In terms of market share and subs, the other newcomers have fared as follows:

• Star-Cell (GSM) - 3.27%, 168,400 subs; part of the TeliaSonera group; commercial launch in 2007
• qb (W-CDMA) - 1.20%, 62,000 subs; commercial launch in 2008
• Latelz (GSM) -0.97% 50,000 subs; launched in 2009; owned by Time Turns Telecom, which is also an investor in telecoms operators in Burundi, Tanzania, Nepal and Sierra Leone
• Excell (CDMA) - 0.31%, 16,000 subs; launched in 2009
  

In September last year, Morten Eriksen, the CEO of the second operator in the above list was interviewed by AsiaLife Guide Phnom Penh, a monthly lifestyle magazine for expatriates living in Cambodia. Eriksen, who also explained that qb is funded by international venture capitalists and local Cambodian partners, expressed the belief that there is a good opportunity created by the country's very limited fixed line telecom infrastructure and the eagerness of its people of "to experience new technologies." He also asserted that rather than focusing on competing, the company is focusing on the people of Cambodia and how it can provide the best benefit to them. Specifically, Eriksen expressed his company's commitment to serving the youth segment with "packages and services to help students in the pursuit of education as they are Cambodia’s future." In an earlier interview - with the Bangkok Post in June 2008 - Eriksen reported that when he was first invited to get involved a 3G project in Cambodia, his initial reaction was that "they must be crazy". He explained that only after reluctantly travelling to Cambodia did he see the potential in a market with three incumbents providing bad, expensive service and where a 256Kbps ADSL line cost over USD 600 a month. The article indicates that the project formally started in 2004, with the company getting a licence in 2006 and then signing a turnkey network agreement with Ericsson in June 2007. Groundwork started in October 2007 and the first test call was made a month later. Finally on March 15 2008, qb was launched "with over 57,000 subscribers signing up on launch day courtesy of a huge concert and free SIM packages."

If that figure of 57,000 initial subs is accurate (and WCIS does reflect this), then further growth has certainly been very slow indeed.

Of the late entrant mobile operators, it would seem, then, that only Viettel's Metfone operation has really made a major impact on the Cambodian market.

So, if Millicom, as market leader, is going to withdraw from this market, which telecoms groups have looked at this seemingly very challenging competitive environment and expressed an interest in acquiring Cellcard? Two names which have surfaced in recent weeks are ones already competing in Cambodia. Consolidation, then, would appear to be on the cards already, even ahead of any of the smaller players potentially having to withdraw.

The first interested party, according to a TeleGeography article earlier this month, is Axiata, the Malaysian-owned mobile group formerly known as TM International. Axiata is said to be considering offering a total of USD 700 million for both Cellcard of Cambodia and Millicom's Sri Lankan operation. Were this bid to be made and accepted, Sri Lanka would also see market consolidation - Axiata owns the island's market-leading cellco Dialog Telekom. According to the TeleGeography article, Axiata has declined to confirm or deny the talks, but said "in-country consolidation is of strategic importance in some of our markets." This does seem to be something of a trend in Asia - and for Axiata - of late. Cellular News reported last month that Aktel, the Axiata/NTT DoCoMo joint venture in Bangladesh is rumoured to be in merger talks with rival Banglalink, which is owned by Egypt's Orascom Telecom. Banglalink CEO Ahmed Abou Doma explained in a statement that apart from the market leader (Grameenphone), "others are continually posting losses" and that "in order to sustain in this fiercely competitive market, and in line with [Orascom's] growth ambitions", his company is "considering many strategies of which consolidation is an option."

In Cambodia, the other potential bidder for Millicom's Cellcard operation seems to be Russia's Vimpelcom. Again, this is another existing competitor, albeit one whose Cambodian launch was very recent. According to a Reuters report earlier this month, Vimpelcom spokeswoman Yelena Prokrova was conceded that potentially the Asian assets of Millicom could be interesting for for the Russian telco because they are located in the region which the company views as strategic in its international expansion. The report notes that Vimpelcom would also be interested in Millicom's operation in Laos.

My sense is that, as we have seen here, Cambodia is one of a number of Asian markets in which mobile sector consolidation seems very likely. I am wary of the notion that low penetration rates alone mean that any given emerging market or developing country offers telecoms groups a licence to print easy money. The low ARPU inherent in serving relatively poor people and the challenges of rolling out infrastructure to under-developed regions, often in challenging physical environments, can make for unattractively thin margins. If destructive levels of price competition are thrown into the mix, it surely becomes difficult for large numbers of competing operators to survive in all but the largest markets. The withdrawal of Millicom International Cellualar from Asia, then, may stimulate much-needed market consolidations in at least two of its three existing Asian territories. Rumours from Bangladesh also suggest that similar developments may be in the offing elsewhere across the continent.

Millicom's withdrawal from Asia to prompt (much-needed?) market consolidations?