South Africa's Telkom: a fighting chance?

Telkom Direct stores: a vital channel to market as the company faces challenging times?

DevelopingTelecomsWatch is picking up lots of chatter today about Telkom, the incumbent wireline operator of South Africa. This started when this morning's daily roundup from TeleGeography included the news that the company is planning to re-enter the mobile space in 2010 after only a brief period with no cellular presence.

Until almost exactly one year ago, Telkom and Vodafone had each owned 50% of Vodacom, the pan-African mobile operator with 35 million customers in South Africa, Tanzania, Lesotho, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Earlier this year, the UK-headquartered mobile giant secured a controlling interest in Vodacom with the purchase of an additional 15% stake from Telkom. The remaining 35% owned by the South African incumbent was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and unbundled to the company's shareholders.

When plans for this transaction were first announced late last year, Lloyd Gedye of South Africa's Mail & Guardian reported the stated rationale for Telkom's sale of its stake in Vodacom and noted that many analysts "had expressed skepticism at Telkom's ability to make a success of going it alone in the mobile space and have questioned how Telkom will survive without the Vodacom cash cow."

Back in November 2008, then, Gedye wrote that Telkom CEO Reuben September was arguing that the deal would unlock significant value for the company's shareholders because its fixed-line business had "been undervalued while it clung on to its 50% stake in Vodacom".

How much validity is there in that notion of Telkom's wireline property being undervalued? The notion is, at the very least, open to question according to An Ovum note issued this week in response to Telkom's announced plans to roll out its own mobile services. Ovum examine the background to this strategy and observe that fixed-line penetration (currently under 9%) is continuing to fall in South Africa so "mobile is clearly the communication mode of choice, and this is where [Telkom] needs to be for its customers."

However, the note continues, establishing a new mobile operation in South Africa won't be easy, as mobile penetration is already above the 100% mark and because Telkom will be competing with two large, well-established players in Vodacom and MTN.

A third mobile operator, Cell C, has achieved a 15.57% share (according to WCIS) of the country's mobile market since its commercial launch in late 2001. For other mobile service providers, South Africa has offered a very challenging competitive environment. Back in March, in an article on the prospects for MVNOs in both Africa and India, DevelopingTelecomsWatch noted that Virgin Mobile South Africa had failed to capture even 1% of the country's mobile subscriptions by the end of 2008. The significance of the recently-launched CDMA mobile offering from Neotel, Telkom's principal challenger in the fixed-line arena, remains to be seen.

While Ovum's note politely points out the level of challenge facing Telkom's proposed new mobile offering, others have responded with far less restrained language. An article by Tiisetso Motsoeneng of Reuters today quotes one analyst who certainly pulls no punches.

"To be targeting the retail market in that industry, I think it will be suicide for Telkom," Jan Meintjes, an analyst at Gryphon Asset Management said. "I fail to see how a converged strategy of fixed and mobile is going to be earning significant margins," Meintjes said. "Unless they can show to the market that there's a specific niche that they're targeting and how they can exploit that in terms of earning margins on that business that will give them an accepted ROE on their capital expenditure, I don't see how that can be value enhancing."

The Ovum note, however, reminds us that in South Africa, Telkom claims not to be starting a mobile network operation from scratch. The note points out that the group already has fixed core network assets, which are used by both Vodacom and MTN for backhaul, and an established channel to market through over 134 Telkom Direct shops. Ovum contend that Telkom can choose to "develop a new brand and associated lifestyle concept to target some of the high-spending customers". Also, the Ovum note continues, Telkom could potentially have greater appeal to enterprise customers due to an ability to bundle services across fixed and mobile networks.

Lloyd Gedye's article late last year indicated that another use of the Telkom's Vodacom windfall might be to acquire a number of new mobile licences in numerous African countries. These would be in addition to the company's existing interest in Nigeria. According to Candice Jones of ITWeb, however, Multi-Links, the Nigerian telco in which Telkom has had a controlling interest since 2006, "is in dire straits, knocking Telkom's annual results set with a R1.7 billion net loss."

Let's see if this difficult experience discourages Telkom from further international expansion. My sense all this year is that African mobile markets are more likely to consolidate than they are to offer rich opportunities for new entrants.

While mobility in South Africa offers a new source of revenue for Telkom, Ovum argue that any new revenue streams from mobile - or from enhanced ICT services currently being developed - "are unlikely to significantly bolster its financials in the near term." Of more immediate concern, Ovum contend, is Telkom's rising cost base. Ovum's note expresses the belief that by implementing best-practice approaches in its own transformation, Telkom is giving itself a fighting chance in the challenging times ahead of it.

South Africa's Telkom: a fighting chance?

How far will the merger of Romania's 3rd and 5th-placed cellcos shake up the country's mobile market?

In mid-May, as part of a longer piece about M&A activity potentially changing the competitive landscape in Central and Eastern Europe, I noted that Greek telecoms group Cosmote had reportedly reached an agreement with Oger Telecom regarding the takeover of Romanian CDMA mobile operator Zapp.

According to James Middleton of telecoms.com writing today, this deal now seems to have been concluded, with Cosmote buying Zapp under a share purchase agreement worth EUR 61 million. The Greek firm will also assume Zapp’s debt and other liabilities worth in the region of EUR 146 million.

The country's mobile market, the penetration rate of which currently stands at 135.13% according to WCIS, will therefore be contested by four cellcos once Cosmote's Romanian operation is merged with its new acquisition.

Why was Zapp an attractive purchase for Cosmote? After all, the acquired company has just 242,000 of the country's 28.7 million mobile subs, according to WCIS figures. Further, the CDMA network operator has been experiencing a steady decline in its customer base since June 2007, when its number of subs peaked at around 546,000.

As I said in May, the answer lies in the fact that although Zapp had already got into third generation service provision via the deployment of a existing CDMA EV-DO network, the company decided last year to use UMTS/HSDPA technology for its 2100 Mhz network as opposed to CDMA2000. This solves a pressing problem for Cosmote Romania, which was the lone cellco with no 3G proposition.

"This opens up a new cycle of development and a widening of the customer base for Cosmote in Romania, given that the company is acquiring both a third generation license and infrastructure," Cosmote group CEO Michalis Tsamaz said in a statement issued last week.

Alkman Granitsas, writing for Dow Jones Newswires today, rounds up some analyst responses to to deal. Brokerage HSBC Pantelakis Securities, for example, stated that the company had paid "full price" for the acquisition, paying a multiple of 3.4 times 2008 enterprise value-to-sales.

"The main rationale behind the acquisition was (Zapp's) 3G licence with the network currently covering 23 Romanian cities," said HSBC. "Cosmote Romania was the only mobile operator in the country not owning a 3G licence; hence we believe that OTE had to pay a rather full price to effectively acquire such a licence so as to be able to compete more effectively in this highly competitive market."

Certainly, Cosmote must be hoping that the addition of 3G services to its portfolio will sharpen its competitive edge in a market where the Vodafone and Orange branded cellcos have been much more successful to date, with 33.95% and 35.34% market share respectively. Their Greek-owned rival lags some way behind with 22.90% of mobile subs. Zapp aside, only latecomer RCS&RDS has built a smaller share of the market - just 6.97% when the WCIS folks last crunched the numbers.

Perhaps more serious for Cosmote, and presumably partly attributable to its lack of a 3G offering, is the degree to which is under-performs in terms of ARPU. Monthly ARPU for Vodafone and Orange as of 2Q 2008 was EUR 10.30 and EUR 10.33 respectively, according to the most recent Central & Eastern Europe Mobile Market Analysis and Forecasts report from Informa Telecoms & Media. The same report indicates that Cosmote Romania's ARPU for the same period stood at just EUR 4.9. Cosmote was also doing much worse than its rivals in terms of ARPU decay, it's 2Q 2008 numbers being down a hefty 25.8% vs. the figure recorded a year earlier. While its two main competitors had also seen ARPU decline, this was at nothing like such a rapid rate.

It will be interesting to review the updated figures a year from now and see if the Zapp acquisition has represented good value for money for Cosmote.

How far will the merger of Romania's 3rd and 5th-placed cellcos shake up the country's mobile market?

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 7

Dr Bahabri of HiTS Telecom: 'highly leveraged' Zain has been in talks with Vodafone, China Mobile - (photo from Comm.ae)

It's a matter of policy here at DevelopingTelecomsWatch not to write anything actively inflammatory. Controversy is not the watchword. There's no harm, however, in merely repeating contentious statements made by others. Is there?

One man seemingly unafraid of rattling cages is Dr Sultan A. Bahabri, Chairman of HiTS Telecom, the self-styled 'new opportunity communications company' that has invested in Brazil, Spain, Saudi Arabia and in several African markets.

Late last week, Bahabri spoke with the telecoms sector's very own man of mystery 'the Informer', offering his hard-hitting opinions on a range of issues. One of these was the recently much-discussed question of whether pan-MEA mobile player Zain is really going to flog its supposedly strategically vital African assets to some lucky punter.

Bahabri alleges that last year Zain was in serious talks with both Vodafone and China Mobile, claiming that the Kuwait/Bahrain-headquartered group is "highly leveraged and that leverage is going to be heavy on their shoulders for years to come."

The HiTS Telecom Chairman went on to make some fairly critical remarks about the manner in which Zain entered the Saudi Arabian market two years ago. The price paid for the country's third licence to operate was a whopping USD 6 billion, at a time when mobile market penetration was close to 80%. As Gavin Patterson of Informa Telecoms & Media wrote in his recently-penned Zain Group Q4 2008 update, mobile penetration in Saudi Arabia had passed the 100% mark by the time the third operator launched services. Patterson also saves us the bother of working out the cost of the licence per inhabitant of Saudi Arabia - USD 226: the world's most expensive on a per capita basis.

According to the Informer, Bahabri claims that his company also bid just over USD 4 billion in the Saudi Arabian auction, but that he could not have justified the bigger sum which Zain ended up spending.

Zain's management have not failed to notice sceptical remarks about their Saudi operation. In February last year, the firm's Chief Communications Officer Ibrahim Adel was interviewed by Mobile Communications International magazine, acknowledging that the move had been dismissed by some as one which that simply did not justify the expense. Adel noted that some observers had dubbed his firm's actions as a case of "crazy Kuwaitis, spending crazy money".

Adel argued, however, that the licence win was essential: "Saudi is a key strategic market for us. We couldn’t not be there."

Keep that word in mind: strategic - and fast-forward to the more recent critical remarks made by Dr Bahabri of HiTS Telecom. In last week's no-holds-barred chat with the Informer, Bahabri joked that "when you can’t think of a reason to justify that sort of spend, you just call it 'strategic'" - using the word as a barb, it seems to me. Many operators, he went on to add, have "a very dangerous combination of ego and cash. That leads to many mistakes."

Tough talk. Does it invite others to watch HiTS Telecoms closely and speak in similarly strong language should Dr Bahabri's organisation ever make moves which leave it open to criticism?

Returning to Dr Bahabri's suggestion that "highly leveraged" Zain was in talks with potential purchasers of parts of its business as far back as one year ago, fresh rumours were circulated yesterday that a sale of some sort is now on the cards - Bloomberg's Ambereen Choudhury writes that the telco has asked Swiss bank UBS AG to consider a possible sale of its African division, which it values at about USD 10 billion. The source? "Three people familiar with the plans."

These mysterious people told Choudhury that UBS "will oversee a review that may lead to a sale of all or part of the unit" and that "Zain is yet to decide on a sale, which would exclude its Sudanese operations."

In previous episodes of Zain Africa Speculation Watch we have considered the merits of various suitors that could step forward should Zain indeed decide that a sale is the best way forward. Of these, I noted that French telecoms and media conglomerate Vivendi has been dismissed by some analysts as being unlikely to be able to raise the necessary funds for an acquisition as significant as Zain's African unit.

Bloomberg's Choudhury, however, takes the time to consider a Vivendi bid and his unnamed sources allege that the company has actually approached Zain in recent months for exploratory talks about the latter's African division. According to Choudhury, Vivendi, which owns 53 percent of Maroc Telecom, has said it wants to revisit the idea of expanding its presence in emerging markets, having scrapped previous discussions about buying a stake in Dubai-based Oger Telecom in 2007.

Of the rumours feeding into Zain Africa Speculation Watch the mini-series, Ambereen Choudhury's are about the most specific. I have no idea, however, if they are the most reliable or credible. So, again I invite you to watch this space. Don't touch that dial. No flipping. etc. etc.

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 7

M&A activity set to change the landscape of SE Europe; Central Asia to follow?

The emerging markets focus of this blog has led me, in the main, to round up and review developments in low teledensity countries of Africa and Asia, with only occasional detours into somewhat more mature markets in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.

This time, however, being here in Vienna (dodging the rain and catching up on paperwork right now) has inspired me to look a bit closer to (my) home.

According to a recent TeleGeography article, Greek telecoms group Cosmote has reportedly reached an agreement with Oger Telecom regarding the takeover of Romanian mobile operator Zapp. Cosmote's existing Romanian operation occupies the third position on the market with 22.55% of the 28.55 million subs, according to the World Cellular Information Service. Zapp is a much less significant operation, with 0.96% of subs - and this is down from 1.82% a year ago.

What, then, is the point of this prospective acquisition? Gaining a 3G proposition seems to be the answer - Cosmote Romania is, as the TeleGeography article notes, the only mobile operator in the country without a UMTS concession.

For a long time, Zapp was the Romanian market's lone CDMA operator. Although Zapp had already got into third generation service provision via the deployment of a existing CDMA EV-DO network, the company decided last year to use UMTS/HSDPA technology for its 2100 Mhz network as opposed to CDMA2000. I daresay had Zapp not gone down this route, the company would be a less attractive acquisition target for Cosmote.

Zapp is an extremely small part of the Oger Telecom portfolio, which includes South African cellco Cell C and Turk Telekom, Turkey's dominant wireline operator which has, according to another recent TeleGeography story, formed a joint working group with its parent company to prepare an offer for the Kyrgyz state-owned telecoms operator Kyrgyztelecom. That article states that the privatisation of Kyrgyztelecom "has been on the Government’s agenda since 1998, although little progress has been made" and that "in July 2008 Turk Telekom declared that it was considering bidding for the 77.84% stake in the telco, but two months later was barred from participating after it failed to pay a required security deposit within the deadline." According to this story, these difficulties have not deterred the Turkish operator from coming back for another attempt.

While keen to improve its proposition in Romania, Cosmote might appear to be in the midst of evaluating how much of the rest of its southeastern Europe footprint it would like to retain. As well in Romania, currently the group has operations in Albania and Bulgaria. Until recently, the Cosmote footprint also extended to Macedonia, a market from which the Greek group exited via the sale of MNO Cosmofon to Telekom Slovenije. On 31st March telecoms.com reported that the Slovenian incumbent had beaten Turkcell to the punch with a successful EUR 190m bid for the Macedonian cellco. That article notes that as well as operating a 3G-HSDPA network, Cosmofon has also acquired six regional WiMAX licenses and launched a nationwide WiMAX network.

Were Cosmote to consider retreating further from the Balkans, one party unlikely to approve would be Deutsche Telekom. A recent MarketWatch article indicates that the giant German telco's purchase of a 20% stake in Cosmote's parent company OTE is motivated by a desire to offset increasing competition from cable and Internet operators on DT's home turf - specifically by expanding its footprint in high-growth markets such as Bulgaria, Romania and Albania.

M&A activity set to change the landscape of SE Europe; Central Asia to follow?

A naked giant in a perfect storm

I enjoyed constructing the title of today's offering. The image of a stoic titan leaning into a howling maelstrom of wind and rain, bereft of protective clothing, is a colourful one, not least on a rare day of hazy sunshine and light Spring breezes here in the north London suburbs (when I started this; the rain is now hammering down). I don't expect it's at all obvious what the title refers to, however. I just looked back at recent post headings and thought they've all been a little too prosaic. That Spring feeling just seems to have me waxing lyrical. Dont' worry. What follows is the usual sensible stuff... and the nude giant in the story makes an appearance before the end of this piece.

The giant concerned is South Africa's former land-line monopolist Telkom, which continutes to adapt to a range of changes in its home market. The managed liberalisation of the country's telecoms sector was catalysed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001, which paved the way for a second national fixed-line operator. With the exception of full mobility, that second wireline player, Neotel, provides a wide range of products including basic voice and data services, high-speed Internet access, VPNs, and network management and hosting.

The new kid on the block, however, has not found competing with Telkom to be without challenges. South African telecoms and tech news portal MyBroadband yesterday picked up a newspaper article whose broad theme is that although the Neotel provides a "welcome" alternative to Telkom, "it doesn't quite offer all the answers."

Penned by Barrie Terblanche of the Mail & Guardian, the article focuses on particular difficulties faces by Neotel in the business telecoms market. Terblanche writes that "years after Neotel received its license to provide South Africa with an alternative to Telkom, by far the majority of small businesses are still forced to depend on the old behemoth for basic fixed telephony – even those businesses situated in the middle of Neotel’s coverage areas in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban."

One reason for this, argues Terblanche, is the lack of fixed-line number portability.

The country's telecoms regulator, ICASA, launched a Mobile Number Portability system in Q4 2006, the first instance of MNP on the African continent. This might have happened even earlier had South Africa's three mobile operators not twice asked the regulatory agency to postpone the introduction of the MNP platform. As my former colleague Matthew Reed (editor of Middle East and Africa Wireless Analyst) noted in a South Africa market update some months later, Cell C, MTN and Vodacom claimed more than once not to be "ready to implement portability" on the earlier scheduled launch dates of March and September 2006. This aroused the ire of no less an individual than billionaire industrialist Sir Richard Branson, whose Virgin brand is used by more than 360 companies worldwide - as I write this, I am still aching as a result of my most recent session in a Virgin Active gym and have yet to pay off the credit card bill for my recent trip to the USA on Virgin Atlantic Airlines.

Branson's interest in South Africa's delayed implementation of MNP stemmed from attempts of the country's Virgin Mobile-branded MVNO to carve out a share of the cellular market. Early last month, when discussing the prospect for MVNOs gaining traction in Africa and India, I observed that this has not been an easy task, noting that Virgin Mobile South Africa had signed up just 600,000 subs by end-2008, of which only 200,000 were active. Back on September 27 2006, a member of Matt Reed's MEAWA team quoted Branson as saying "South Africa's mobile players are dragging their heels on this issue, because it isn't in their best interests... they want to lock their customers in. You shouldn't be held hostage by your mobile phone company."

In the same article, this was refuted by a Vodacom spokesman, who said that the delays had been caused by "the technically complex nature of MNP, which requires new business processes to be designed and implemented."

The article, however, also contended that Cell C, then (and now) the country's third placed mobile operator had lobbied for MNP to be introduced more quickly but that Vodacom and MTN had insisted on a longer delay.

Whichever operator(s) may or may not have been behind any alleged MNP foot-dragging, the MEAWA article of the time raised the question of whether number portability would really have any very significant market impact. "Local analysts have played down the likely effect of MNP on the market," stated the article, which reported the view that fewer than half a million subscribers would be likely to change networks within a year.

I don't have to hand a detailed analysis of to what extent MNP may have driven customer churn in South Africa. There was, however, a little jostling in the year which followed the implentation of number portability. Market-leading Vodacom lost ground a little, but maintained a significant lead over it rivals. The bigger winner over that period Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007 seems to have been Cell C, though not to such a degree that the market changed dramatically. Cell C has, however, coninued to make up ground on its competitors since then - according to the World Cellular Information Service, the Oger Telecom-backed MNO now owns 13.80% of South Africa's mobile subscriptions, up significantly from the 8.61% logged in September 2006. I am absolutely not qualified even to speculate to what degree this is due to MNP. That said, my sense is that number portability has not massively changed the South African mobile market.

What, then, is behind Barrie Terblanche's claim for the degree to which the non-availability of fixed-line number portability has hampered Neotel's efforts to compete with the incumbent wireline opearator? He contends "that only business start-ups really have a choice between Neotel and Telkom, because established businesses can ill afford to give up an existing number."

Terblanche goes on to say that it is not only in the small business space that Neotel is finding the going tough. "Another huge hurdle in the full-scale adoption of Neotel by slightly larger businesses", he writes "is its lack of line-hunting facilities. This provides a business with one public telephone number linked to several lines in the business. When a customer phones the number, the exchange hunts for the first available line and puts the call through." The lack of line hunting, apparently to be solved in the next few months, "means that a business with a PABX still has to rent Telkom lines for incoming calls", continued this Tuesday's Terblanche article.

Tuesday was a good day for commentary on the South African telecoms market. Carried the very same day by MyBroadband was another article taken from the country's Financial Mail. This one, penned by a Duncan McLeod, zeroes in on the former fixed-line monopolist. While Barrie Terblanche contends that Telkom is better positioned than its rivals to compete in the enterprise telephony markets, McLeod constructs an interesting piece around the large number of challenges faced by the incumbent.

The article begins by noting that Telkom is soon to dispose of its 50% stake in market-leading cellco Vodacom, which, despite the advances of Cell C, continues to own slightly more than half of the country's mobile subscriptions. McLeod feels that "the divestiture will reshape SA’s telecommunications landscape for the better" and asserts that "it's sink or swim time for Telkom." Despite Neotel's struggles in the business telephony space, McLeod feels that the incumbent's fixed-line business "is going nowhere fast and, with new competition, it is going to have a hard time defending its top-line revenue and profit margins."

Given the powerful position of Vodacom in its home country, and given its valuable collection of subsidiary opcos in Tanzania, Mozambique, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo, why would Telkom seek to get rid of its stake in the business?

Let me turn once again to MEAWA's Matthew Reed, who in November last year wrote that the sale would free Telkom "from an unsatisfactory relationship with Vodacom." Matt stated "Telkom had hoped that Vodacom would help it to expand into the fast-growing mobile sector and into new markets in Africa, but it has been disappointed by the level of cooperation."

As Matt noted then, Telkom has begun a wireless play of its own. Earlier this month, as reported by TelecomPaper, the operator launched its new Mobi service, which offers mobile voice over a WCDMA network. The mobile service is currently available in Gauteng and Cape Town only.

My understanding is that the shareholder agreement with Vodacom prevents Telkom from building a national mobile network. Instead, to establish a nationwide presence, Telkom must sign a roaming agreement with with MTN and/or Vodacom. Cell C does not fit the bill, having not yet established a 3.5G network.

Beyond the home country, Telkom may also be working to find its own route into the mobile arena. Matt Reed observed in November that the operator had, in 2007, "acquired a 70% stake in Nigerian CDMA operator Multi-Links... and... is thought to have had separate talks with both Zain and Nigeria's No. 2 mobile operator, Globacom, about the possibility of forging partnerships."

Will Telkom's sale of its stake in Vodacom prove, then, to be a smart move? According to Duncan McLeod's article, one vocal supporter of the decision is the incumbent's CFO Peter Nelson, who has praised CEO Reuben September, saying "it showed a lot of leadership and courage... the new Telkom is standalone — I call it the naked Telkom."

This naked giant, McLeod contends, looks set to be caught in "a perfect storm" with the telecoms sector wide open to new competition. Cellcos MTN and Vodacom are free to compete in the wireline area, McLeod writes, also inviting readers to "consider also that new undersea cables will finally end Telkom’s control of international bandwidth."

McLeod reports that Mr. September is, however, "clearly relishing the company’s imminent divorce from Vodacom and the demands of a competitive market" and expresses admiration for the Telkom CEO's willingness to take tough decisions, such as shutting down Telkom Media, the pay TV unit for which a buyer could not be found.

Duncan McLeod wonders whether September will "take flak" for deciding to postpone a project that was set to outsource 19,000 jobs, questioning whether this has resulted from political pressure ahead of the country's elections. CFO Nelson, however, has defended the postponement thus: "We won’t outsource problematic and poorly engineered areas because what happens is you lock in inefficiency and you pay for it forever." McLeod conceded that this is a fair argument, going on to say that "Telkom is still SA's most important communications operator. It is critical for the economy that it doesn’t stumble and fall. Whatever South Africans might feel about Telkom — and it’s often not flattering — September deserves their encouragement."

A naked giant in a perfect storm