Zain Africa Done Deal Watch

Former Zain CEO Al Barrak - exit from Africa caused his departure?

During 2009 DevelopingTelecomsWatch became somewhat preoccupied with the fate of the African assets of MEA mobile powerhouse Zain. As speculation mounted about whether these operations were up for sale and, if so, who the prospective purchasers might be, DTW managed to churn out no less than thirteen Zain-themed articles, the first of these appearing on 12th June. Scratching away at persistent rumours like a mutt with fleas, this blog was still whining on about the story on 18th August.

The whole series of ramblings rejoiced in the clunky title 'Zain Africa Speculation Watch', which has been revived and paraphrased here with today's offering.

Along the way, a number of potential suitors for Zain's African opcos got a mention. These included France Telecom and Vivendi plus Indian operators Reliance Communications and BSNL.

All these months later, it seems fairly safe to assert that the speculation stage is finally over, with shares in another Indian cellco, Bharti Airtel, edging higher on the back of news that it will sign a USD 10.7 billion deal to acquire the Zain's African telecom assets later today.

If, as now appears to be virtually certain, the Indian MNO does manage to conclude this deal, it will be a case of third time lucky, as noted recently by Shalini Singh of the Times of India, who reminds us of Bharti Airtel's two fruitless attempts to engineer a tie-up with South Africa's MTN, another saga which had some coverage here at DTW. As well as observing that the Zain Africa purchase will "catapult Bharti to the rank of the sixth-largest telecom service provider in the world by number of subscribers", Singh feels that it is "an ironic twist of fate" that one of the Indian firm's major competitors in its new markets will be MTN.

With this mega-deal now on the brink of proceeding, perhaps the time is right to ask that Bharti Airtel has to gain (and lose) from competing in so many new markets at once, and to ask what motivated Zain to quit Africa less than five years after entering the continent's mobile arena via the acquisition of Mohamed Ibrahim's Celtel International.

James Middleton of telecoms.com writes that "for Zain, the deal represents a retrenchment of the company's strategy as well as good value." Middleton argues that while the company has succeeded in transforming its brand and in building up an impressive customer base across sub-Saharan Africa, it has struggled to operate profitably.

Quoted in James's article is his fellow Informa Telecoms & Media employee Nick Jotischky, a principal analyst with the firm. "Perhaps it turned to the managed services model too late in the day and failed to leverage its supplier relationships so as to build in sufficient economies of scale", says Jotischky, who suggests that this is where Bharti Airtel will focus its efforts.

"Whilst it will, no doubt, be confident of controlling its costs, Airtel will aim to build up its brand equity characterised by reliability very quickly," says Jotischky. "But reliability alone will not be enough – the newcomer will have to show itself to be innovative as well. In an already competitive marketplace, Bharti will not just be competing with other mobile operators for a share of wallet but with other brands in adjacent consumer goods sectors. This means that Bharti will be under pressure to offer services that are directly relevant to end-users and this will differ from market to market."

James Middleton talks up the chances of the Indian cellco maximising the value of this large new investment. "Bharti has a heritage in making network sharing and outsourcing deals work and will not be afraid of being aggressive on per minute pricing," he writes. "The company is also well versed in addressing the difficulties of serving a largely rural, high-churn, low-revenue market."

Inspired by this transaction, Informa's telecoms.com is currently running a series of articles offering 'ten tips for investing in Africa'.

Informa offer their first tip, that operators need to be innovative on pricing, while noting that mobile tariffs in much of Africa are high compared to those in some other emerging markets. "For example", runs the telecoms.com article, "Zain Kenya’s lowest tariff is about [USD] 0.04 per minute, for on-net calls.. compared to India, where Reliance Communications offers tariffs that are as low as [USD] 0.01 per minute, for both on-net and off-net calls." The article continues by pointing out that the fact that tariffs in Africa are relatively high is reflected in ARPU levels: "In 4Q09 blended monthly ARPU across Africa as a whole was [USD] 10.49 – but in India blended monthly ARPU in 4Q09 was much lower, at just [USD] 2.73, and falling.

However, the article observes that mobile tariffs have already come down in many African markets in the past couple of years as competition has intensified, often because of the market entry of new operators. Usage in Africa, meanwhile,  the article contends, has increased over the past couple of years too. African MoU, however, remains "half that of India's, which does suggest that there is potential for substantial further growth."

This growth opportunity notwithstanding, the gist of Infoma's 'tip' is that "African operators are probably best advised to avoid getting into the kind of price wars that are taking place in the Indian market", where ARPU halved during 2009, creating a big squeeze on  operators' profits.

Rather, Informa advises, "African operators should aim to demonstrate more of the innovation in pricing that is already evident on the continent through plans such as Zain's One Network, which allows subscribers to pay local rates when roaming, and MTN's MTN Zone, a dynamic tariff plan that charges lower rates when the network is not busy."

Let's see whether Bharti Airtel considers this to be sage advice as it embarks on its African adventure.

On a personal note, I will be interested to see whether the Indian cellco will make many changes to the management teams running its numerous newly-acquired opcos - and to listen out for a sense of how far Zain's people around Africa welcome the change of ownership. One opco CEO apparently quite upbeat about all of this is Zain Zambia MD David Holiday:




Presumably less positive about Zain's sales of its African assets is the man who masterminded their acquisition for the Kuwaiti group, former CEO Saad al Barrak, who resigned in February.

At the time, Emeka Obiodu, a senior analyst at Ovum, said: "Al Barrak championed this expansion push – buying Celtel, and aiming to make Zain one of the top ten mobile operators by 2011. But his whole ambition was blown to pieces by the owners who wanted to sell off in Africa."

While Al Barrak and his strategy do appear to have some detractors, Obiodu does not seem to be among them: "He’s taken MTC, this small company from Kuwait and transformed it into Zain, a global mobile powerhouse. He didn't bite of more than he can chew, but his vision diverged from the vision of the owners. When we did some financial analysis on Zain, the company wasn’t doing particularly badly. It wasn’t like he ran the business into the ground, although you have to concede that some of the small markets in Africa were seriously under-performing."

Now we will see whether Bharti Airtel has the patience and vision to stay in these numerous African markets for longer than Al Barrak's former company elected to do.

Zain Africa Done Deal Watch

Unsurprising news of the week

India's Communications & IT Minister: summoned to explain falling revenues at BSNL

To my mind, the least surprising news item so far this week comes from Mansi Taneja of India's Business Standard, who reports that state-owned Indian state-owned telco BSNL is likely to exit a consortium that has been aiming to acquire a 46% in pan-MEA mobile group Zain. According to Taneja, MTNL, the other public sector operator party to the consortium, is also likely to exit since it had agreed to follow BSNL’s lead in the deal.

DevelopingTelecomsWatch has no axe to grind with regard to these two telecoms enterprises, but it won't have escaped the notice of regular readers that this blog has observed some pretty strong criticisms of their performance in their domestic market, most notably in an article written in August.

It was partly with these criticisms in mind that DTW was unsurprised when Etisalat rather than BSNL prevailed in the scramble to acquire the Sri Lankan mobile operator previously owned by Millicom International Cellular. It would, then, cause raised eyebrows at DTW HQ were MTNL to win what looks to be a hotly contested scramble to buy a controlling interested in Zambia's soon-to-be-privatised incumbent fixed line operator, Zamtel. As a recent Cellular News item points out, the list of other interested parties contains some formidable names including Orascom Telecom, Telkom of South Africa and Russia's pan-CIS cellco Vimpelcom, which has recently expanded its footprint into Southeast Asia.

Lest anyone feel that this blog returning quite regularly to the troubles of India's two major state-owned telecoms enterprises is somehow unwarranted, it is worth noting that concern about their prospects has been expressed in the highest circles in the south Asian country. Monday's Economic Times, for example, reported that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is likely to meet the BSNL's management along with Communications and IT Minister A. Raja to look into the causes of the company's falling revenues and to find ways to improve its performance.

According to the Economic Times, BSNL says the loss in net profit and revenue is due to huge wage costs and customers deciding to terminate their fixed line subscriptions. The article states that the company has been struggling with the problem of landlines being surrendered for years now, due to a combination of the increasing popularity of mobile phone and its own service levels falling below customer expectations. In the past three years, the article reports, 6.3 million landline connections have been terminated.

This blog has also documented the company's struggles to capitalise on first-mover advantage in the 3G mobile services space or to take make much of a similar head start with WiMAX broadband services.

In light of all this, DTW remains wary of any claims that BSNL makes about ambitions to grow its business into unfamiliar overseas territories.

Unsurprising news of the week

Canada's 'thirdworldish' policies to stifle wireless competition?

Naguib Sawiris: planning to shake up Canada's wireless market

DTW’s recent article on international ambitions of India’s two major state-owned telecoms operators mentioned that one opportunity they are considering is the acquisition of a controlling stake in Zamtel, the incumbent fixed-line operator in Zambia. It remains to be seen if this joint bid from BSNL and MTNL will succeed and it does look as though some formidable players are also interested.

According to a recent Cellular News article, other interested parties include Telecel Globe (a subsidiary of Orascom Telecom), Telkom (South Africa’s incumbent fixed-line operator) and Russia’s increasingly expansionist Vimpelcom, all of which, the article states, officially began due diligence this week.

Interest in Zamtel is by no means the biggest recent news item about Orascom Telecom and might well have escaped the notice of North American readers whose attention has probably been drawn more readily to the challenges the Egyptian firm is facing in Canada.

Globalive Communications Corp. of Toronto was established in 1998, since which time it has offered competitive long distance plans. Ten years later, the company successfully made a purchase in Industry Canada's radio spectum auction, which paved the way for the creation of a challenger - Globalive Wireless - for the country's established mobile operators, including Telus Mobility, Rogers Wireless and Bell Mobility. The joint efforts of these three major carriers and regional players such as SaskTel have failed to drive national mobile penetration beyond 66.65% according to WCIS. This seems very low for a G8 country that ranks among the world's top ten trading nations. In an interview for Huawei's Communicate magazine earlier this year, Bell Mobility CTO Stephen Howe attributed this state of affairs to three factors: the relatively late licensing of digital wireless spectrum in Canada; Canada' s huge geographical area; the country's robust and unlimited-usage wireline networks.

Globalive Wireless, backed by Orascom Telecom and which had earlier this year announced its intention to launch services under the Wind brand familiar in Italy and Greece, has been led by CEO Ken Cambpell since October 2008. Cambell, whose former roles include a stint running the BITĖ Group, the Vodafone partner network in Lithuania and Latvia, would take issue with Stephen Howe's explanation for Canada's status as a wireless industry laggard. Speaking with Michael Bettiol of Boy Genius Report last month, Campbell lays the blame squarely with the country's wireless carriers:

"Here we’ve got a situation where we pay twice as much as they do in the US, our minutes of use are half of what they are in the US, and wireless penetration is at 65%. Clearly it is a market that is under-developed and where customers simply overpay. The other thing is that in Canada our customer saturation numbers are extremely low. We’ve got a very disenfranchised and very frustrated customer base that is really ripe and in need of competition. The other thing you should know is that this country is dominated by three carriers, but if you look regionally, it is typically two carriers that dominate regional markets. Canada is effectively an oligopoly and in many regions pretty much a duopoly. There is definitely an opportunity with consumers and the numbers speak for themselves."

If, as Michael Bettiol contests, Canadians have "long craved for a new wireless carrier to bust onto the scene and break up what is often described as the anti-competitive practices of [the] incumbents", there must surely be much excitement in the country about the market debut of Wind.

For now, however, any excitement must be deferred a while. Globalive Communications has been in a state of limbo since late last month, when the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ruled that the company is effectively under the control of its Egyptian-based financial backer (Orascom Telecom) and is therefore in breach of rules on foreign ownership and control.

Terence Corcoran of the National Post despairs of the resulting "wireless mess":

"Globalive Wireless has just pumped more than half a billion dollars into the Canadian economy. That includes paying Ottawa $442-million last year for the right to new wireless spectrum, cash now already spent by the federal government stimulating road work in Saskatchewan and writing giant cheques to constituents in Nova Scotia," writes Corcoran, who also notes that "Globalive has also invested another hundred million or more preparing a new Canadian wireless network".

"Having taken Globalive's money", Corcoran continues, "Canada is now telling the company the deal is off."

Corcoran argues that the large spectrum auction fees collected by the Canadian Government would have been far more modest had the participation of Orascom Telecom supremo Naguib Sawiris not been authorised in the first place. Corcoran says that Sawiris has every right to feel mightily aggrieved:

"Whether or not it's possible to sue Ottawa over this thirdworldish policy switch and bureaucratic camel-trading, complete with secret meetings and rule-bending approval processes, it certainly looks like Globalive and its owner, Mr. Sawiris, have a case of some kind, politically and morally, if not legally. Ottawa led Globalive into bidding for spectrum and a major role in the Canadian wireless market, and then it pulled the carpet out from under the company.

This wrangle is a fascinating one for me. In the course of my work, I have spent considerable time networking with telecoms executives from Europe, North America and the Middle East who make their living running operations in less developed countries. I have lost count of the number of times I've heard (doubtless justified) complaints about the complexities and pitfalls of doing business in such markets - regulatory agencies that can be erratic and less than even-handed; taxation policies which stifle growth and innovation; foreign ownership rules which can prove limiting. It is with interest, then, that I read of a company rooted in Egypt encountering in Canada some of the problems I usually hear attributed to much less affluent and developed societies.

Canada's 'thirdworldish' policies to stifle wireless competition?

Knocked back in Sri Lanka, India's state sector telcos continue to eye international expansion opportunities

BSNL: global ambitions?

DevelopingTelecomsWatch has followed, with some interest, suggestions that India's two major state sector telecoms operators - BSNL and MTNL - might be aiming to become international players.

In September, this blog went on a meandering tour of emerging markets M&A rumours, during which it was mentioned that BSNL's bid for Millicom International Cellular's Sri Lankan MNO had been unsuccessful. Tigo Sri Lanka, as reported more recently here, was eventually acquired by Etisalat of the UAE, in a move which prompted some analysts to express fear for the profitability of the island nation's other mobile operators. These commentators have noted that Etisalat tends to compete fiercely on price when coming late to a cellular market.

In the same September M&A tour, DTW also quoted industry watchers who were warning both BSNL and MTNL to steer clear of reported attempts to acquire a stake in Kuwaiti-owned pan-MEA mobile group Zain. A Mint article by Shauvik Ghosh was referenced, in which an anonymous analyst said that BSNL would be advised not to purchase a stake in Zain. "BSNL has a lot of cash on its books but it lacks the ability to execute," said the mystery man. Not shy of the odd split infinitive, the unknown analyst said "Africa is not a market for an operator to just add some revenue to its balance sheet. They have to first show that they can execute in India with the opportunities already in front of them like broadband and 3G before they can venture into bigger game like Zain." A previous DTW article discussed at some length the view that the two public sector telcos have perhaps not yet demonstrated that ability to "execute in India" to anything like a satisfactory degree.

There is evidence, though, from as recently as mid-October, that BSNL and MTNL have not been deterred by such criticism and that the two companies continues to investigate both the Zain opportunity and other potential foreign adventures.

Writing on 15th October, Mansi Taneja of the Business Standard reports that a consortium led by Delhi-based Vavasi Group is in discussions with both BSNL MTNL for a majority stake in a special purpose vehicle that is being formed for a bid for Zain.

Taneja quotes "a top source close to the consortium" who has said: "Our talks with BSNL and MTNL are on track, but we don’t have any exclusivity contract with them. We are also holding informal discussions with other telecom companies, including China Mobile, in case talks with BSNL and MTNL do not fructify."

(note to self: attempt to use the word 'fructify' in conversation this week)

Is it unfair on the two Indian operators to venture the suggestion that the giant Chinese cellco might be a far more powerful player to have involved in an audacious bid to acquire operations and subscribers across Africa and the Middle East? Way back in 2002, the Chinese operator stole Vodafone's crown as the world's leading mobile operator in terms of subscriber numbers. Vodafone was subsequently seen to stake out its credentials as the world's largest cellco by revenues. Finally, in September this year, this accolade was also swiped by China Mobile.

If the Vavasi Group does turn out to be more impressed by the credential of the world's most gigantically-huge-mobile-operator-by-every-measurement-ever than by what BSNL and MTNL can bring to a bid for Zain, where else might the two Indian operators look for overseas growth opportunities?

One possibility, again aired by the indispensable Business Standard, is a much more modest foray into Africa, namely the acquisition of a majority stake in Zamtel, the state-owned incumbent telco of Zambia, which competes in the mobile space and is the monopoly fixed-line operator. On 15th September, the Government of the landlocked southern African country announced its intention to part-privatise the telco through the sale of up to 75% of the company’s equity. Industry watchers Buddecomm, in their Zambia profile, describe the country's wireline infrastructure as "at a very low level of development, which in turn has impeded growth in the Internet sector." Zamtel's monopoly in this space is set to be threatened, continues the Buddecomm profile, which notes that "the country’s ISPs are rolling out wireless broadband networks, which will also position them as competitors in the telecoms sector once VoIP is fully liberalised", something which is meant to be "a key component in Zambia's new ICT Policy."

The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) makes a more upbeat assessment of the Zamtel fixed network, claiming that it connects all major population centres and is undergoing a substantial upgrade, with over 80% of switching infrastructure now digital, and DSL capacity being rolled out. The ZDA claims that Zamtel’s primary fixed-wireless network is also being upgraded and expanded, with coverage and capacity expected to more than double within the next twelve months. Zamtel’s secondary fixed-wireless network, based on WIMAX technology, is designed to cover the whole of metropolitan Lusaka, and is scheduled to go live during 2010, says the ZDA.

In the mobile space, Zamtel lags a long way behind its competitors in terms of market share. The stats, estimated for September 2009 by WCIS look like this:

1. Zain Zambia - 72.17%
2. MTN Zambia - 23.12%
3. Zamtel - 4.71%

Zamtel, then, is struggling to compete effectively against two of Africa's leading mobile groups. There is, however, room for all competitors to grow, with Zambia's mobile penetration rate currently standing at just under 33% according to WCIS. Whether BSNL and MTNL are ideally suited to improving the fortunes of the company, however, could be questioned in light of some of the criticisms aired here about their performance in their home market of India. According to the Business Standard, the two public sector telcos are joined by seven other companies or consortia from in having successfully prequalified to participate in a bid for Zamtel.

Should both the relatively modest aspiration of buying control of Zambia's incumbent operator and the rather more grand designs on Zain both come to nought, MTNL and BSNL do appear to have ambitions to establish a presence in other regions.

Again, I am indebted to India's Business Standard for an update. According to an article of October 23rd, the two operators, along with the Vavasi Group, are planning to set up new operations in Russian and western Europe.

Under this deal, the article states, Vavasi "is acquiring frequency spectrum and licences for Russia and several western European countries" and "the same [special purpose vehicle] that is being formed to acquire a majority stake in Zain will be used to invest in the Russian operations."

Confirming the development, a senior Vavasi executive is quoted as having said: "We are in the process of acquiring a licence for the new generation (NG)-1 technology and have applied in Russia and four other European countries."

This is where I betray the fact that I am not an engineer by wondering about this "NG-1 technology". What is it? The Business Standard article claims that "NG-1 technology is an alternative to GSM and CDMA and was developed in the US universities" and that "Vavasi claims that the network needs lower capital expenditure as well as operating expenses."

I'll hold my hands up. This is a new one on me.

An inspection of the Vavasi website reveals that NG-1 is a proprietary wireless access technology the company has developed itself and which it claims "understands the need of both rural and urban areas". Impressive sounding claims are also made for the spectrum efficiency and eco-friendly credentials of the technology.

NG-1 sounds wonderful - but can proprietary kit from India really prevail against global standards such as WiMAX, HSPA and LTE?

Some grand claims, then, are being made about the ambitions of India's two major state sector telecoms companies. Some of these claims seem to be articulated rather more loudly by the Vavasi Group than by the telcos themselves. I wonder how much there is in all of this. Can two operators that have attracted much criticism in their home market really be set to emerge as global players?

Knocked back in Sri Lanka, India's state sector telcos continue to eye international expansion opportunities

What next for Bharti Airtel in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

Sunil Bharti Mittal: looking to new opportunities in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

Will they? Won't they? Will they? Won't they?

No. Not now - and maybe not ever.

Of the two big telecoms M&A deals discussed by this blog over the last few months, one has definitely stalled, seemingly not to be revived again this year.

We've been here before. Giant Indian cellco Bharti Airtel and South Africa's multinational mobile group MTN failed to come together last year. Now, after months of discussions and a repeatedly extended deadline for those talks, the two firms have once again failed to find a way to combine their assets into one giant emerging markets player which would have been the third largest telecoms company in the world, according to the Indian MNO's statement about the scrapped merger plans.

Bharti Airtel maintains that the planned alliance "was a vision based on solid fundamentals" and that "substantial synergies could have been captured" with the proposed transaction. The Indian firm's statement indicates that much thought was given to the "the sensibilities and sensitivities of both companies and both their countries" and contends that "the proposed deal structure took into account their leadership in their respective geographies to ensure continuity of business - including listing, tax residencies, management, brand etc." With what sounds like a note of regret about a missed opportunity, the statement expresses the opinion that "the deal would have been a significant step in promoting South-South cooperation - a vision of the two countries."

So what's gone wrong this time? The Bharti Airtel statement indicates that failure to gain the approval of the South African Government is what has caused both companies to take the decision to disengage from discussion. James Middleton of Informa Telecoms & Media also describes the aborted transaction as a case of both firms failing to convince the Zuma Government, which is MTN's biggest shareholder via the Public Investment Corporation (a pension fund), of the value of the deal.

Another Informa scribe, the shadowy 'Informer', in his usual playful manner, reaches for the fairly obvious metaphor of a cancelled wedding and has some fun with it. Writing yesterday, the mystery man of Mortimer House jokes that that "the parents of the bride-to-be" were "clearly unimpressed by the quality of her suitor."

While the Indian firm expresses the hope that "the South African government will review its position in the future and allow both companies an opportunity to re-engage," it's probably legitimate to wonder if there will be the appetite to revisit this again for a third time. I'm all in favour of persistence - God loves a tryer and all that. I've also learned, though, that 'no' often means... 'no'. Happily, I've not had the chastening experience of asking several times for a lady's hand in marriage and being repeatedly spurned. My guess, though, is that I'd probably start to take the hint at the second knock-back. If Sunil Bharti Mittal and his management team feel at all like that, then this recent disappointment begs a new question: What next?

In its statement about the failed tie-up with MTN, Bharti Airtel stated that the company "will continue to explore international expansion opportunities that are consistent with its vision and bring value to its shareholders." I would expect that to be the case, having expressed the view back in February that competitive pressures on home turf might force the Indian operator to identify investment targets around the world.

As the year has unfolded since then, some of these pressures have not proven to be as strong as might have been feared. For example, one threat my February article identified was state-owned operators (i.e. BSNL and MTNL) stealing a march in the 3G space and in the WiMAX services arena. As we have seen here since, however, it now appears that the two big public sector telcos have failed to make much of this this first-mover advantage.

Other pressures do continue to exist, though, even in a massively booming market. Since that February article, India's mobile operators have added almost 100 million subscriptions. Bharti Airtel's share of the vast subscriber base, however, has slipped a little, with ground conceded to a strongly performing Reliance Communications and to smaller players whose market share has improved a bit, notably Aircel and Russian-owned MTS India.

Where, then, will the giant MNO seek new growth opportunities outside its home territory? Back in February, I aired the view that Bharti Airtel may be almost uniquely well suited to the challenges of African markets, noting that the Indian operator has to cope with the lowest tariffs in the world while sustaining growth. More than once, when reporting the rumoured sale of a set of African mobile operators, this blog has noted that those operations are rather less profitable than the parent company's properties in the Middle East. Bharti Airtel, then, might be the most obvious fit to purchase those assets. The group being referred to here is, of course, Zain.

So, could the failure to tie-up with MTN now put the Indian operator in the frame as a suitor either for Zain's African portfolio or for a stake in the entire Kuwaiti-headquartered group? Maybe. Consider this from the chuckling 'Informer':

"You shouldn’t stick around where you’re not wanted... there are, after all, plenty more fish in the sea. The Informer suggests that Bharti has a look at Zain, instead. Zain gives the impression of being a little more, how shall we say… available."

If this were to happen, I'd guess that a link-up with MTN would be permanently off the cards, due to the significant overlapping of the Zain and MTN footprints.

What next for Bharti Airtel in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

M&A mystery tour: Zain, Tigo Sri Lanka, Vivendi's foray into Brazil

Zain Group: all operations up for grabs?

Over the (northern hemisphere) summer months, this blog became very preoccupied with whispers about a 'for sale' sign supposedly being slapped onto the African assets of Kuwait-headquartered mobile group Zain. So much so that an inelegant title (Zain Africa Speculation Watch) was cobbled together for what quickly became a series of articles. That series ran to no less than thirteen episodes, such was the number of conflicting rumours doing the rounds from June to August. Of late, though, this long-running tale has meandered in a new direction - towards the idea that a significant stake in the whole Zain group may be sold, not merely its operations in Africa.

A reading of media reports coming out this week suggests this is looking increasingly likely. One such comes from Tom Gara, writing for the UAE's English language newspaper, the National. Gara reports that the Kuwaiti group leading the sale has announced that it will sell its stake in Zain to a consortium of Indian and Malaysian investors. The Kharafi Group - whose other activities include construction, civil engineering and the manufacturing of consumer goods - officially owns about 10% of Zain, writes Gara, but is believed by analysts to control up to 25% of the telecoms firm through subsidiaries and associates.

Gara reports that on Tuesday this week, a Kharafi subsidiary ran an advertisement in Kuwaiti newspapers, inviting investors owning fewer than 300,000 Zain shares to participate in the sale. "We hope that this preserves the rights and interests of small shareholders and gives them priority," the advertisement said.

What of the prospective purchasers? Gara describes them as a consortium led by India’s Vavasi Group and backed by Malaysian billionaire Syed al Bukhary. This consortium has apparently indicated that a purchase price has yet to be confirmed.

Gara also states that "two large Indian state-owned telecommunications companies that were originally listed as members of the consortium have since denied making any decision on the deal." Regular readers will surely know that this refers to MTNL and BSNL. The latter, says Shauvik Ghosh of Indian business newspaper Mint, writing earlier this week, may not want to pick up a stake in Zain because of an urgent need to hold on to its cash to maintain interest earnings, to pay for 3G spectrum and to fund an ongoing restructuring programme critical for long-term profitability. The last point certainly chimes with the critical analyses of BSNL's performance reported here at DTW.

The Mint article also quotes analysts who are similarly critical of the state of BSNL. One of these, who remains anonymous, warns that the public sector telco would be advised to stay away from the Zain stake purchase. "BSNL has a lot of cash on its books but it lacks the ability to execute," he says. "Africa is not a market for an operator to just add some revenue to its balance sheet. They have to first show that they can execute in India with the opportunities already in front of them like broadband and 3G before they can venture into bigger game like Zain."

One foreign adventure which certainly seems not to be on the cards for BSNL is its mooted purchase of the Millicom International Cellular operation in Sri Lanka. On Wednesday, India's Economic Times carried the news that the state-owned firm had bid for the Tigo-branded cellco. By Friday, the Business Standard was reporting that this bid had been rejected. "They have not considered our bid", BSNL Chairman Kuldeep Goyal told a reporter. "We had quoted a value [that] we thought was appropriate but it has fallen short of their expectations."

This blog recently opined about the likely consolidation of the fiercely competitive Sri Lankan mobile market, with one possibility being that Bharti Airtel could purchase the Tigo-branded MNO - the giant Indian operator already has an operation in Sri Lanka. The recent Business Standard article also mentions rumours of Bharti Airtel's interest in the transaction - as well as interest from another prospective purchaser already present in the Sri Lankan market, Malaysia's Axiata. The only seemingly interested party still being mentioned whose presence in Sri Lanka would not lead to market consolidation is the UAE's Etisalat, which is also mentioned in the Business Standard story. Total Telecom reported on Monday that the Emirati firm has indeed submitted a bid.

Plenty of interest in Tigo Sri Lanka, then. Let's see who prevails.

What news, though, of erstwhile protagonists from the early episodes of the now-fizzled out Zain Africa Speculation Watch mini-series here at DTW? Regular readers may recall that the whole hoo-ha was initially set off by rumours of interest from French telecoms and media conglomerate Vivendi. Having heard nothing since about that the company's plans, I was interested this week to read a report from my former colleague at Informa Telecoms & Media, Mr James Middleton. While the Zain Africa business came to nothing, James writes that the French group seems to remain keen on increasing its footprint in emerging markets beyond Morocco, where it controls Maroc Telecom. Vivendi, perhaps best known by telecoms watchers for its controlling stake in French cellco and broadband player SFR, has now launched a EUR 2 billion offer for 100% of Brazilian fixed line carrier GVT, which offers VoIP telephony, corporate data, broadband, internet services and pay TV, writes James.

As of June 30, 2009, GVT had approximately 2.3 million customer lines in service, including voice, broadband, data and VoIP services. It is one of the smaller players competing against giants like Oi, América Móvil and Telefónica.

So, after wandering across Africa, South Asia and South America, here concludes another whistle-stop tour of telecoms M&A stories from emerging markets. Let's see which of these has further to run.

M&A mystery tour: Zain, Tigo Sri Lanka, Vivendi's foray into Brazil

Millicom's Asian sell-off: two down, one to go

Vimpelcom's Beeline brand: next stop Laos

Back in late July, global emerging markets mobile group Millicom International Cellular announced that its Asian assets were up for sale. Since then, this blog has tracked other telecoms groups' interest in these operations.

The first confirmed transaction was the sale of Millicom's majority stake in Cambodian mobile operator Cellcard to another of the existing shareholders, the Royal Group. When Millicom first announced its intention to quit Cambodia, Mikael Grahne, the company's CEO, explained that this was partly due to the negative effect on profitability caused by the disruptive market-entrance strategies of the new players that have recently flocked to the Southeast Asian country's crowded mobile arena.

When DTW first covered this story, we saw that the Royal Group's CFO Mark Hanna was quick to dismiss any such concerns about profitability. We have also seen here, however, that in the months which have followed, Mr Hanna has himself felt the need to attack a new entrant for allegedly selling services below the cost of delivery. The apparently disruptive player in question is Beeline Cambodia, controlled by giant Russian mobile firm Vimpelcom.

As the dispute between mobile operators in Cambodia rumbles on acrimoniously, then, perhaps it is legitimate to wonder if a similar set of circumstances will unfold in neighbouring Laos, another country from which Millicom has been seeking to extract itself.

With a mobile penetration rate of just 27.14% (end of June, according to WCIS), Laos would appear to be quite attractive in terms of growth potential. WCIS estimates that Millicom's Tigo-branded operation has built a 17.01% share of current subscriptions since its own market debut back in 2003, when it became the third entrant.

The longest-established mobile offering in Laos is that of the country's incumbent fixed-line operator, Lao Telecom, in which the the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic holds a 51% stake. Via a company named Shenington Investments, the other stakeholders are Thai communications satellite operator Thaicom, ST Telemedia, and Qatari telecoms group Qtel.

While the later entrants have, of course, eroded Lao Telecom's share of the mobile market, this share has only fallen as far as the 60% mark - still a dominant position. I will not pretend to know a lot about the telecoms market of Laos, but I note that the country profile available from Australian research firm Buddecomm mentions that "the rate of regulatory reform continues to lag well behind industry development and has the potential to derail the progress already made if the reform is not speeded up." This, perhaps, explains the qualified success of those challenging the national incumbent telco in the mobile space and might be part of why Millicom preferred to focus its efforts elsewhere.

Undeterred by such challenges, however, is the purchaser of the 78% stake that Millicom International Cellular held in Tigo Laos. That purchaser, as I learned yesterday from TeleGeography, is none other than Russia's Vimpelcom, whose Cambodian Beeline-branded operation has been offering aggressively priced services and arousing the anger of its competitors in the process. If Vimpelcom is planning something similar in Laos, perhaps the arrival of Beeline's low-price offerings will accelerate the growth of the country's modest mobile penetration rate. It's also possible that any such strategy would cause the same friction as seen in Cambodia. Beeline comes to Laos and grows its SE Asia cluster. Let's see if there's a sting in the tale.

Regarding Millicom's plan to quit Asian markets and sharpen its focus on Africa and Latin America, just one task remains - the disposal of its asset in Sri Lanka. DTW has noted in previous articles that interest seems to be strong. The last I read about it, both India's BSNL and the UAE's Etisalat remain in what some are describing now as a "race" to buy Millicom's Sri Lankan operation.

Millicom's Asian sell-off: two down, one to go

Sri Lankan mobile market: one way or another, consolidation looks likely

Sri Lankans queue to get their hands on Airtel 's low price offers earlier this year

When Bharti Airtel's Sri Lanka operation Airtel Lanka launched its cut price services in January this year, the new cellco became the fifth operator competing for a share of the country's mobile market. The number of mobile service providers in the island nation, however, may soon be set to fall back to four. This will depend, though, on which party comes forward to snap up one operator currently sporting a 'for sale' sign.

Up for grabs is Tigo Sri Lanka, one of the Asian operations that Millicom International Cellular is keen to sell. When this blog first commented on Millicom's planned withdrawal the three Asian markets in which it has done business, Axiata (formerly Telekom Malaysia International) was mentioned as a possible purchaser of two of these operations - Tigo Sri Lanka and Cambodia's Cellcard. In both cases this would lead to market consolidation - in Sri Lanka, Axiata has a controlling stake in market-leading cellco Dialog Telekom; Cambodian MNO Hello is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Malaysian group. As discussed in the most recent DTW article, however, it was another existing shareholder in the Cambodian cellco (the Royal Group) which eventually relieved Millicom of its stake in Cellcard. Given that other organisations have been more recently and more regularly touted as potential purchasers of Tigo Sri Lanka, Malaysia's Axiata also seems to be out of the running with regard to that opportunity.

One potential suitor mentioned very recently is state-owned Indian operator BSNL, whose management committee approved a proposal to submit a bid to acquire the Sri Lankan operator company last week, according to Manoj Gairola of the Hindustan Times.

The public sector telco seems to have attracted considerable criticism of late, some of which has been reported here. Quite striking was the August 12th article written by Kunal Kumar Kundu, who feels that BSNL is crippled by political interference, poor demand forecasting, lack of effective budgetary control and a bloated payroll. This blog has also reported the very modest take-up of BSNL's wireless broadband offerings and negative feedback about the company's preferred franchisee business model for the development of both 3G mobile and WiMAX services. Almost as often, however, the state-owned operator has been linked here with possible overseas investments. Perhaps the competitive pressure from India's numerous private sector mobile players is felt so keenly by BSNL's management that foreign opportunities are seen as a much better bet in terms of realistic growth opportunities. This may explain the fact that in the few months since the inception of this blog, the Indian operator has been mentioned in connection with a stake in pan-MEA mobile group Zain and with a new telecoms licence in Tunisia. BSNL's interest in Tigo Sri Lanka, then, is perhaps not very surprising.

Also connected in media reports with the sale of Tigo Sri Lanka is the UAE's Etisalat, which in August was reported to be considering an investment in the country now that the long civil war seems to have finally reached a conclusion. Priyantha Kariyapperuma, Director General of Sri Lanka's telecoms regulator, reportedly met with a visiting official from Etisalat last month and told journalists that "with the war over in May, there is ample scope for investments into telecom services and infrastructure facilities, especially in the north and east," referring to the area of the island that was most affected by the conflict. Few of the reports on Etisalat's possible interest in Sri Lanka have stated explicitly that the UAE company's route into the country's market would be via the acquisition of the Tigo-branded MNO. All of these reports, however, mention the availability of Millicom's Sri Lankan operation, so perhaps it's not unreasonable to infer that the Emirati company might have had Tigo Sri Lanka in its sights.

The most recent name floated in connection with the opportunity, however, is one from India rather than from the Middle East. As with an Axiata purchase, this move would also lead to market consolidation - because the company concerned is Bharti Airtel, already present in the Sri Lanka market since January, as we noted at the top of this article.

It seems, then, that the management of the giant Indian telecoms firm is not completely absorbed by the ongoing negotiations about the proposed mega-merger with South Africa's MTN. That saga has been notable for the repeatedly-extended deadline for concluding the talks and for various parties weighing in with opinions about the desirability of the mooted deal. One recently expressed opion comes from South Africa's Communications Minister, Siphiwe Nyanda, who voiced caution over the proposed tie-up in an interview yesterday. The Minister told the Sunday Times that any deal should take into account that MTN was a "South African company with a footprint in Africa." I take this to mean that there exists concern over MTN potentially losing its identity as a telecoms group with its roots - and the bulk of its business - in Africa. The Minister's comments are certainly of relevance given that South Africa's Government-owned Public Investment Corporation holds a 21% stake in MTN.

Bharti Airtel's interest in Tigo Sri Lanka came to my attention earlier this week, when R. Jai Krishna of the Wall Street Journal reported comments from an unnamed person close to the development. Suggesting that any deal would be worth USD 100-120 million, the mystery source said "in Sri Lanka, if you need to be a significant player in the market, you need to do an acquisition... greenfield, you will not be successful," by way of explaining the rationale behind Bharti Airtel's rumoured move.

A strengthened presence in Sri Lanka on the part of the Indian cellco could be welcomed by consumers - certainly if the company continues to compete aggressively on price, a strategy that has yielded impressive subscriber growth. Since going to market in January, the new entrant had 900,000 subs by the end of June, according to WCIS market intelligence. Another Informa Telecoms & Media service, Global Mobile Daily, reported in late July that Airtel Lanka claimed to have reached the one million subs mark.

The Bharti-owned cellco, however, has seen some of its competitors crying foul over its tariffs. Late last month, for example, Duruthu Edirimuni Chandrasekera of Sri Lanka's Sunday Times, reported that some operators have threatened to cut their interconnection with Airtel Lanka to retaliate for the the Indian-owned company failling to withdraw tariffs not approved by the country's telecoms regulator.

This sounds oddly familiar - the most recent article here covered a very similar wrangle over tariffs and interconnect agreements in Cambodia. Competition in Asia's mobile markets, then, certainly seems to be brutally fierce right now. Again I find myself voicing the view that there may well be casualties when the going gets this tough.

What price on mobile market consolidation in Sri Lanka then?

Sri Lankan mobile market: one way or another, consolidation looks likely

Big trouble in Indochina

Cambodia's mobile operators are in for some serious wrangling and the country's consumers are in for some serious savings - for now, at least.

A week ago, courtesy of Cellular News, I learned that the southeast Asian country's cellcos have been at odds, with one MNO accusing another of offering loss-leading tariffs. The alleged offender is Sotelco, which is backed by Vimpelcom and which operates under the same Beeline brand familiar to mobile users in the CIS markets of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia and Armenia. Making the accusations, according to a TeleGeography article on the same story, is Mark Hanna, CFO of the Royal Group, a Cambodian investment and development company whose assets include a stake in Cellcard, the mobile operator whose large share of the country's cellular market (currently 48.41% according to WCIS) has been steadily eroded by newer entrants over the last couple of years.

The Cambodian mobile market is something of a paradox. One on hand we have boosters such as the Royal Group proclaiming that Cambodia has "a booming economy, second in Asia only to China in double-digit GDP growth" and that it "enjoys a stable political situation, together with the most welcoming and liberal business, investment and trade environment in ASEAN." All of this sounds very attractive. On the other hand, Millicom International Cellular, which owns a majority stake in Cellcard, has opted to quit the Cambodian market, having found the level of competition to be excessive in the country's very crowded mobile sector.

Having written back in July about Millicom's decision to exit this and other Asian markets (also Laos and Sri Lanka), the last I heard was that the company has agreed to sell its stake in Cellcard to the Royal Group. Interest in Millicom's Sri Lankan operation, meanwhile, has been expressed by Indian state owned telco BSNL, which, along with fellow public sector operator MTNL, is also said to be mulling over a 46% stake in pan-MEA giant Zain (of which more here later, no doubt).

Certainly, the intensely competitive battle between Cambodia's nine (!!!) cellcos does seem to be cited as the reason for operators' sliding revenues in the country. One example of this, as reported by Steve Finch of the Phnom Penh Post reported late last month, comes from Axiata-backed Hello. While the Malaysian parent company recorded a 44% rise in net profit overall for Q2 2009, its Cambodia operation suffered from a "challenging" business environment, a recent statement said. According to Axiata, "major operators are facing intense competition on pricing, and new operators are offering free SIM cards and free minutes to capture market share." This has affected Hello to the tune of a 17.4% slide in 2Q 2009 revenues.

While Vimpelcom's operation is just the latest disruptive new entrant, this blog has discussed similar tactics on the part of another latecomer, Metfone, a subsidiary of Viettel, an operator from neighbouring Vietnam. Since its launch late last year, the Vietnamese-backed cellco has carved out an impressive 11.66% share of the Cambodian mobile subs market according to WCIS. Last time I covered this, it was stated that Metfone's market share was 17.47% - so I think the good people at WCIS have revised some of their June 2009 figures for Cambodia, doubtless in line with more recently received market intelligence. The lower figure, though, is still very solid. So I stand by the remark I made back in July about there probably not being many precedents worldwide for an operator making such a strong impact so quickly in such an already-congested market.

As discussed here before, Metfone has rapidly built a customer base through the distribution of free SIM cards and airtime, as bemoned by the good folks at Axiata. Further, and as I discussed in a March article on the links between telcos in countries with left-of-centre government and/or centrally planned economies, Viettel Deputy General Director Nguyen Manh Hung has been quoted as saying that Metfone intends to extend services to Cambodia's lower income groups and thereby "contribute to society." I have taken this to mean that the Vietnamese company, with its roots in the military establishment of a socialist republic, is free to interpret the profit motive rather differently than those of us who are compelled to think of shareholder value when we go to work every day.

I don't know if Metfone's very aggressive pricing is now a thing of the past - but it is Beeline Cambodia's actions that have been making the headlines of late and arousing the ire of the Royal Group.

Last Wednesday, the Phnom Penh Post reported that the Vimpelcom-backed operator had been accused of reneging on a promise to avoid selling services "below the cost of connecting across networks". It seems that while Beeline has ceased to make its controvesial 'Boom' tariff plan available only to new subscribers. The Royal Group's Mark Hanna contends that this violates the agreement Beeline struck with the country's regulator. Beeline Cambodia General Director Gael Campan is unrepentant. The operator sent text messages to all users already signed up for the 'Boom' tariff that the rate would remain "forever". Campan has also argued that it is not selling below cost, and that its pricing policy is little different from a supermarket selling most products for a profit with a number of promotions added to entice customers and build loyalty.

Application forms for Beeline’s Boom tariff. Photo: Sovan Philong, Phnom Penh Post

Campan has made accusations of this own, claiming that Cellcard has limited interconnection between the two networks throughout the heated dispute.

Despite the continuing disagreement, stated last Wednesday's Phnom Penh Post article, Campan has neither threatened legal action nor received word of Cellcard planning a lawsuit. Both sides, however, continues the article, have made claims of legal infringement. While Beeline has accused Cellcard of violating an interconnection contract, interconnection standards and therefore Cambodian regulations by blocking its network, Cellcard accuses Beeline of illegally using its rival's prefixes to get around interconnectivity issues. Hanna said Beeline had "violated national security and the ITU guidelines on the use of mobile prefixes".

Undeterred by criticism from rivals, Beeline Cambodia announced this week that the über-cheap 'Boom' tariff is to be followed with another very aggressive offering. Ith Sothoeuth of the ever-indispensable Phnom Penh Post writes that customers will only be charged for the first minute of any calls they make of up to 15 minutes' duration within the Beeline network. Under the "Super Zero" plan, the per-minute charge will kick in again after 15 minutes, while calls across networks will be charged at USD 0.06 per minute, compared with USD 0.05 per minute at all times on all networks on the controversial "Boom" plan, Beeline Commercial Director Benoin Janin told a press conference last Friday. "Super Zero" SIM cards will cost just USD 0.50 under a promotion running until December 31, though the Super Zero tariff will continue for already-qualified users indefinitely, or until the company changes its pricing policy, reports Sothoeuth.

Beeline's Campan, writes Sothoeuth, also said on Friday that he hopes to resolve the dispute with Cellcard and added that the connectivity issue would not help the Royal Group-controlled MNO in the long run. "It is a very fragmented market right now, and nobody has the majority of subscribers," he said. Cellcard, he continued "is not the biggest part of the market; the majority of subscribers are with the other operators. We want to work with them as much as possible, and if [they do] not want to give their subscribers access to Beeline customers, it's their problem, not ours." Tough talk - although, as we have seen from the WCIS numbers, it's only just about true that Cellcard does not own a majority of subs.

Following earlier musings here about Metfone's pricing and its effects on market value in Cambodia, this latest wrangle strengthens my feeling that the country's mobile scene is surely bound to see some degree of consolidation soon. Observing from an admittedly long distance, I'm inclined to think a competitive war of attrition cannot continue unchecked for very much longer. I wonder what prices Cambodia's mobile users will be paying when the number of service providers shrinks.

Big trouble in Indochina

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 13

Anil Ambani, Reliance Communications: eyeing Zain's African operations?

The newswires have been humming with more than enough Zain-related information over the last few days to justify this thirteenth episode of our mini-series following the summertime rumours around the Kuwaiti telecoms firm.

On Sunday, Eman Goma of Reuters reported that the pan-MEA mobile group has asked shareholders to vote on removing certain ownership restrictions, a move that would pave the way for selling a large stake. This seems to have prompted a Sunday surge in Zain's shares on the Kuwaiti stock exchange, as speculation rose that the move could allow an outside investor to take a large stake in the company.

In the most recent chapter of the Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch story, we considered the possible sale of the 24.61% stake in the operator held by the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) (the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund) - Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai, had reported that "the KIA has no objection to discussing any offer to buy its stake in Zain whether made by the UAE’s Etisalat or others under the condition that the offer would be serious and with attractive returns."

Without expressing an opinion about possible purchasers of that stake, it now seems that Zain's management would welcome the opportunity to part ways with the KIA. As a Cellular News article reported this week, Zain CEO Saad al-Barrak has said that he wants to see the sovereign wealth fund sell its stake in his company as soon as possible. "I wish they would leave tomorrow, and I am working on this," he said. He added that the motivation was to ensure the company could operate without political interference.

Whatever the future holds for the group as a whole, stories continue to bubble up about Zain's African portfolio. Only yesterday, that man Eman Goma was reporting comments made by Barrak to al-Rai, to the effect that the company is in talks with three major telecoms firms, including one from India, to sell all or part of its African operations.

Which companies are being referred to here? One of them might be France Telecom. Ten days ago we noted here that in a recent Reuters note on the French incumbent telco's need to limit margin erosion, Finance Director Gervais Pellisier was quoted as saying that the company "might look at some of the African assets of Kuwait's Zain if the latter decided to sell them in parts."

What about the unnamed Indian party? Could that be Bharti Airtel? Back in February, I would not have hesitated to offer that name as my best guess. An article by a former colleague of mine, Nick Jotischky of Informa Telecoms & Media, prompted me to write my own piece about whether India's market-leading cellco might be driven to more aggressive international expansion by the numerous competitive pressures it faces in its home market.

Since then, of course, the Indian mobile operator has been involved in lengthy talks with South Africa's MTN group about a possible tie-up between the two. Given the apparent complexity of those discussions, is it naïve of me to assume that simultaneous talks with Zain would not be feasible? After all, my understanding has always been than an exclusivity agreement has been locking Bharti Airtel and MTN out of discussions with other prospective bedfellows. Earlier this month, the Bharti Group announced the extension of this exclusivity period through to 31st August, and the Economic Times has reported in the last few hours that Bharti Airtel is now very close to raising the funds needed for what would India’s biggest cross-border deal to date, surpassing Tata Steel’s acquisition of Corus for USD 12.2 billion in 2007.

Even if it were possible for India's leading mobile operator to discuss any interest in Zain's African assets at the same time as working on its mooted tie up with MTN, another complication would be that the Kuwaiti group and the South African group have somewhat overlapping footprints. The two companies compete with each other in Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia.

As Eman Goma's article noted, this issue of overlapping assets would also have to be taken into account in any approach Etisalat may make for Zain. Goma quotes Prime Holdings analyst Sleiman Aboulhosn, who says that the Emirati group may be content to cherry pick some of Zain's assets in the region, given regulatory restrictions on a wholesale purchase. "Etisalat cannot buy the ones that co-exist with its own assets, for example in Nigeria," he said in Dubai. "So they might be interested in some parts."

If Bharti Airtel is currently an unlikely suitor for Zain, which other Indian companies might be making the enquiry mentioned by Saad al-Barrak? One possible candidate is state-owned telco BSNL. In June, Reuters reported comments made by the company's Chairman, Kuldeep Goyal, who said the the public sector telco is looking to expand to Africa by acquiring new licences or stakes in firms. "We are looking into various options there... getting into new licences, which are being issued, or partnering with existing licencees (and) taking a stake," Goyal told reporters. Asked whether BSNL, which has cash stockpile of more than USD 6 billion, was ready for a big acquisition, he said: "Yes, why not?"

The positive assessment of the state of BSNL is not shared by Kunal Kumar Kundu of consulting and IT services firm InfoSys. In our most recent article here at DTW, I quoted Kundu's recent Asia Times article, which is nothing short of a gloomy assessment of the health of the state-owned operator, which he feels is set to go the way of struggling government-run Air India, "which has had to crawl cap in hand for a state bailout to survive."

If Kundu's analysis is correct, and if this would prevent any ambitious foreign adventures by BSNL (rather than perhaps actually making it imperative to consider them), perhaps Reliance Communications is a more plausible prospective purchaser of some or all of Zain's African assets? Towards the middle of last year, the Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group-owned operator withdrew from inconclusive talks of its own with MTN. Another Economic Times article written in the last few hours suggest that the Indian operator's interest in Africa has not waned since then. Amrita Nair-Ghaswalla writes that "sources" have named Reliance Communications as the Indian company currently in discussions with Zain.

The last time DTW visited the topic of all this speculation about the future of Zain, much was made of the impresssive performance of the company's stock since the rumour mill really got churning around mid-May. I even considered whispers passed to a loyal DTW reader - and then to me - to the effect that "the whole Zain thing" has merely been a highly successful attempt to manipulate the Kuwaiti group's share price. If there is anything in that suggestion, the success of any such ruse would appear to have come to a halt around a week after we discussed it here, should we choose to heed the warning noises emanating from Dubai-based investment bank Shuaa Capital. Late last week, Ramya Dilip of Reuters noted that the bank had downgraded Zain to "sell" from "neutral," saying the risk-reward profile of the shares were no longer attractive at current levels.

Around the same time, another Reuters piece carried quotes from analysts who could see the logic of selling the African assets and predictions about Zain's ongoing strategy in the wake of any such sale.

"The African operations are the major contribution to the revenues and subscriber base," said Jithesh Gopi, head of research at Bahrain-based Sico Investments. "But as far as net profit ... they have not been a contributor to the group."

According to this article, African markets account for about 62% of Zain's 64.7 million customers, but only 15 % of the group's net profit, as of the end of March. Seven out of 16 African operations, the article states, made a first-quarter net lost. In the Middle East, only the Saudi Arabian operation was loss-making.

"It's going to be a company that's refocused on the Middle East with a series of very strong franchises," said Simon Simonian, a telecom sector analyst at Shuaa Capital.

If Simonian is correct, Zain's growth plans would be downgraded as the majority of the Middle East markets served by the group are mature to the point of saturation, the exceptions being Jordan and Iraq, where operators face security issues, a relatively unpredictable regulatory/licensing environment and the prospect of a new entrant in the mobile space.

In that scenario, Zain would presumably focus primarily on upgrading existing networks and increasing revenues from mobile broadband multimedia services.

Work of this kind is naturally ongoing across the group's Middle Eastern operations. The Saudi opco, for example, last week announced that it had secured a USD 2.5 billion Islamic loan facility (Murabahah), which will be used to repay an existing Murabahah facilitating network expansion and future growth.

In Bahrain meanwhile, writes Roger Field of ITP, Zain is planning to upgrade its network with LTE technology in a bid to "future proof" its operation and gain an advantage over rival operator Batelco and the new entrant cellco owned by Saudi Telecom. Field observes that Zain Bahrain has failed to provide a timeframe for the network upgrade, but notes that similar projects in other parts of the world are expected to take more than a year to complete, from the time they were announced.

This wraps up another episode in this ongoing saga. Perhaps the fact that Zain's own Saad al-Barrak seems to revealing snippets to the Kuwaiti press suggests that the story is moving beyond the speculation stage. Whether this means we can expect to see imminent announcements about the future of Zain and of its African operations remains to be seen. Keep watching.

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 13