Unsurprising news of the week

India's Communications & IT Minister: summoned to explain falling revenues at BSNL

To my mind, the least surprising news item so far this week comes from Mansi Taneja of India's Business Standard, who reports that state-owned Indian state-owned telco BSNL is likely to exit a consortium that has been aiming to acquire a 46% in pan-MEA mobile group Zain. According to Taneja, MTNL, the other public sector operator party to the consortium, is also likely to exit since it had agreed to follow BSNL’s lead in the deal.

DevelopingTelecomsWatch has no axe to grind with regard to these two telecoms enterprises, but it won't have escaped the notice of regular readers that this blog has observed some pretty strong criticisms of their performance in their domestic market, most notably in an article written in August.

It was partly with these criticisms in mind that DTW was unsurprised when Etisalat rather than BSNL prevailed in the scramble to acquire the Sri Lankan mobile operator previously owned by Millicom International Cellular. It would, then, cause raised eyebrows at DTW HQ were MTNL to win what looks to be a hotly contested scramble to buy a controlling interested in Zambia's soon-to-be-privatised incumbent fixed line operator, Zamtel. As a recent Cellular News item points out, the list of other interested parties contains some formidable names including Orascom Telecom, Telkom of South Africa and Russia's pan-CIS cellco Vimpelcom, which has recently expanded its footprint into Southeast Asia.

Lest anyone feel that this blog returning quite regularly to the troubles of India's two major state-owned telecoms enterprises is somehow unwarranted, it is worth noting that concern about their prospects has been expressed in the highest circles in the south Asian country. Monday's Economic Times, for example, reported that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is likely to meet the BSNL's management along with Communications and IT Minister A. Raja to look into the causes of the company's falling revenues and to find ways to improve its performance.

According to the Economic Times, BSNL says the loss in net profit and revenue is due to huge wage costs and customers deciding to terminate their fixed line subscriptions. The article states that the company has been struggling with the problem of landlines being surrendered for years now, due to a combination of the increasing popularity of mobile phone and its own service levels falling below customer expectations. In the past three years, the article reports, 6.3 million landline connections have been terminated.

This blog has also documented the company's struggles to capitalise on first-mover advantage in the 3G mobile services space or to take make much of a similar head start with WiMAX broadband services.

In light of all this, DTW remains wary of any claims that BSNL makes about ambitions to grow its business into unfamiliar overseas territories.

Unsurprising news of the week

Canada's 'thirdworldish' policies to stifle wireless competition?

Naguib Sawiris: planning to shake up Canada's wireless market

DTW’s recent article on international ambitions of India’s two major state-owned telecoms operators mentioned that one opportunity they are considering is the acquisition of a controlling stake in Zamtel, the incumbent fixed-line operator in Zambia. It remains to be seen if this joint bid from BSNL and MTNL will succeed and it does look as though some formidable players are also interested.

According to a recent Cellular News article, other interested parties include Telecel Globe (a subsidiary of Orascom Telecom), Telkom (South Africa’s incumbent fixed-line operator) and Russia’s increasingly expansionist Vimpelcom, all of which, the article states, officially began due diligence this week.

Interest in Zamtel is by no means the biggest recent news item about Orascom Telecom and might well have escaped the notice of North American readers whose attention has probably been drawn more readily to the challenges the Egyptian firm is facing in Canada.

Globalive Communications Corp. of Toronto was established in 1998, since which time it has offered competitive long distance plans. Ten years later, the company successfully made a purchase in Industry Canada's radio spectum auction, which paved the way for the creation of a challenger - Globalive Wireless - for the country's established mobile operators, including Telus Mobility, Rogers Wireless and Bell Mobility. The joint efforts of these three major carriers and regional players such as SaskTel have failed to drive national mobile penetration beyond 66.65% according to WCIS. This seems very low for a G8 country that ranks among the world's top ten trading nations. In an interview for Huawei's Communicate magazine earlier this year, Bell Mobility CTO Stephen Howe attributed this state of affairs to three factors: the relatively late licensing of digital wireless spectrum in Canada; Canada' s huge geographical area; the country's robust and unlimited-usage wireline networks.

Globalive Wireless, backed by Orascom Telecom and which had earlier this year announced its intention to launch services under the Wind brand familiar in Italy and Greece, has been led by CEO Ken Cambpell since October 2008. Cambell, whose former roles include a stint running the BITĖ Group, the Vodafone partner network in Lithuania and Latvia, would take issue with Stephen Howe's explanation for Canada's status as a wireless industry laggard. Speaking with Michael Bettiol of Boy Genius Report last month, Campbell lays the blame squarely with the country's wireless carriers:

"Here we’ve got a situation where we pay twice as much as they do in the US, our minutes of use are half of what they are in the US, and wireless penetration is at 65%. Clearly it is a market that is under-developed and where customers simply overpay. The other thing is that in Canada our customer saturation numbers are extremely low. We’ve got a very disenfranchised and very frustrated customer base that is really ripe and in need of competition. The other thing you should know is that this country is dominated by three carriers, but if you look regionally, it is typically two carriers that dominate regional markets. Canada is effectively an oligopoly and in many regions pretty much a duopoly. There is definitely an opportunity with consumers and the numbers speak for themselves."

If, as Michael Bettiol contests, Canadians have "long craved for a new wireless carrier to bust onto the scene and break up what is often described as the anti-competitive practices of [the] incumbents", there must surely be much excitement in the country about the market debut of Wind.

For now, however, any excitement must be deferred a while. Globalive Communications has been in a state of limbo since late last month, when the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ruled that the company is effectively under the control of its Egyptian-based financial backer (Orascom Telecom) and is therefore in breach of rules on foreign ownership and control.

Terence Corcoran of the National Post despairs of the resulting "wireless mess":

"Globalive Wireless has just pumped more than half a billion dollars into the Canadian economy. That includes paying Ottawa $442-million last year for the right to new wireless spectrum, cash now already spent by the federal government stimulating road work in Saskatchewan and writing giant cheques to constituents in Nova Scotia," writes Corcoran, who also notes that "Globalive has also invested another hundred million or more preparing a new Canadian wireless network".

"Having taken Globalive's money", Corcoran continues, "Canada is now telling the company the deal is off."

Corcoran argues that the large spectrum auction fees collected by the Canadian Government would have been far more modest had the participation of Orascom Telecom supremo Naguib Sawiris not been authorised in the first place. Corcoran says that Sawiris has every right to feel mightily aggrieved:

"Whether or not it's possible to sue Ottawa over this thirdworldish policy switch and bureaucratic camel-trading, complete with secret meetings and rule-bending approval processes, it certainly looks like Globalive and its owner, Mr. Sawiris, have a case of some kind, politically and morally, if not legally. Ottawa led Globalive into bidding for spectrum and a major role in the Canadian wireless market, and then it pulled the carpet out from under the company.

This wrangle is a fascinating one for me. In the course of my work, I have spent considerable time networking with telecoms executives from Europe, North America and the Middle East who make their living running operations in less developed countries. I have lost count of the number of times I've heard (doubtless justified) complaints about the complexities and pitfalls of doing business in such markets - regulatory agencies that can be erratic and less than even-handed; taxation policies which stifle growth and innovation; foreign ownership rules which can prove limiting. It is with interest, then, that I read of a company rooted in Egypt encountering in Canada some of the problems I usually hear attributed to much less affluent and developed societies.

Canada's 'thirdworldish' policies to stifle wireless competition?

Knocked back in Sri Lanka, India's state sector telcos continue to eye international expansion opportunities

BSNL: global ambitions?

DevelopingTelecomsWatch has followed, with some interest, suggestions that India's two major state sector telecoms operators - BSNL and MTNL - might be aiming to become international players.

In September, this blog went on a meandering tour of emerging markets M&A rumours, during which it was mentioned that BSNL's bid for Millicom International Cellular's Sri Lankan MNO had been unsuccessful. Tigo Sri Lanka, as reported more recently here, was eventually acquired by Etisalat of the UAE, in a move which prompted some analysts to express fear for the profitability of the island nation's other mobile operators. These commentators have noted that Etisalat tends to compete fiercely on price when coming late to a cellular market.

In the same September M&A tour, DTW also quoted industry watchers who were warning both BSNL and MTNL to steer clear of reported attempts to acquire a stake in Kuwaiti-owned pan-MEA mobile group Zain. A Mint article by Shauvik Ghosh was referenced, in which an anonymous analyst said that BSNL would be advised not to purchase a stake in Zain. "BSNL has a lot of cash on its books but it lacks the ability to execute," said the mystery man. Not shy of the odd split infinitive, the unknown analyst said "Africa is not a market for an operator to just add some revenue to its balance sheet. They have to first show that they can execute in India with the opportunities already in front of them like broadband and 3G before they can venture into bigger game like Zain." A previous DTW article discussed at some length the view that the two public sector telcos have perhaps not yet demonstrated that ability to "execute in India" to anything like a satisfactory degree.

There is evidence, though, from as recently as mid-October, that BSNL and MTNL have not been deterred by such criticism and that the two companies continues to investigate both the Zain opportunity and other potential foreign adventures.

Writing on 15th October, Mansi Taneja of the Business Standard reports that a consortium led by Delhi-based Vavasi Group is in discussions with both BSNL MTNL for a majority stake in a special purpose vehicle that is being formed for a bid for Zain.

Taneja quotes "a top source close to the consortium" who has said: "Our talks with BSNL and MTNL are on track, but we don’t have any exclusivity contract with them. We are also holding informal discussions with other telecom companies, including China Mobile, in case talks with BSNL and MTNL do not fructify."

(note to self: attempt to use the word 'fructify' in conversation this week)

Is it unfair on the two Indian operators to venture the suggestion that the giant Chinese cellco might be a far more powerful player to have involved in an audacious bid to acquire operations and subscribers across Africa and the Middle East? Way back in 2002, the Chinese operator stole Vodafone's crown as the world's leading mobile operator in terms of subscriber numbers. Vodafone was subsequently seen to stake out its credentials as the world's largest cellco by revenues. Finally, in September this year, this accolade was also swiped by China Mobile.

If the Vavasi Group does turn out to be more impressed by the credential of the world's most gigantically-huge-mobile-operator-by-every-measurement-ever than by what BSNL and MTNL can bring to a bid for Zain, where else might the two Indian operators look for overseas growth opportunities?

One possibility, again aired by the indispensable Business Standard, is a much more modest foray into Africa, namely the acquisition of a majority stake in Zamtel, the state-owned incumbent telco of Zambia, which competes in the mobile space and is the monopoly fixed-line operator. On 15th September, the Government of the landlocked southern African country announced its intention to part-privatise the telco through the sale of up to 75% of the company’s equity. Industry watchers Buddecomm, in their Zambia profile, describe the country's wireline infrastructure as "at a very low level of development, which in turn has impeded growth in the Internet sector." Zamtel's monopoly in this space is set to be threatened, continues the Buddecomm profile, which notes that "the country’s ISPs are rolling out wireless broadband networks, which will also position them as competitors in the telecoms sector once VoIP is fully liberalised", something which is meant to be "a key component in Zambia's new ICT Policy."

The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) makes a more upbeat assessment of the Zamtel fixed network, claiming that it connects all major population centres and is undergoing a substantial upgrade, with over 80% of switching infrastructure now digital, and DSL capacity being rolled out. The ZDA claims that Zamtel’s primary fixed-wireless network is also being upgraded and expanded, with coverage and capacity expected to more than double within the next twelve months. Zamtel’s secondary fixed-wireless network, based on WIMAX technology, is designed to cover the whole of metropolitan Lusaka, and is scheduled to go live during 2010, says the ZDA.

In the mobile space, Zamtel lags a long way behind its competitors in terms of market share. The stats, estimated for September 2009 by WCIS look like this:

1. Zain Zambia - 72.17%
2. MTN Zambia - 23.12%
3. Zamtel - 4.71%

Zamtel, then, is struggling to compete effectively against two of Africa's leading mobile groups. There is, however, room for all competitors to grow, with Zambia's mobile penetration rate currently standing at just under 33% according to WCIS. Whether BSNL and MTNL are ideally suited to improving the fortunes of the company, however, could be questioned in light of some of the criticisms aired here about their performance in their home market of India. According to the Business Standard, the two public sector telcos are joined by seven other companies or consortia from in having successfully prequalified to participate in a bid for Zamtel.

Should both the relatively modest aspiration of buying control of Zambia's incumbent operator and the rather more grand designs on Zain both come to nought, MTNL and BSNL do appear to have ambitions to establish a presence in other regions.

Again, I am indebted to India's Business Standard for an update. According to an article of October 23rd, the two operators, along with the Vavasi Group, are planning to set up new operations in Russian and western Europe.

Under this deal, the article states, Vavasi "is acquiring frequency spectrum and licences for Russia and several western European countries" and "the same [special purpose vehicle] that is being formed to acquire a majority stake in Zain will be used to invest in the Russian operations."

Confirming the development, a senior Vavasi executive is quoted as having said: "We are in the process of acquiring a licence for the new generation (NG)-1 technology and have applied in Russia and four other European countries."

This is where I betray the fact that I am not an engineer by wondering about this "NG-1 technology". What is it? The Business Standard article claims that "NG-1 technology is an alternative to GSM and CDMA and was developed in the US universities" and that "Vavasi claims that the network needs lower capital expenditure as well as operating expenses."

I'll hold my hands up. This is a new one on me.

An inspection of the Vavasi website reveals that NG-1 is a proprietary wireless access technology the company has developed itself and which it claims "understands the need of both rural and urban areas". Impressive sounding claims are also made for the spectrum efficiency and eco-friendly credentials of the technology.

NG-1 sounds wonderful - but can proprietary kit from India really prevail against global standards such as WiMAX, HSPA and LTE?

Some grand claims, then, are being made about the ambitions of India's two major state sector telecoms companies. Some of these claims seem to be articulated rather more loudly by the Vavasi Group than by the telcos themselves. I wonder how much there is in all of this. Can two operators that have attracted much criticism in their home market really be set to emerge as global players?

Knocked back in Sri Lanka, India's state sector telcos continue to eye international expansion opportunities

What next for Bharti Airtel in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

Sunil Bharti Mittal: looking to new opportunities in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

Will they? Won't they? Will they? Won't they?

No. Not now - and maybe not ever.

Of the two big telecoms M&A deals discussed by this blog over the last few months, one has definitely stalled, seemingly not to be revived again this year.

We've been here before. Giant Indian cellco Bharti Airtel and South Africa's multinational mobile group MTN failed to come together last year. Now, after months of discussions and a repeatedly extended deadline for those talks, the two firms have once again failed to find a way to combine their assets into one giant emerging markets player which would have been the third largest telecoms company in the world, according to the Indian MNO's statement about the scrapped merger plans.

Bharti Airtel maintains that the planned alliance "was a vision based on solid fundamentals" and that "substantial synergies could have been captured" with the proposed transaction. The Indian firm's statement indicates that much thought was given to the "the sensibilities and sensitivities of both companies and both their countries" and contends that "the proposed deal structure took into account their leadership in their respective geographies to ensure continuity of business - including listing, tax residencies, management, brand etc." With what sounds like a note of regret about a missed opportunity, the statement expresses the opinion that "the deal would have been a significant step in promoting South-South cooperation - a vision of the two countries."

So what's gone wrong this time? The Bharti Airtel statement indicates that failure to gain the approval of the South African Government is what has caused both companies to take the decision to disengage from discussion. James Middleton of Informa Telecoms & Media also describes the aborted transaction as a case of both firms failing to convince the Zuma Government, which is MTN's biggest shareholder via the Public Investment Corporation (a pension fund), of the value of the deal.

Another Informa scribe, the shadowy 'Informer', in his usual playful manner, reaches for the fairly obvious metaphor of a cancelled wedding and has some fun with it. Writing yesterday, the mystery man of Mortimer House jokes that that "the parents of the bride-to-be" were "clearly unimpressed by the quality of her suitor."

While the Indian firm expresses the hope that "the South African government will review its position in the future and allow both companies an opportunity to re-engage," it's probably legitimate to wonder if there will be the appetite to revisit this again for a third time. I'm all in favour of persistence - God loves a tryer and all that. I've also learned, though, that 'no' often means... 'no'. Happily, I've not had the chastening experience of asking several times for a lady's hand in marriage and being repeatedly spurned. My guess, though, is that I'd probably start to take the hint at the second knock-back. If Sunil Bharti Mittal and his management team feel at all like that, then this recent disappointment begs a new question: What next?

In its statement about the failed tie-up with MTN, Bharti Airtel stated that the company "will continue to explore international expansion opportunities that are consistent with its vision and bring value to its shareholders." I would expect that to be the case, having expressed the view back in February that competitive pressures on home turf might force the Indian operator to identify investment targets around the world.

As the year has unfolded since then, some of these pressures have not proven to be as strong as might have been feared. For example, one threat my February article identified was state-owned operators (i.e. BSNL and MTNL) stealing a march in the 3G space and in the WiMAX services arena. As we have seen here since, however, it now appears that the two big public sector telcos have failed to make much of this this first-mover advantage.

Other pressures do continue to exist, though, even in a massively booming market. Since that February article, India's mobile operators have added almost 100 million subscriptions. Bharti Airtel's share of the vast subscriber base, however, has slipped a little, with ground conceded to a strongly performing Reliance Communications and to smaller players whose market share has improved a bit, notably Aircel and Russian-owned MTS India.

Where, then, will the giant MNO seek new growth opportunities outside its home territory? Back in February, I aired the view that Bharti Airtel may be almost uniquely well suited to the challenges of African markets, noting that the Indian operator has to cope with the lowest tariffs in the world while sustaining growth. More than once, when reporting the rumoured sale of a set of African mobile operators, this blog has noted that those operations are rather less profitable than the parent company's properties in the Middle East. Bharti Airtel, then, might be the most obvious fit to purchase those assets. The group being referred to here is, of course, Zain.

So, could the failure to tie-up with MTN now put the Indian operator in the frame as a suitor either for Zain's African portfolio or for a stake in the entire Kuwaiti-headquartered group? Maybe. Consider this from the chuckling 'Informer':

"You shouldn’t stick around where you’re not wanted... there are, after all, plenty more fish in the sea. The Informer suggests that Bharti has a look at Zain, instead. Zain gives the impression of being a little more, how shall we say… available."

If this were to happen, I'd guess that a link-up with MTN would be permanently off the cards, due to the significant overlapping of the Zain and MTN footprints.

What next for Bharti Airtel in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

M&A mystery tour: Zain, Tigo Sri Lanka, Vivendi's foray into Brazil

Zain Group: all operations up for grabs?

Over the (northern hemisphere) summer months, this blog became very preoccupied with whispers about a 'for sale' sign supposedly being slapped onto the African assets of Kuwait-headquartered mobile group Zain. So much so that an inelegant title (Zain Africa Speculation Watch) was cobbled together for what quickly became a series of articles. That series ran to no less than thirteen episodes, such was the number of conflicting rumours doing the rounds from June to August. Of late, though, this long-running tale has meandered in a new direction - towards the idea that a significant stake in the whole Zain group may be sold, not merely its operations in Africa.

A reading of media reports coming out this week suggests this is looking increasingly likely. One such comes from Tom Gara, writing for the UAE's English language newspaper, the National. Gara reports that the Kuwaiti group leading the sale has announced that it will sell its stake in Zain to a consortium of Indian and Malaysian investors. The Kharafi Group - whose other activities include construction, civil engineering and the manufacturing of consumer goods - officially owns about 10% of Zain, writes Gara, but is believed by analysts to control up to 25% of the telecoms firm through subsidiaries and associates.

Gara reports that on Tuesday this week, a Kharafi subsidiary ran an advertisement in Kuwaiti newspapers, inviting investors owning fewer than 300,000 Zain shares to participate in the sale. "We hope that this preserves the rights and interests of small shareholders and gives them priority," the advertisement said.

What of the prospective purchasers? Gara describes them as a consortium led by India’s Vavasi Group and backed by Malaysian billionaire Syed al Bukhary. This consortium has apparently indicated that a purchase price has yet to be confirmed.

Gara also states that "two large Indian state-owned telecommunications companies that were originally listed as members of the consortium have since denied making any decision on the deal." Regular readers will surely know that this refers to MTNL and BSNL. The latter, says Shauvik Ghosh of Indian business newspaper Mint, writing earlier this week, may not want to pick up a stake in Zain because of an urgent need to hold on to its cash to maintain interest earnings, to pay for 3G spectrum and to fund an ongoing restructuring programme critical for long-term profitability. The last point certainly chimes with the critical analyses of BSNL's performance reported here at DTW.

The Mint article also quotes analysts who are similarly critical of the state of BSNL. One of these, who remains anonymous, warns that the public sector telco would be advised to stay away from the Zain stake purchase. "BSNL has a lot of cash on its books but it lacks the ability to execute," he says. "Africa is not a market for an operator to just add some revenue to its balance sheet. They have to first show that they can execute in India with the opportunities already in front of them like broadband and 3G before they can venture into bigger game like Zain."

One foreign adventure which certainly seems not to be on the cards for BSNL is its mooted purchase of the Millicom International Cellular operation in Sri Lanka. On Wednesday, India's Economic Times carried the news that the state-owned firm had bid for the Tigo-branded cellco. By Friday, the Business Standard was reporting that this bid had been rejected. "They have not considered our bid", BSNL Chairman Kuldeep Goyal told a reporter. "We had quoted a value [that] we thought was appropriate but it has fallen short of their expectations."

This blog recently opined about the likely consolidation of the fiercely competitive Sri Lankan mobile market, with one possibility being that Bharti Airtel could purchase the Tigo-branded MNO - the giant Indian operator already has an operation in Sri Lanka. The recent Business Standard article also mentions rumours of Bharti Airtel's interest in the transaction - as well as interest from another prospective purchaser already present in the Sri Lankan market, Malaysia's Axiata. The only seemingly interested party still being mentioned whose presence in Sri Lanka would not lead to market consolidation is the UAE's Etisalat, which is also mentioned in the Business Standard story. Total Telecom reported on Monday that the Emirati firm has indeed submitted a bid.

Plenty of interest in Tigo Sri Lanka, then. Let's see who prevails.

What news, though, of erstwhile protagonists from the early episodes of the now-fizzled out Zain Africa Speculation Watch mini-series here at DTW? Regular readers may recall that the whole hoo-ha was initially set off by rumours of interest from French telecoms and media conglomerate Vivendi. Having heard nothing since about that the company's plans, I was interested this week to read a report from my former colleague at Informa Telecoms & Media, Mr James Middleton. While the Zain Africa business came to nothing, James writes that the French group seems to remain keen on increasing its footprint in emerging markets beyond Morocco, where it controls Maroc Telecom. Vivendi, perhaps best known by telecoms watchers for its controlling stake in French cellco and broadband player SFR, has now launched a EUR 2 billion offer for 100% of Brazilian fixed line carrier GVT, which offers VoIP telephony, corporate data, broadband, internet services and pay TV, writes James.

As of June 30, 2009, GVT had approximately 2.3 million customer lines in service, including voice, broadband, data and VoIP services. It is one of the smaller players competing against giants like Oi, América Móvil and Telefónica.

So, after wandering across Africa, South Asia and South America, here concludes another whistle-stop tour of telecoms M&A stories from emerging markets. Let's see which of these has further to run.

M&A mystery tour: Zain, Tigo Sri Lanka, Vivendi's foray into Brazil

Big trouble in Indochina

Cambodia's mobile operators are in for some serious wrangling and the country's consumers are in for some serious savings - for now, at least.

A week ago, courtesy of Cellular News, I learned that the southeast Asian country's cellcos have been at odds, with one MNO accusing another of offering loss-leading tariffs. The alleged offender is Sotelco, which is backed by Vimpelcom and which operates under the same Beeline brand familiar to mobile users in the CIS markets of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia and Armenia. Making the accusations, according to a TeleGeography article on the same story, is Mark Hanna, CFO of the Royal Group, a Cambodian investment and development company whose assets include a stake in Cellcard, the mobile operator whose large share of the country's cellular market (currently 48.41% according to WCIS) has been steadily eroded by newer entrants over the last couple of years.

The Cambodian mobile market is something of a paradox. One on hand we have boosters such as the Royal Group proclaiming that Cambodia has "a booming economy, second in Asia only to China in double-digit GDP growth" and that it "enjoys a stable political situation, together with the most welcoming and liberal business, investment and trade environment in ASEAN." All of this sounds very attractive. On the other hand, Millicom International Cellular, which owns a majority stake in Cellcard, has opted to quit the Cambodian market, having found the level of competition to be excessive in the country's very crowded mobile sector.

Having written back in July about Millicom's decision to exit this and other Asian markets (also Laos and Sri Lanka), the last I heard was that the company has agreed to sell its stake in Cellcard to the Royal Group. Interest in Millicom's Sri Lankan operation, meanwhile, has been expressed by Indian state owned telco BSNL, which, along with fellow public sector operator MTNL, is also said to be mulling over a 46% stake in pan-MEA giant Zain (of which more here later, no doubt).

Certainly, the intensely competitive battle between Cambodia's nine (!!!) cellcos does seem to be cited as the reason for operators' sliding revenues in the country. One example of this, as reported by Steve Finch of the Phnom Penh Post reported late last month, comes from Axiata-backed Hello. While the Malaysian parent company recorded a 44% rise in net profit overall for Q2 2009, its Cambodia operation suffered from a "challenging" business environment, a recent statement said. According to Axiata, "major operators are facing intense competition on pricing, and new operators are offering free SIM cards and free minutes to capture market share." This has affected Hello to the tune of a 17.4% slide in 2Q 2009 revenues.

While Vimpelcom's operation is just the latest disruptive new entrant, this blog has discussed similar tactics on the part of another latecomer, Metfone, a subsidiary of Viettel, an operator from neighbouring Vietnam. Since its launch late last year, the Vietnamese-backed cellco has carved out an impressive 11.66% share of the Cambodian mobile subs market according to WCIS. Last time I covered this, it was stated that Metfone's market share was 17.47% - so I think the good people at WCIS have revised some of their June 2009 figures for Cambodia, doubtless in line with more recently received market intelligence. The lower figure, though, is still very solid. So I stand by the remark I made back in July about there probably not being many precedents worldwide for an operator making such a strong impact so quickly in such an already-congested market.

As discussed here before, Metfone has rapidly built a customer base through the distribution of free SIM cards and airtime, as bemoned by the good folks at Axiata. Further, and as I discussed in a March article on the links between telcos in countries with left-of-centre government and/or centrally planned economies, Viettel Deputy General Director Nguyen Manh Hung has been quoted as saying that Metfone intends to extend services to Cambodia's lower income groups and thereby "contribute to society." I have taken this to mean that the Vietnamese company, with its roots in the military establishment of a socialist republic, is free to interpret the profit motive rather differently than those of us who are compelled to think of shareholder value when we go to work every day.

I don't know if Metfone's very aggressive pricing is now a thing of the past - but it is Beeline Cambodia's actions that have been making the headlines of late and arousing the ire of the Royal Group.

Last Wednesday, the Phnom Penh Post reported that the Vimpelcom-backed operator had been accused of reneging on a promise to avoid selling services "below the cost of connecting across networks". It seems that while Beeline has ceased to make its controvesial 'Boom' tariff plan available only to new subscribers. The Royal Group's Mark Hanna contends that this violates the agreement Beeline struck with the country's regulator. Beeline Cambodia General Director Gael Campan is unrepentant. The operator sent text messages to all users already signed up for the 'Boom' tariff that the rate would remain "forever". Campan has also argued that it is not selling below cost, and that its pricing policy is little different from a supermarket selling most products for a profit with a number of promotions added to entice customers and build loyalty.

Application forms for Beeline’s Boom tariff. Photo: Sovan Philong, Phnom Penh Post

Campan has made accusations of this own, claiming that Cellcard has limited interconnection between the two networks throughout the heated dispute.

Despite the continuing disagreement, stated last Wednesday's Phnom Penh Post article, Campan has neither threatened legal action nor received word of Cellcard planning a lawsuit. Both sides, however, continues the article, have made claims of legal infringement. While Beeline has accused Cellcard of violating an interconnection contract, interconnection standards and therefore Cambodian regulations by blocking its network, Cellcard accuses Beeline of illegally using its rival's prefixes to get around interconnectivity issues. Hanna said Beeline had "violated national security and the ITU guidelines on the use of mobile prefixes".

Undeterred by criticism from rivals, Beeline Cambodia announced this week that the über-cheap 'Boom' tariff is to be followed with another very aggressive offering. Ith Sothoeuth of the ever-indispensable Phnom Penh Post writes that customers will only be charged for the first minute of any calls they make of up to 15 minutes' duration within the Beeline network. Under the "Super Zero" plan, the per-minute charge will kick in again after 15 minutes, while calls across networks will be charged at USD 0.06 per minute, compared with USD 0.05 per minute at all times on all networks on the controversial "Boom" plan, Beeline Commercial Director Benoin Janin told a press conference last Friday. "Super Zero" SIM cards will cost just USD 0.50 under a promotion running until December 31, though the Super Zero tariff will continue for already-qualified users indefinitely, or until the company changes its pricing policy, reports Sothoeuth.

Beeline's Campan, writes Sothoeuth, also said on Friday that he hopes to resolve the dispute with Cellcard and added that the connectivity issue would not help the Royal Group-controlled MNO in the long run. "It is a very fragmented market right now, and nobody has the majority of subscribers," he said. Cellcard, he continued "is not the biggest part of the market; the majority of subscribers are with the other operators. We want to work with them as much as possible, and if [they do] not want to give their subscribers access to Beeline customers, it's their problem, not ours." Tough talk - although, as we have seen from the WCIS numbers, it's only just about true that Cellcard does not own a majority of subs.

Following earlier musings here about Metfone's pricing and its effects on market value in Cambodia, this latest wrangle strengthens my feeling that the country's mobile scene is surely bound to see some degree of consolidation soon. Observing from an admittedly long distance, I'm inclined to think a competitive war of attrition cannot continue unchecked for very much longer. I wonder what prices Cambodia's mobile users will be paying when the number of service providers shrinks.

Big trouble in Indochina

WiMAX and 3G trials and tribulations for India's public sector telcos

'India Week' here at DevelopingTelecomsWatch concludes with a round up of views on the prospects for the country's public sector telecoms enterprises.

State-owned telco MTNL is one company somewhat keen to experiment with WiMAX, but is also keen to mitigate the risks and reduce costs through a proposed partnership with another organisation.

Writing for the Economic Times on Saturday, Joji Thomas Philip explains that the public sector operator has invited global telecoms businesses to set up and run its Delhi and Mumbai WiMAX operations on a franchisee basis for a six-year period. If a willing partner is found, MTNL plans to enter into a revenue sharing agreement with the successful bidder. Philip writes that the contract will be reviewed every two years and can be terminated if the franchisee partner does not meet prescribed targets. MTNL wants to work together with the winning bidder when working out strategies for advertising, marketing and promoting the broadband services, and wants those services to carry the MTNL brand. Execution on the sales and market side, along with the business of credit checking customers will be the prime responsibility of the bidder. MTNL, on the other hand, wishes to retain responsibility for fixing tariffs. While there will be room for consulation with its partner, MTNL's word will be final on this issue, the company has said.

How attractive is this opportunity? This may depend on interested parties' views of where WiMAX fits into India's evolving communications landscape. Any prospective bidders who envisage strong demand for a mobile WiMAX service, for example, may encouter words of warning - even from the CEO of the one company already offering WiMAX-based services on a franchisee model.

San Francisco-headquartered Soma Networks, is a supplier of WiMAX base stations, CPE and a multimedia application system designed to provide essential software elements for broadband service providers - support for simultaneous multimedia applications; integration with third-party, IP-based billing and provisioning; interoperability with IMS infrastructures.

A former colleague of mine, Ken Wieland of Informa Telecoms & Media, recently summarised the deal struck between Soma Networks and BSNL, India's other major state-owned telecoms operator back in January 2008. Writing for the telecoms.com portal, Ken notes that BSNL uses Soma Networks as a mobile WiMAX franchisee in the three circles (regions) of Goa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. Under the franchise arrangement, Ken writes, Soma Networks pays for the WiMAX equipment in exchange for access to BSNL infrastructure (such as tower sites and backhaul facilities). A revenue-sharing deal is also in place as part of the arrangement, with a 70-30 split in favour of the kit-maker.

Soma Networks CEO Yatish Pathak, in an interview with Business Line last month, argued that the mobile WiMAX opportunity in India is probably quite limited, at least in the short term.

"One of the reasons that Soma Networks chose to use WiMAX 802.16e-2005 technology, also called Mobile WiMAX, is that it supports mobile broadband as well as [having] the capability to provide wireless broadband to homes and offices," Pathak told Business Line. "However, its application depends on the context and availability of competing technologies. In an emerging market such as India with vast areas under-served due to lack of wired infrastructure or due to sub-optimal DSL connections, the best use of WiMAX today is to deliver broadband to the homes and businesses that have no broadband, or poor broadband connectivity."

"Using WiMAX as a mobile broadband application is better suited for developed, more mature markets that have high data consumption," Pathak asserted. "Classic examples are Tokyo and Korea."

Pathak can see the business case for broadband service providers opting to use WiMAX to target the Indian laptop user market, saying that "then it will simply be a service such as EV-DO, but with higher data rates." The Soma Networks CEO believes that India's existing mobile operators will continue to evolve their network towards LTE to address their customers' evolving mobile broadband needs. He feels that cellcos might opt for WiMAX deployments in select high traffic business districts and cities to address the enterprise market. However, Pathak does not envisage any Indian MNO deciding to use WiMAX for mobile data on cellphones, arguing that such a service would require the operator to invest in and run two separate networks - an FDD network for 3G and a TDD network for WiMAX. Besides, he continues, the service would require dual mode phones, and the support for two different types of radios would make the handsets cost-prohibitive for Indian consumers, "until there is service acceptance and we see economies of scale."

Soma Networks, is, then, in Pathak's words, currently focused on the delivery of a "broadband data service that optimises the use of bandwidth link to wirelessly deliver a megabit-rate experience within the comforts of a fixed location, such as home or office," notwithstanding the fact that the company's technology, used for rollouts in India for BSNL, "supports mobility even today". It is BSNL's prerogative, Pathak states, to make a decision depending on its business model and strategy on when it wants to extend the mobility features to consumers.

Pathak feels that "going for mobility from day one is a very ambitious plan and requires massive investments." He told Business Line that broadband penetration across the three circles (total population 240 million) served by Soma Networks and BSNL is currently just 0.5%. Even if this rises to 3% over the next three years, he says, we are still talking of very small volumes to justify that kind of investment, given the low ARPU numbers in India.

"In my opinion," Pathak says, "a prudent approach is to focus on Wireless DSL market where there is a huge pent-up demand. This helps us deploy in a scalable manner without making billion dollar investments before any revenue starts accruing. By phasing the rollouts, we lower costs and risks to achieve rapid ROI and then scale up the investments to stitch the coverage areas to offer mobility."

BSNL, however, does not seem to share Mr. Prakha's cautious view about the prospects for mobile WiMAX. Earlier this month, wireless solutions provider Harris Stratex announced an agreement to supply mobile WiMAX technology to the Indian telco. Under the multi-year contract, run the announcement, Harris Stratex will supply its StarMAX™ WiMAX solution to extend BSNL’s public wireless access network to provide high-speed wireless mobility services to enterprise and retail customers in urban areas across the southern Indian state of Kerala, the country's fourth largest telecommunications market. Financial details were not provided in the announcement, but media coverage indicates that this is another franchising model arrangement.

This has presumably not met with the full approval of global trade and standard body the WiMAX Forum, whose regional Honorary Chairman for India, C.S. Rao, in June asked BSNL to avoid further use of the franchisee model.

"While adopting the franchisee model, we feel that BSNL is losing out on the opportunity of racing ahead of the private players in this space," said Rao, who argued that if the state-owned telco deployed networks itself, this would result in revenues amounting to about USD 1.2 billion annually. In the franchisee model, argues Rao, BSNL would only get about USD 500 million per annum.

That public sector telcos BSNL and MTNL are the ones dominating WiMAX news from India at present is due to the period of exclusivity the two organisations have had in this space. As James Middleton, another former Informa Telecoms & Media colleague of mine, observed in February, BSNL also has a first-to-market advantage when it comes to BWA (broadband wireless access) spectrum. While the BWA auctions are scheduled to take place the same time as the 3G licence awards, BSNL is already sitting on a chunk of pan-Indian 20MHz spectrum in the 2.5GHz band, for which it does not have to pay until the auctions take place. BSNL’s 20MHz of BWA spectrum will cost the state-owned operator the same as the highest amount paid for the three remaining 20MHz BWA licences that will be up for auction, two in the 2.3GHz frequency band and another at 2.5GHz. Whether BSNL can be said to have made of the most of this advantageous position seems debatable in light of the low broadband penetration figures and conservative-sounding projections offered by Yatish Pathak of Soma Networks.

BSNL and MTNL have also gained first-to-market advantage in the 3G space, again not having to make payment for spectrum until private sector operators are involved in an auction. As with the BWA auction, and as noted in a Wall Street Journal article today, the two public sector operators will have to pay the Government an amount equal to the highest bid in that auction, the date of which the article only predicts in the vaguest terms, i.e. "later this year."

The state-owned operators may have got into the 3G space ahead of their rival cellcos, but I'm not sure they can be said to have "enjoyed" first-mover advantage. In Tuesday's piece about Mobile Number Portability, we heard from Rajiv Sharma of HSBC Securities, who warned the public sector telcos not to make significant further investments in 3G mobile technology and from Alok Shende of Ascentius Consulting, who believes that the below-industry ARPU recorded by MTNL and BSNL reflects that the companies have attracted price-sensitive, low-MOU subscribers who do not use VAS and do not gain from the enhanced capabilities of a 3G offering. We noted reports that in the six months since its 3G launch, BSNL has acquired just 10,733 subscribers and that the figure for MTNL is said to stand at a mere 902, an average of just 150 per month across Mumbai and Delhi, considered the two most lucrative 3G markets in India.

It is in the context of these extremely modest 3G subscriber numbers that I'd like to consider an Asia Times article written this week by Kunal Kumar Kundu of consulting and IT services firm InfoSys. This - which is a summary of the writer's personal opinions - is nothing short of a withering analysis of BSNL, a company Kundu describes as showing "signs of sickness." Kundu feels that India's largest fixed-line telco looks set to go the way of struggling government-run Air India, "which has had to crawl cap in hand for a state bailout to survive."

For Kundu, "the signs of sickness are all too obvious, led by bloated payroll costs." He states that BSNL's salaries now account for about 25% of revenue, compared with rival Bharti Airtel's 5%, after rising at an compounded rate of 21.5% per annum between the financial years ending March '02 and March '08. Kundu notes that this far outpaces revenue gains, which in the same period increased at a compounded 5.53% per annum. He also argues that only by earning interest in cash kept idle in bank deposits has BSNL kept out of the red, and reports a deterioration in finances in the year to March 2009. Analysts, says Kundu, are forecasting a loss of between around USD 825 million-1.03 billion as salary costs jump by about USD 500 million.

The company, says Kundu, once regarded as one of the Government's crown jewels, is now one of the top candidates for disinvestment this year. He is especially critical of BSNL's performance in the fixed-line space, where "an abominable quality of service and increased options from the private sector have led to a drastic fall in the company's landline subscriptions."

Whether a proposed merger between BSNL and MTNL would cure these ills remains to be seen - and there may be some wait. A week ago, the Business Standard reported that India's Communications and IT Ministry will decide on the merger between the two state-owned telecom companies only after the listing of the former.

"MTNL is a New York Stock Exchange-listed company, and a merger would not be possible without the listing of BSNL. We will first look at listing BSNL and then will decide on the merger," Union Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology Gurudas Kamat said.

WiMAX and 3G trials and tribulations for India's public sector telcos

MNP draws closer in India: How will cellcos be affected?

After years of discussions, it now seems that the imposition of Mobile Number Portability (MNP) in India really might be imminent. As noted in local reports last week, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) recently announced that its guidelines for MNP should be in place later this month and has asked operators to be ready for a quick implementation.

In the meantime, the country's cellcos continue to disagree on the desirability and likely impact of number porting in the country. Joji Thomas Philip of the Economic Times reports that, "in a move which could make it significantly costlier for mobile users to change their operator while retaining the number", GSM operators are demanding that only those who wish to change their numbers be made to bear the cost of the enabling technology.

Philip writes that state-owned telco BSNL estimates its implemtation costs for MNP will be around USD 250 million and that only 2% of "elite customers" are likely to use the facility. Philip contunues that "going by BSNL's formula, back of the envelope calculations show that it will cost about [USD 125] per user to port... number[s]".

BSNL, then, is proposing that these costs should not be borne by the subscriber base as a whole:

"Only those customers for the benefit of whom the MNP is being implemented should be made to bear the cost of the same and not the ordinary customers, who are not going to get any benefit from the implementation of MNP. All these customers, who will utilise the MNP, are big entrepreneurs, professionals [and] businessmen who will save huge switching costs, otherwise, they will have to invest on informing friends and business partners about new number, missing calls from uninformed people and updating company web pages, brochures and business cards etc. These customers can afford and must pay for availing this facility," BSNL said in a statement to the TRAI.

This concern for the vast majority of less affluent subscribers seems admirable enough. BSNL and fellow state-owned telecoms operator MTNL, though, would appear to have a compelling need to avoid taking on a lot of extra cost, if we are to believe some analysts. As reported today by Rashmi Pratap (another Economic Times writer), industry watchers such as HSBC Securities analyst Rajiv Sharma are warning the public sector telcos not to make significant further investments in 3G mobile technology.

Sharma feels that MTNL is better placed to leverage its fixed line infrastructure for wireline broadband products, and is sceptical about the chances of the operator's plans for partnering with an overseas telecoms player to run its 3G operations, asserting that "the chances of MTNL benefiting from such a structure will be restricted as the state-owned enterprise culture of the company will get in the way of foreign telcos, restricting their ability to deliver."

Rakshmi Pratap also quotes Alok Shende of Ascentius Consulting, who believes that the below-industry ARPU recorded by MTNL and BSNL reflects that the companies have attracted price-sensitive, low-MOU subscribers who do not use VAS and would not gain from the enhanced capabilities of a 3G offering. Sharma writes that in the six months since its 3G launch, BSNL has roped in just 10,733 subscribers and that the figure for MTNL stands at "a dismal 902", an average of just 150 per month across Mumbai and Delhi, considered the two most lucrative 3G markets in India.

If these observations about the state-owned telcos' subscribers are accurate, I can perhaps see why BSNL has said that only a very small percentage of its customers are likely to gain from MNP. If the bulk of the telco's subscriber base really is so price sensitive, I'd guess that use of multiple prepaid SIM cards is widespread, with customers switching between service providers to take advantage of the optimum tariff for any given call.

How widespread? Gartner analyst Madhusudan Gupta, quoted in a Forbes India article by Rohin Dharmakumar back in June, estimates that 10% of all mobile connections in India might be instances of one phone/person with multiple SIM cards. Dharmakumar writes that India's mobile subscription numbers may also be somewhat inflated by churn, stating that 35-50% percent of prepaid connections (which, he says, form 93% of all mobile connections in India) become idle. Separating live (but infrequently used) subscriptions from totally inactive ones seems to be made harder by the existence of numerous approaches to gauging the validity of a given sub. Due to the rapid evolution of lifetime offers, writes Dharmakumar, each operator is saddled with lifetime subscribers bound by different contracts - some are required to recharge once in six months to stay active while others get by simply by getting an incoming call every few months.

In this context of low ARPU subscriptions and high churn, one can perhaps sympathise with BSNL's point of view regarding the costs of implementing MNP services only likely to benefit an affluent minority of their customers.

Joji Thomas Philip notes that two other GSM players are supportive of BSNL's argument. Bharti Airtel, for example, is of the view that "all operators who make the investment (for MNP) are entitled to recover their costs". The market-leading cellco has told the TRAI that "the investments being made by operators for the implementation of MNP needs to recovered only from the consumers who want to port their numbers" and that "ordinary customers should not be penalised by increased tariffs and call charges." Idea Cellular has chipped into the debated by observing that service providers should be compensated for the one time CAPEX and recurring OPEX involved in MNP.

Strongly opposed to this line of argument, writes Philip, is CDMA operator Reliance Communications, which also launched GSM services earlier this year. The cellco asserts that since it costs less than Rs 50 (around one US dollar) for a prepaid subscriber to take a new connection, the porting cost should be lower than this figure and has suggested that the any fee charged to the individual consumer be fixed at Rs 20. If we are to believe the output of MTNL's number-crunching, Reliance Communications seems to be a strong advocate of spreading the much, much higher costs of MNP across a subscriber base most of which is not likely to be interested. Is Reliance motivated to take this position by its status as a new entrant in the GSM space? To do so, I would have thought, is to buy the idea that MNP helps new entrants and hurts incumbents. The last time DevelopingTelecomsWatch visited the MNP issue, we considered an alternative view - as articulated by Raymond Yu of telecoms think tank Ovum - that all MNOs are vulnerable to MNP-driven churn. Yu cites the cases of Greece and Lithuania, where the largest operators actually managed to increase their market shares immediately following the introduction of MNP.

Aside from this disagreement about how best to spread the cost of implementing MNP, what else might India's operators need to consider? ARPU may be one worry, reported Rajesh Kurup of the Business Standard in June, basing his article on a study by stokebrokers Angel Broking. This study indicates that ARPU would be negatively impacted by around 5% and that telcos' margins would also drop by 100-150 basis points and earnings per share estimates would be pruned by 9-21%. Angel Broking belives that an increase in subscriber acquisition and retention costs plus higher capital expenditure to improve service quality are also expected to exert pressure on margins and earnings growth.

What proportion of post-paid subscribers might be motivated to churn once they have the option of retaining their existing numbers? An EFYTimes article last month, drawing on a recently conducted Mobile Consumer Insights study by the Nielsen market research company, reports that around 18% of contract customers will change service provider once MNP is live. The figure is higher for customers of Tata Teleservices and Reliance Communications.

According to the study, around 55% of respondents were generally satisfied with their operator, but only 48% are satisfied with network quality. The operators are probably concerned by the fact that scores for network quality satisfaction were down compared to previous iterations of the Nielsen study. Bharti Airtel, BSNL and Reliance Communications have registered the biggest drops in this metric. According to the study, 43% of the people polled are satisfied with the price they pay for their service.

My feeling is that ARPU in India is already so low that differentiation by quality of service could prove to be a more powerful tool for any operators which cope best with this issue in India's highly competitive market. I don't imagine that competing more aggressively on price than is currently the case could be sustainable for very long.

India's operators may be interested to note that loyalty to operators is, according to the study, higher among lowest socio-economic groups, older age groups and among female customers.

Lots to think about, then, for India's numerous competing mobile operators. Let's see, however, if this end-of-year deadline for MNP going live is really going to be met. Past delays have been numerous and India would not be the only country in the world to see shifting deadlines as the many concerns about MNP are debated. Right now in Thailand, for example, while MNP regulations have come into force, it is not yet clear when mobile subscribers will be able to port their numbers as operators are not yet ready for the service, TelecomPaper reports.

MNP draws closer in India: How will cellcos be affected?

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 10 - Who's rejecting whom?

Today seems to be merger/takeover/tie-up-on-hold-day at DevelopingTelecomsWatch.

We begin with a brief visit to India for a peek at that country's most current mooted-marriage-gone-bad story before turning the gaze of DTW once again on the main subject of our fascination - the future of Zain's assets in Africa.

The deal which has stalled in India is a proposed merger of two state-owned telcos, BSNL and MTNL, which, according to an Economic Times story yesterday, has been put on hold for the time being because, in the words of IT and Communications Minister Gurudas Kamat, "the enabling conditions for the suggested options are not appropriate enough to lead to a successful merger."

OK. Back to Zain Africa Speculation Watch, the mini-series. Now running to ten episodes, is this still a mini-series though? I'd hate to think I'll be visiting this ad nauseum. I hadn't planned for this to run seemingly forever like Cheers, Friends or Seinfeld.

Writing this particular episode, however, could hardly be avoided - yesterday I gave up counting how many news services were carrying the announcement by French telecoms and media conglomerate Vivendi that it was "interrupting" talks about acquiring a majority stake in the African assets of Zain. As Cellular News observed, no reason was given for the break-off of the talks and no hint given about whether they would resume at some stage. The Cellular News article, however, reminded us that when the talks were confirmed earlier in the month, Vivendi said that it "attaches the utmost importance to keeping its credit rating and its dividend at their current levels and will continue to work in the interests of its shareholders." The article speculates whether recent comments from debt ratings agency, Standard & Poor's may have caused Vivendi to back off - the comments amounted to a warning that the company's credit rating could face a downgrade following any investment in Zain.

Staying with this theme for a moment, I'd like to recommend a rather amusing treatment of how Vivendi's credit rating might be affected - rough calculations and quick analysis by 'Somze', whose Telecommunication in Nigeria blog is well worth a read.

Andrew Parker of the Financial Times, meanwhile, asserts that while Vivendi has not ruled out restarting talks with Zain, much could depend on the level of interest from other companies. Parker suggests that France Telecom and Vodafone will be tempted to take a look at Zain's African operations because both have stakes in mobile businesses across the continent.

Elizabeth Judge of the Times, however, seems much more confident that Vivendi will resume discussions with Zain, writing that "people with knowledge of the talks, which would create a combined business with more than 62 million subscribers, indicated it was a temporary breakdown and that negotiations were likely to resume at a later stage."

These reports, then, don't really make any suggestions about what might have gone wrong. Thanks, then, to the good people at Gulf News, for translating into English a much more juicy story (from Kuwaiti daily newspaper Al Qabas), which gets straight to the point with the allegation that Zain has rejected a Vivendi offer mainly on the basis of not liking the terms and conditions of payment. This story also contends that Zain feels its financial position is strong enough to accept only the most beneficial offers.

One person emphatically not attracted to the truth of this is Kuwaiti blogger 'Alpha Dinar', who asks whether Zain rejected Vivendi or Vivendi walked away. 'Alpha' feels the latter is probably correct.

So, it feels like we are still some way from knowing how this saga is going to play out. I daresay what was once a mini-series will indeed run for a few more episodes.

Perhaps, though, we can be a tad more confident about developments in one outpost of Zain's African empire where the group does appear keen to cash in some of its assets. According to George Obulutsa of Reuters, the Kuwaiti group plans to give up its 35% stake in state-run Tanzania Telecommunications Company (TTCL), the largest fixed-line operator in the East African country and the owner of a struggling CDMA mobile service with just 115,000 subscribers, according to an estimate by the World Cellular Information Service from Informa Telecoms & Media. Zain also has its own GSM operator in the country, with an estimated 4.47 million subscriptions, which gives it a market share of 32.27%.

The Reuters article does not state why Zain wishes to end its involvement in TTCL, but I daresay this is not unconnected to the generally shaky state of the Tanzanian telco which has, since the early part of this decade, been in a number of joint management arrangements necessitated by its financial instability. The latest of these came unravelled very recently, with Canadian firm SaskTel International pulling out of a management contract covering the operation, maintenance and expansion of the incumbent’s network to improve its financial, commercial and technical performance. This was meant to run until July 2010.

So, while it seems pretty clear what's going on in that one particular corner of the Zain footprint, the bigger picture remains worth watching. Don't touch that dial. No flipping - etc. etc.

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 10 - Who's rejecting whom?