Zain Africa Done Deal Watch

Former Zain CEO Al Barrak - exit from Africa caused his departure?

During 2009 DevelopingTelecomsWatch became somewhat preoccupied with the fate of the African assets of MEA mobile powerhouse Zain. As speculation mounted about whether these operations were up for sale and, if so, who the prospective purchasers might be, DTW managed to churn out no less than thirteen Zain-themed articles, the first of these appearing on 12th June. Scratching away at persistent rumours like a mutt with fleas, this blog was still whining on about the story on 18th August.

The whole series of ramblings rejoiced in the clunky title 'Zain Africa Speculation Watch', which has been revived and paraphrased here with today's offering.

Along the way, a number of potential suitors for Zain's African opcos got a mention. These included France Telecom and Vivendi plus Indian operators Reliance Communications and BSNL.

All these months later, it seems fairly safe to assert that the speculation stage is finally over, with shares in another Indian cellco, Bharti Airtel, edging higher on the back of news that it will sign a USD 10.7 billion deal to acquire the Zain's African telecom assets later today.

If, as now appears to be virtually certain, the Indian MNO does manage to conclude this deal, it will be a case of third time lucky, as noted recently by Shalini Singh of the Times of India, who reminds us of Bharti Airtel's two fruitless attempts to engineer a tie-up with South Africa's MTN, another saga which had some coverage here at DTW. As well as observing that the Zain Africa purchase will "catapult Bharti to the rank of the sixth-largest telecom service provider in the world by number of subscribers", Singh feels that it is "an ironic twist of fate" that one of the Indian firm's major competitors in its new markets will be MTN.

With this mega-deal now on the brink of proceeding, perhaps the time is right to ask that Bharti Airtel has to gain (and lose) from competing in so many new markets at once, and to ask what motivated Zain to quit Africa less than five years after entering the continent's mobile arena via the acquisition of Mohamed Ibrahim's Celtel International.

James Middleton of telecoms.com writes that "for Zain, the deal represents a retrenchment of the company's strategy as well as good value." Middleton argues that while the company has succeeded in transforming its brand and in building up an impressive customer base across sub-Saharan Africa, it has struggled to operate profitably.

Quoted in James's article is his fellow Informa Telecoms & Media employee Nick Jotischky, a principal analyst with the firm. "Perhaps it turned to the managed services model too late in the day and failed to leverage its supplier relationships so as to build in sufficient economies of scale", says Jotischky, who suggests that this is where Bharti Airtel will focus its efforts.

"Whilst it will, no doubt, be confident of controlling its costs, Airtel will aim to build up its brand equity characterised by reliability very quickly," says Jotischky. "But reliability alone will not be enough – the newcomer will have to show itself to be innovative as well. In an already competitive marketplace, Bharti will not just be competing with other mobile operators for a share of wallet but with other brands in adjacent consumer goods sectors. This means that Bharti will be under pressure to offer services that are directly relevant to end-users and this will differ from market to market."

James Middleton talks up the chances of the Indian cellco maximising the value of this large new investment. "Bharti has a heritage in making network sharing and outsourcing deals work and will not be afraid of being aggressive on per minute pricing," he writes. "The company is also well versed in addressing the difficulties of serving a largely rural, high-churn, low-revenue market."

Inspired by this transaction, Informa's telecoms.com is currently running a series of articles offering 'ten tips for investing in Africa'.

Informa offer their first tip, that operators need to be innovative on pricing, while noting that mobile tariffs in much of Africa are high compared to those in some other emerging markets. "For example", runs the telecoms.com article, "Zain Kenya’s lowest tariff is about [USD] 0.04 per minute, for on-net calls.. compared to India, where Reliance Communications offers tariffs that are as low as [USD] 0.01 per minute, for both on-net and off-net calls." The article continues by pointing out that the fact that tariffs in Africa are relatively high is reflected in ARPU levels: "In 4Q09 blended monthly ARPU across Africa as a whole was [USD] 10.49 – but in India blended monthly ARPU in 4Q09 was much lower, at just [USD] 2.73, and falling.

However, the article observes that mobile tariffs have already come down in many African markets in the past couple of years as competition has intensified, often because of the market entry of new operators. Usage in Africa, meanwhile,  the article contends, has increased over the past couple of years too. African MoU, however, remains "half that of India's, which does suggest that there is potential for substantial further growth."

This growth opportunity notwithstanding, the gist of Infoma's 'tip' is that "African operators are probably best advised to avoid getting into the kind of price wars that are taking place in the Indian market", where ARPU halved during 2009, creating a big squeeze on  operators' profits.

Rather, Informa advises, "African operators should aim to demonstrate more of the innovation in pricing that is already evident on the continent through plans such as Zain's One Network, which allows subscribers to pay local rates when roaming, and MTN's MTN Zone, a dynamic tariff plan that charges lower rates when the network is not busy."

Let's see whether Bharti Airtel considers this to be sage advice as it embarks on its African adventure.

On a personal note, I will be interested to see whether the Indian cellco will make many changes to the management teams running its numerous newly-acquired opcos - and to listen out for a sense of how far Zain's people around Africa welcome the change of ownership. One opco CEO apparently quite upbeat about all of this is Zain Zambia MD David Holiday:




Presumably less positive about Zain's sales of its African assets is the man who masterminded their acquisition for the Kuwaiti group, former CEO Saad al Barrak, who resigned in February.

At the time, Emeka Obiodu, a senior analyst at Ovum, said: "Al Barrak championed this expansion push – buying Celtel, and aiming to make Zain one of the top ten mobile operators by 2011. But his whole ambition was blown to pieces by the owners who wanted to sell off in Africa."

While Al Barrak and his strategy do appear to have some detractors, Obiodu does not seem to be among them: "He’s taken MTC, this small company from Kuwait and transformed it into Zain, a global mobile powerhouse. He didn't bite of more than he can chew, but his vision diverged from the vision of the owners. When we did some financial analysis on Zain, the company wasn’t doing particularly badly. It wasn’t like he ran the business into the ground, although you have to concede that some of the small markets in Africa were seriously under-performing."

Now we will see whether Bharti Airtel has the patience and vision to stay in these numerous African markets for longer than Al Barrak's former company elected to do.

Zain Africa Done Deal Watch

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 13

Anil Ambani, Reliance Communications: eyeing Zain's African operations?

The newswires have been humming with more than enough Zain-related information over the last few days to justify this thirteenth episode of our mini-series following the summertime rumours around the Kuwaiti telecoms firm.

On Sunday, Eman Goma of Reuters reported that the pan-MEA mobile group has asked shareholders to vote on removing certain ownership restrictions, a move that would pave the way for selling a large stake. This seems to have prompted a Sunday surge in Zain's shares on the Kuwaiti stock exchange, as speculation rose that the move could allow an outside investor to take a large stake in the company.

In the most recent chapter of the Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch story, we considered the possible sale of the 24.61% stake in the operator held by the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) (the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund) - Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai, had reported that "the KIA has no objection to discussing any offer to buy its stake in Zain whether made by the UAE’s Etisalat or others under the condition that the offer would be serious and with attractive returns."

Without expressing an opinion about possible purchasers of that stake, it now seems that Zain's management would welcome the opportunity to part ways with the KIA. As a Cellular News article reported this week, Zain CEO Saad al-Barrak has said that he wants to see the sovereign wealth fund sell its stake in his company as soon as possible. "I wish they would leave tomorrow, and I am working on this," he said. He added that the motivation was to ensure the company could operate without political interference.

Whatever the future holds for the group as a whole, stories continue to bubble up about Zain's African portfolio. Only yesterday, that man Eman Goma was reporting comments made by Barrak to al-Rai, to the effect that the company is in talks with three major telecoms firms, including one from India, to sell all or part of its African operations.

Which companies are being referred to here? One of them might be France Telecom. Ten days ago we noted here that in a recent Reuters note on the French incumbent telco's need to limit margin erosion, Finance Director Gervais Pellisier was quoted as saying that the company "might look at some of the African assets of Kuwait's Zain if the latter decided to sell them in parts."

What about the unnamed Indian party? Could that be Bharti Airtel? Back in February, I would not have hesitated to offer that name as my best guess. An article by a former colleague of mine, Nick Jotischky of Informa Telecoms & Media, prompted me to write my own piece about whether India's market-leading cellco might be driven to more aggressive international expansion by the numerous competitive pressures it faces in its home market.

Since then, of course, the Indian mobile operator has been involved in lengthy talks with South Africa's MTN group about a possible tie-up between the two. Given the apparent complexity of those discussions, is it naïve of me to assume that simultaneous talks with Zain would not be feasible? After all, my understanding has always been than an exclusivity agreement has been locking Bharti Airtel and MTN out of discussions with other prospective bedfellows. Earlier this month, the Bharti Group announced the extension of this exclusivity period through to 31st August, and the Economic Times has reported in the last few hours that Bharti Airtel is now very close to raising the funds needed for what would India’s biggest cross-border deal to date, surpassing Tata Steel’s acquisition of Corus for USD 12.2 billion in 2007.

Even if it were possible for India's leading mobile operator to discuss any interest in Zain's African assets at the same time as working on its mooted tie up with MTN, another complication would be that the Kuwaiti group and the South African group have somewhat overlapping footprints. The two companies compete with each other in Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia.

As Eman Goma's article noted, this issue of overlapping assets would also have to be taken into account in any approach Etisalat may make for Zain. Goma quotes Prime Holdings analyst Sleiman Aboulhosn, who says that the Emirati group may be content to cherry pick some of Zain's assets in the region, given regulatory restrictions on a wholesale purchase. "Etisalat cannot buy the ones that co-exist with its own assets, for example in Nigeria," he said in Dubai. "So they might be interested in some parts."

If Bharti Airtel is currently an unlikely suitor for Zain, which other Indian companies might be making the enquiry mentioned by Saad al-Barrak? One possible candidate is state-owned telco BSNL. In June, Reuters reported comments made by the company's Chairman, Kuldeep Goyal, who said the the public sector telco is looking to expand to Africa by acquiring new licences or stakes in firms. "We are looking into various options there... getting into new licences, which are being issued, or partnering with existing licencees (and) taking a stake," Goyal told reporters. Asked whether BSNL, which has cash stockpile of more than USD 6 billion, was ready for a big acquisition, he said: "Yes, why not?"

The positive assessment of the state of BSNL is not shared by Kunal Kumar Kundu of consulting and IT services firm InfoSys. In our most recent article here at DTW, I quoted Kundu's recent Asia Times article, which is nothing short of a gloomy assessment of the health of the state-owned operator, which he feels is set to go the way of struggling government-run Air India, "which has had to crawl cap in hand for a state bailout to survive."

If Kundu's analysis is correct, and if this would prevent any ambitious foreign adventures by BSNL (rather than perhaps actually making it imperative to consider them), perhaps Reliance Communications is a more plausible prospective purchaser of some or all of Zain's African assets? Towards the middle of last year, the Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group-owned operator withdrew from inconclusive talks of its own with MTN. Another Economic Times article written in the last few hours suggest that the Indian operator's interest in Africa has not waned since then. Amrita Nair-Ghaswalla writes that "sources" have named Reliance Communications as the Indian company currently in discussions with Zain.

The last time DTW visited the topic of all this speculation about the future of Zain, much was made of the impresssive performance of the company's stock since the rumour mill really got churning around mid-May. I even considered whispers passed to a loyal DTW reader - and then to me - to the effect that "the whole Zain thing" has merely been a highly successful attempt to manipulate the Kuwaiti group's share price. If there is anything in that suggestion, the success of any such ruse would appear to have come to a halt around a week after we discussed it here, should we choose to heed the warning noises emanating from Dubai-based investment bank Shuaa Capital. Late last week, Ramya Dilip of Reuters noted that the bank had downgraded Zain to "sell" from "neutral," saying the risk-reward profile of the shares were no longer attractive at current levels.

Around the same time, another Reuters piece carried quotes from analysts who could see the logic of selling the African assets and predictions about Zain's ongoing strategy in the wake of any such sale.

"The African operations are the major contribution to the revenues and subscriber base," said Jithesh Gopi, head of research at Bahrain-based Sico Investments. "But as far as net profit ... they have not been a contributor to the group."

According to this article, African markets account for about 62% of Zain's 64.7 million customers, but only 15 % of the group's net profit, as of the end of March. Seven out of 16 African operations, the article states, made a first-quarter net lost. In the Middle East, only the Saudi Arabian operation was loss-making.

"It's going to be a company that's refocused on the Middle East with a series of very strong franchises," said Simon Simonian, a telecom sector analyst at Shuaa Capital.

If Simonian is correct, Zain's growth plans would be downgraded as the majority of the Middle East markets served by the group are mature to the point of saturation, the exceptions being Jordan and Iraq, where operators face security issues, a relatively unpredictable regulatory/licensing environment and the prospect of a new entrant in the mobile space.

In that scenario, Zain would presumably focus primarily on upgrading existing networks and increasing revenues from mobile broadband multimedia services.

Work of this kind is naturally ongoing across the group's Middle Eastern operations. The Saudi opco, for example, last week announced that it had secured a USD 2.5 billion Islamic loan facility (Murabahah), which will be used to repay an existing Murabahah facilitating network expansion and future growth.

In Bahrain meanwhile, writes Roger Field of ITP, Zain is planning to upgrade its network with LTE technology in a bid to "future proof" its operation and gain an advantage over rival operator Batelco and the new entrant cellco owned by Saudi Telecom. Field observes that Zain Bahrain has failed to provide a timeframe for the network upgrade, but notes that similar projects in other parts of the world are expected to take more than a year to complete, from the time they were announced.

This wraps up another episode in this ongoing saga. Perhaps the fact that Zain's own Saad al-Barrak seems to revealing snippets to the Kuwaiti press suggests that the story is moving beyond the speculation stage. Whether this means we can expect to see imminent announcements about the future of Zain and of its African operations remains to be seen. Keep watching.

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 13

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 12

Zain share price: massive spike since the rumour mill started turning

One loyal reader has suggested it's high time that this blog revisited its most regularly explored theme - the ongoing not-so-mini-series that is Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch.

Note the parentheses around the word 'Africa', a set of punctuation marks that, for good reason, crept into the title of this series in Episode 11. Bracketing 'Africa' in this way was to denote that while this continuing investigation into developments at the Kuwaiti MEA telecoms group was initially focused on the rumours about the sale of Zain's African operations, the focus needed to become a bit wider, i.e. speculating about the future of the whole company. This was due to the UAE's Etisalat informing reporters of its interest in buying a 51% stake in the Kuwaiti group.

Since then, that loyal reader I mentioned has urged me to take note of a couple of possibly quite significant elements of the Zain story.

The first of these is the news that a major Zain shareholder is likely to consider selling its stake in the telecoms company if it receives the right price. That shareholder, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) (the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund), owns a 24.61% stake in the operator. According to Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai, "the KIA has no objection to discussing any offer to buy its stake in Zain whether made by the UAE’s Etisalat or others under the condition that the offer would be serious and with attractive returns."

That, then, looks like pretty positive news for the Emirati telecoms group if its interest in Zain really is very strong.

The other bit that my friendly reader brought to my attention is much more cloak-and-dagger.

My friend tells me he's heard whispers that "the whole Zain thing" has been a ruse set in motion with the sole intention of driving up the Kuwaiti group's share price. By way of support for this assertion, my pal urged me to take a look at Zain's stock chart from March to July. "It's quite amazing what transpired", my correspondent reminds me. Kuwaiti blogger 'Alpha Dinar' concurs, having noted back on July 13th that Vivendi’s USD 12 billion rumored proposal to acquire Zain’s African operations "has stolen headlines for the past few weeks, sparked large volumes, and resulted in a huge spike in Zain’s stock price."

I asked my correspondent whether he felt that the likes of Vivendi (and other rumoured Zain Africa suitors like France Telecom) could really be tempted into declaring their interest and thereby enabling any such ruse to succeed. My friend's response: "If the new buyers weren't really aware of the game, and if the game was well-played, I don't think they would have been able to keep the genie in the bottle. In any case, if Party A wanted to manipulate the share price, they would be the ones leaking and Party B wouldn't have been able to stay in stealth mode. I don't know how likely it is. I'm not saying that's what happened. I'm just saying that the price did indeed jump up quite a bit, and despite the talks having failed, it hasn't gone down that much at all."

My correspondent concedes that games of the kind being alleged here are not terribly common in Bahrain or Kuwait. He asserts, however, that this is a game often played in other parts of the world and that the fact remains that "the stock was even and then - BOOM - a ninety degree angle."

Who knows? Not me, that's for sure.

One company whose talks with Zain could be said to have "failed" is Vivendi, which announced on July 20th that it was "interrupting" the discussions. No reason was given at the time. Since then, however, Kui Kinyanjui, writing for Kenya's Business Daily Africa, has alleged that the French telecoms and media conglomerate's interest cooled following a disappointing trip to her home country. Kinyanjui writes that "a dozen senior Vivendi officials jetted into the country to view close hand one of the Zain operations their company hoped to purchase" and that "they came, they saw, were disappointed, and in the process, a multi-million dollar deal was scuttled." The article describes Zain's struggle to compete with Kenya's market-leading cellco Safaricom and cites unconfirmed information from Kenyan sources which indicates that Zain is "keen to sell its Kenyan, DR Congo and Sierra Leone units, and could consider separate bids from disparate telecommunications firms for those operations."

Such rumours of Zain breaking up its African portfolio and selling off operations piecemeal have been far less prominent than stories of that whole portfolio being sold to a single buyer. One prospective purchaser, however, has expressed an interest in buying up only those Zain-owned opcos which would complement its own existing African footprint.

In a recent Reuters note on France Telecom's need to limit margin erosion, Finance Director Gervais Pellisier is quoted as saying that the French incumbent telco "might look at some of the African assets of Kuwait's Zain if the latter decided to sell them in parts." Any willingness on the part of Zain to consider a piecemeal sell-off of some African assets - as alleged by Kui Kinyanjui - would presumably, then, be music to the ears of Mr. Pellisier and his colleagues.

Were a sale of Zain itself or just of Zain's African assets to go ahead, one stumbling block could come in the form of legal action brought by Econet Wireless, the telecoms group led by Zimbabwe-born businessman Strive Masiyiwa. As a recent Guardian article reminds us, in late 2000, Masiyiwa led a consortium that won a licence to operate a mobile phone network in Nigeria. Econet Wireless had a 5% stake in the consortium and claims it had a right of first refusal to buy out the rest of the network in the event of any bid emerging. A bid did emerge from Mo Ibrahim's Celtel International, but, writes the Guardian's Richard Wray, "a series of legal obfuscations blocked Econet from ever getting the chance to bid."

Celtel was, of course, subsequently acquired by Zain and Wray states that the fast-growing Nigerian mobile phone business now accounts for about half of all the Kuwaiti group's African revevnues. In court, says Wray, "Masiyiwa's lawyers are arguing he should be allowed to buy back Zain's Nigerian business at the price set in 2006, in effect blasting a hole straight through Zain's plans to sell its whole African operation with Nigeria as the jewel in its crown."

Well, another episode of Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch has probably left you not much the wiser. It was ever thus. Let's see what happens in the next installment. Don't touch that dial etc.

Zain (Africa) Speculation Watch: Episode 12

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 9 - Can Vivendi do it?

Zain CEO Saad al Barrak:
thumbs up to the sale of Zain's African operations? You'd have to ask the shareholders...

DevelopingTelecomsWatch celebrates its 100th blog post with another episode of Zain Africa Speculation Watch. Will that turn out to have been a future-proof title for this mini-series? Maybe not, because for the first time since DTW started visiting this theme, one of the companies rumoured to be interested in acquiring the African assets of the Kuwaiti telecoms group has actually confirmed that interest. It seems, therefore, that we are now moving beyond the speculation stage.

That said, perhaps for now we can stick with the term 'speculation' in the title of these musings. The speculation today, however, will move from wondering which prospective suitor looks the most plausible to wondering whether one particular suitor really has the wherewithal to do the deal.

That suitor is one whose name seems to have been in the mix since day one - Vivendi, the French international media conglomerate which is active in music, TV, movies, publishing, video games and telecoms.

Last Thursday, the group confirmed that there is indeed some interest in acquiring Zain's African operations. James Middleton of telecoms.com, reporting the story the next day, concluded his article with the caveat that the French firm has cautioned that at this stage there is no certainty that the discussions will lead to an acquisition.

This last point is echoed by a Financial Times article written the same day, which notes that Vivendi Chairman & CEO Jean-Bermard Lévy has "a track record of walking away from deals he regards as too expensive", something that has provided "some reassurance to analysts that the company will not over-pay."

The last time we looked at this story here, sums of USD 10 billion and USD 12 billion were mentioned as possible prices for Zain's collection of African MNOs. This is not far off the money from a Vivendi perspective according to the FT article, which cites "people familiar with the matter" who apparently say that the French group values Zain's African unit at USD 10-11 billion. A big concern for Vivendi, however, according to the company's statement of July 9th, is "keeping its credit rating and its dividend at their current levels".

This last point was mentioned in Episode 3 of Zain Africa Speculation Watch, when I noted that Reuters writer Adam Durchslag had expressed doubts about how Vivendi, with net debt of around EUR 8.3 billion, would be able to afford such a significant acquisition without putting that all-important investment grade BBB credit rating in jeopardy.

This concern about maintaining the group's credit rating notwithstanding, were this purchase to go ahead, it would, as the FT article notes, be Mr Lévy's fifth large acquisition in less than four years. The same article reports the opinion that the purchase of Zain Africa makes good strategic sense, giving Vivendi wider exposure to fast-growing markets at a time when its domestic telecoms and pay-TV businesses are facing stronger competition and its music business is in decline.

While it is pretty clear that Vivendi has pretty compelling reasons to consider a purchase of this size and nature, it is worth asking once again why Zain might be prepared to make the sale. According to the FT, Zain CEO Dr Saad al Barrak simply felt obliged to alert the Kuwaiti group's shareholders to the approach by Vivendi.

"If we are approached by big players with clear value creation we have to pass this to our shareholders. This is not a decision for us on the management level. It is all up to the shareholders to decide," the Zain CEO told the FT. He also revealed that only Vivendi has made an offer for the African assets.

Those shareholders have already felt the effects of the speculation. Matt Smith of Reuters reported yesterday that Zain's shares jumped 9.8% after news broke of Vivendi's confirmed offer for the company's African unit. Sounds good? Sure, but the very day that Vivendi was confirming its offer, Saad al Barrak had denied a deal was on, causing a fall of almost 9% in Zain shares, according to another Reuters article.

It remains to be seen whether that means that no other groups are likely to come forward to trump any offer from the French group - if such an offer does ever happen. Doubts are likely to remain for now. As Cyril Altmeyer of Reuters wrote late last week, analysts have expressed the view that it would be possible for Vivendi to take full control of Zain's African operations without endangering its BBB rating. Altmeyer's article quotes an unnamed banker who contends that with Vivendi having put something on the table, Zain and its advisers are probably figuring out whether to have targeted discussions with other interested parties." The same banker feels that potentially interested parties would be France Telecom, China Mobile and Vodafone.

This article also states that one way for Vivendi to make the Zain Africa acquisition without risky capital raising at group level would be to make the approach though Maroc Telecom, which is not in debt and in which the French group holds a 53% stake.

More twists and turns, then. Keep watching.

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 9 - Can Vivendi do it?

Double A Side: Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 8 + Iran 3rd Mobile Licence Saga Update

Vivendi's Lévy: no comment on Zain Africa rumours
Picture: ⓒ 2008 The IBTimes Company

Intrepid reporters from Reuters can often be relied upon to grab telecoms big hitters on the sidelines of conferences and other events. Reuters people seem to be well trained in the dark art of thrusting a mic at the luminaries and bagging a headline-worthy quote.

Last month, for example, the ambitions of Russian cellco MTS were revealed to a Reuters scribe on the sidelines of the of the St Petersburg Economic Forum.

This week, however, the news service has done quite so well. A Reuters reporter sprang on Jean-Bernard Lévy, Chairman of French media and telecoms conglomerate Vivendi, who was present yesterday at a forum in Aix-en-Provence, France. Regular readers of this blog, particularly those gripped by the drama of Zain Africa Speculation Watch the mini-series should be able to guess which question was asked. The answer? Not too illuminating.

Levy declined on Saturday to say whether his company is interested in acquiring the African operations of Kuwaiti telecoms group Zain. "I have no comment to make on this," was Lévy's reply.

So we are none the wiser - unless you're the kind of conspiracy theorist who infers something significant from such a minimal response.

I was one of those for whom the notion of Zain selling its African operations popped up out of nowhere. I remembered colleagues returning from a pan-African telecoms sector conference and reporting that Chris Gabriel, CEO of Zain's African unit had spoken in terms of having a war chest for further acquisitions. Much had also been made of Zain's stated ambition of being a major global player and of the strategic important of Africa in that context.

Zain Africa Speculation Watch kicked off on on 12th June, almost as soon as I had started to hear rumours. Another reason this was all rather surprising was that only days before that, there had been suggestions that Zain might be looking to acquire a significant asset on the African continent -France Telecom's stake in market-leading Egyptian cellco Mobinil. Readers interested in that part of the world cannot have failed to notice the long wrangle that has gone on between France Telecom and the other major shareholder in Mobinil, Orascom Telecom, itself a Cairo-headquartered company.

This tussle seems to have been initiated when the two sides found themselves at variance over strategy for Mobinil. According to Alastair Sharp, the Egyptians were keen to invest more heavily than the French wished to, disagreeing over Mobinil's budget and expenditure, marketing strategy and start up of 3G services. Since kicking off in April, this has become quite a heated business, with famously outspoken Orascom Telecom Chairman Naguib Sawiris accusing France Telecom of being "in the business of value destruction".

Sneaking onto the end of today's musings - by virtue of being Zain-related - is the matter of Iran's third national mobile licence. In common with Zain Africa Speculation Watch and the Sawiris-France Telecom battle, this is another fairly long-running story to which it is probably not unfair to apply the label 'saga'.

The saga started with the UAE's Etisalat and local partners winning the valuable Iranian concession, which comes with a useful period of exlusivity regarding the provision of 3G services. This later went sour and by mid-May, I was noting here that Zain appeared to be waiting in the wings to pick up the licence and get into the large, growing and still helpfully under-penetrated Iranian mobile market.

This is now looking unlikely.

On Friday, TeleGeography was picking up reports from an Iranian newspaper which indicated that a new tender will be held to find a strategic investor to launch the country’s third national mobile network. Iran’s telecoms minister Mohammad Soleimani was quoted as saying that Zain had been offered the third operating licence in May, but had "not fulfilled obligations".

A Cellular News take on the same story talks in terms of confusion about whether Zain had not only been "offered" this licence but had also actually secured it, mentioning reports from mid-May about the Kuwaiti company having been "awarded" the concession.

The article continues, however, by noting that Zain said it had only been invited to renew its negotiations as the leader of the consortium that came second in the original bid process. As the article states, "if Zain was formally awarded the license, then it has kept very quiet about it."

For seasoned Iran watchers, this is all a bit déjà vu. As the Cellular News piece reminds us, there was also controversy over the country's second national mobile licence. This had been snapped up by a company 51% owned by Turkcell in 2004, but the deal fell foul of a clamp down on foreign investments by conservative forces in Iran. The Turkish cellco was accused of having links with Israel - clearly a complete no-no. After a year of wrangling, the licence was reissued to South Africa's MTN, which was happy with a minority stake in the new operator.

Two sagas, then, that I enjoying watching. Happily, a little news about both was breaking at around the same time. Hence this Double A Side update from DTW.

Double A Side? Use of that term betrays the fact that I'm old enough to have been brought up on vinyl. Having turned over a chunk of Sunday to writing this, perhaps I'll slap something mellow on the turntable and just leave the sagas to one side for now.

Double A Side: Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 8 + Iran 3rd Mobile Licence Saga Update

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 3

Zain-branded retail store in Uganda: needing a new paint job soon?

(image from Honeysun blog)

Telecoms media news sources, analysts and bloggers continue to be divided on the issue of whether there is much substance to the rumours about Zain looking to sell its African assets. Some commentary about this story, which, for me at least, popped up seemingly out of nowhere last week, continues to express a high degree of skepticism. The tone of some writing, meanwhile, seems to present Zain's desire to offload the former Celtel International operations pretty much as a given, focusing on quite detailed analysis of particular challenges that will have to be faced during the process.

Zambian journalist Michael Malakata, for example, writes in terms of how "Zain's efforts to sell its African operations" are likely to be hampered by problems such as a move by Econet Wireless Group to block the Nigerian element of the deal. Just as Malakata's article seems built on the assumption that Zain's exit from the African scene is actually going to happen, he also seems very sure that Orange/France Telecom is set to acquire the sixteen mobile operators supposedly up for sale - rather than Vivendi, whose name has been bandied about very freely these last few days.

Adam Durchslag of Reuters, conversely, seems more interested in examining the case for Vivendi being involved and gets a big thumbs up from me for making a pun of the word za(i)ny in the title of the blog post he wrote yesterday. I avoided the temptation to do so myself, but only just.

In his article, Durchslag picks up on widespread bemusement about how getting out of Africa would make sense in the context of Zain CEO Saad al-Barrak's recently stated ambition for the business to a top-ten global mobile operators by 2011.

With this in mind, Lesley Stones of South Africa's Business Day offers some useful thoughts on what could drive any sale, asserting that while Zain’s African operations accounted for 65% of its subscribers and 56% of revenue in 2008, "they absorb more than 75% of its capital expenditure, yet only account for 15% of net income." Stones states that "while Zain’s net income rose just 6% last year, if Africa had been excluded it would have been up 34%."

Adam Durchslag, meanwhile, considers the idea of a rather different kind of Zain-Vivendi tie-up potentially being on the cards, such as Zain taking a minority stake in the larger French group. If there is any substance to rumours of these two companies being in talks, perhaps that scenario is more likely than Vivendi simply buying operations from Zain. As Durchslag notes, it is worth considering Vivendi's ability to afford a USD 12 billion transaction. He points out that the French group has about EUR 8.3 billion of net debt and, "according to some analysts, has only EUR 1 billion for manoeuvre without jeopardising its investment grade BBB credit rating."

Durchslag then considers another possibility - that of Vivendi, through its Maroc Telecom subsidiary (which owns telcos in Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Gabon) buying only some of Zain’s African operations.

This raises of the question of whether Zain could conceivably be open to the possibility of breaking up its African operation and selling assets piecemeal to groups looking to fill gaps in their pan-African footprints - rather than a single transaction in which the whole lot are sold to a single buyer. Kenyan newspaper the Daily Nation carried rumours on Tuesday that Zain's Kenyan outfit "could end up in the hands of MTN Group, the powerful South African transnational." The article asserts that "MTN has for years been known to covet the Kenyan market", having previously tried and failed to buy the operation now known as Zain Kenya.

Writing for another Kenyan newspaper, Macharia Kamau considers MTN as a possible suitor, but spends more time considering the Vivendi option. In the spirit of Alanis Morisette, Kamau feels that if Vivendi succeeds, this would mark an "ironical" return of the company to the Kenyan market. Kamau reminds us that Vivendi sold a 60% stake in KenCell (the predecessor of today's Zain Kenya) in 2005. Any loyal Kenyan subscribers of this operator's services, therefore, are already on third brand name in a four year period. A further transaction could mean four brands in four years - that's almost as confusing as the regularity with which my favourite football club hires and fires managers.

Even this high degree of brand name turnover, however, would be trumped in Nigeria. Writing for that country's Vanguard newspaper, Prince Osuagwu, notes that if "Zain Group finally agrees to sell its Celtel Africa unit to a bidding French media conglomerate, Vivendi SA this week, the Nigerian operation of the company may be heading for the 6th... name change."

Osuagwu spoke with Zain Nigeria subscribers and reports some discontent at the prospect of yet another rebranding, feeling that some might switch to rival service providers because of "fears that the network might not catch up with competition after going through [the] image crisis that may possibly follow."

Thanks for bearing with me on another long-ish ramble through the Zain empire as I try to figure out whether this is a hot story, a non-story or something in between. There's bound to be a least one more episode in this mini-series. Don't touch that dial. No flipping.

Zain Africa Speculation Watch: Episode 3

Out of Africa: Zain to sell assets to a European buyer?

Earlier this week I started to receive email news updates suggesting that Zain, the Kuwait-headquartered multinational telecoms group specialising in mobile communications across the Middle East and Africa may be quitting the latter territory.

If this is correct, Zain's stay in Africa will turn out to have been quite a short one, having extended its reach from its Middle East roots via the 2005 acquisition of Celtel International, the pan-African telecoms group founded by the Sudanese-born British entrepreneur Dr. Mo Ibrahim.

One report from TelecomPaper contends that Zain Group may agree as early as this week to sell its African unite to a French company for up to USD 12 billion. A French company? A good guess has to be France Telecom/Orange, right? That was my first guess, but one report from a Nigerian newspaper is tipping Vivendi, the telecoms and media group whose assets include majority stakes in French quad-player SFR and Morocco's Maroc Telecom. It must be said that I haven't found any other articles naming Vivendi as an interested party...

The Nigerian report continues that if the deal isn't settled, Zain will study bids made by other companies. Apparently, the plan is for the French company to buy Zain Africa's debts, which will be discounted from the purchase price.

If there is any truth in this story, genuinely savvy market-watchers are now invited to smile at my naivety now because I must admit that since well before the inception of this blog, I have regularly opined that in the current economic climate, the only telecoms strategic investors likely to remain acquisitive, expanding their geographical reach in any major way, would be those headquartered in the Middle East and Gulf region. I was, of course, thinking of Zain as well as the likes of Etisalat and QTel. If these reports are to be believed, however, we will see a major Gulf region player divesting significant assets with a European buyer being the acquirer. Not at all what I would have expected.

If the timing of this were different, perhaps the pool of prospective purchasers would be larger. For example, one player which would presumably find it very challenging to become involved right now in a tussle for Zain's African assets is the South Africa-headquartered MTN group. If Zain really does intend to quit Africa, the timing is odd, argues Lesley Stones of MoneyBiz. Stones feels that MTN is an "obvious suitor" and therefore wonders why Zain would put its African business up for sale just as the South African group is negotiating a tie-up with Bharti Airtel of India, especially because these two "have agreed to talk exclusively to each other until July 31." MTN, as Stones, notes, was one of the interested parties when Zain/MTC prevailed with its acquisition of Celtel International.

Given my own contention that groups such as Zain are more likely to be in buying mode than selling mode these days, the big question for me around all of this is why Zain would be looking to sell its African unit. Let's look at evidence to support the notion that this would be a strange move:

• Celtel operators across Africa were the subject of an expensive rebranding exercise only last year - surely quite wasteful if there was never a long-term plan to stay in these markets.
• As Lesley Stones notes, as recently as November, Zain Africa CEO Chris Gabriel said the company "planned to be the acquisitor rather than the acquisition in an inevitable consolidation of telecoms players."
• As Stones argues, Zain CEO Saad Al Barrak has not hinted at any plans to sell, instead saying only a month ago that the group has an "unwavering commitment to reach our 2011 target of being a top-10 global mobile operator", an aim that would be made impossible by the shedding of a major chunk of its business.
• Zain’s commitment to Africa saw it launch a network in Ghana as recently as December.
• Zain has announced plans to introduce mobile financial services for Africa's unbanked via cellphones in several countries this year.

Bearing all of this in mind, the whole thing does feel rather implausible. The (non?) story seems to originate from a single article in a Kuwaiti newspaper. As Lesley Stones notes, rumours of the sale may simply be untrue. Watch this space, I guess.

Out of Africa: Zain to sell assets to a European buyer?

East Africa Com musings: Does it matter which submarine cable lands first?

The socio-economic impact of undersea cables in East Africa: the SEACOM view

Blogger Clement Nthambazale Nyirenda is a lecturer, researcher and consultant in Electronics and Computer Engineering at the Malawi Polytechnic, a constituent college of the University of Malawi. He is currently studying for a PhD in Japan at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. In February Clement wrote about the broadband speeds he enjoys in Tokyo and expressed his hope that a similar service might one day be available in his home country.

Malawi, as Clement noted, while usually considered to be part of Southern Africa, also lies in the easterly part of the continent, which is "the only region in the world that has neither intra-[continental] nor direct access to worldwide international cable networks." The region, Clement observes, "instead relies on expensive satellite communication" with "data costs... among the highest in the world."

Clement discusses the progress of the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy), "the first initiative proposed to connect countries of eastern Africa via a high bandwidth fibre optic cable system to the rest of the world." According to the EASSy website, the level of international telephone traffic per main line in sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in any region in the world, which is proof of there being "considerable demand in East Africa due to insufficient supply for telecommunications within the region." My own single experience of visiting that part of the world - last week's trip to the East Africa Com conference in Nairobi - does lead me to concur, as does the business of simply trying to make calls to other East African countries from the UK. As I noted in my most recent post here, the only frustrating aspect of my short trip to Kenya was finding it fairly difficult to stay on top of my day job via our company VPN. At both my hotel and the conference venue, Internet access was slow and unreliable.

My understanding is that there exists the hope that providing East African countries with improved connectivity could prove to be an effective catalyst for economic development in the region through the expansion of businesses based on the Internet, the provision of call centre services and the outsourcing of other back office functions.

EASSy is set to run from South Africa to Sudan, with landing points in six countries, and will be connected to several landlocked countries. A number of telecoms operators have invested in EASSy via WIOCC (West Indian Ocean Cable Company), which had a visible presence at last week's conference. These include state-owned wireline incumbent operators such as Botswana Telecommunications Corporation, Djibouti Telecom, Telecomunicacoes de Mocambique and soon-to-be-privatised ONATEL of Burundi.

Others in the WIOCC contingent are Orascom Telecom-backed MNO U-Com (of Burundi), Telkom Kenya, Dalkom (Somalia), Zantel, Uganda Telecom, Israel's Gilat Satcom and the Lesotho Telecommunications Authority.

From South Africa, direct investors in EASSy include Neotel, MTN and a consortium of Telkom (SA) and Vodacom. Futher direct investors in the project are Telecom Malagasy, Mauritius Telecom, SUDATEL, Tanzania Telecommunications Company, Comores Telecom and Zamtel (no, that's not a repeat of Zantel). From beyond the region, other backers are BT, Saudi Telecom, Bharti Airtel, Etisalat and France Telecom.

In his February blog post, Clement Nyirenda notes that EASSYy was once expected to be ready for commercial use in Q2 2007 but that construction did not get underway until March 2008. Clement reports (confirmed by a more recent Compterworld Kenya article) that the project is now slated for completion and commercial service in the second half of 2010 - three years behind schedule. "EASSy has not been EASY", comments Clement.

In Clement's opinion, "the major problems hampering the progress of the EASSy project stem from the fact that it is a joint venture of more than 20 largely monopolistic parastatal telecommunication bureaucracies." I shall leave it to individual readers to decide which (if any) of the project's backers fit this rather critical description. "In Africa," says Clement, "the culture of working together in such a large grouping is not common."

Wrangles between partners do seem to have been a feature of the project, at least as far back as June 2006, when a meeting of ICT ministers from Eastern and Southern African countries helped resolve disagreements among project participants, according to Sammy Kirui, the chairman of EASSY's project management team.

Regarding the most recently announced delays, the Computerworld article quotes WIOCC CEO Chris Wood, who said late last month that "the delays have been caused due to optimizing the cost structures and finalizing the agreements between all participating carriers". Wood, states the article, is not worried about the delays because the most important thing is the long-term stability of the financial structure of the cable system. "Time and again", Wood said, "the telecom industry has seen private equity financed companies build cables and then go bankrupt within a few years as their business model, hit by high costs, proved unattainable."

EASSy is just one of three submarine cables set to improve the region's connectivity. Another is TEAMS (East African Marine System). Etisalat appears to be spreading its bets in the race to connect the region, having a 15% stake in TEAMS in addition to its investment in EASSy. The other 85% of the ownership of the TEAMS project is split between a diverse group of interests including the Kenyan Government, Telkom Kenya (another one which is backing two horses) and Kenya's market-leading cellco Safaricom. Also involved from Kenya are the country's largest private data carrier Kenya Data Networks and most recent mobile market entrant Essar Telecom Kenya, whose billboards I saw all over Nairobi last week. The advertising of another TEAMS backer, the cable MSO Zuku, was also very prominent as I caught a glimpse of the city during cab rides between meetings.

Kenyan players dominate the consortium, with ISP AccessKenya and Jammii Telecommunications (which provides access to the Internet Backbone to telcos, ISPs, and large enterprises) also involved.

One more Keynan TEAMS backer is Flashcom, an integrated telecommunications solutions provider offering voice, data and SMS services with a collection of network assets including a CDMA2000 WLL and ISDN services over Fibre. Flashcom's CEO Joe Kimani was on the speaker panel at last week's conference, but unfortunately I didn't get the chance to catch what he had to say. From beyond Kenya, a small stake in TEAMS is held by Africa Fibrenet of Uganda.

The other submarine cable on the East Africa scene is SEACOM, whose investors state that the project will ensure access to low cost bandwidth, thereby encouraging the growth of existing and new industries, as well as education and e-government.

Does the region need three undersea cables? If all of this is thought of as a race to land the cables and start doing business first, will whichever project finishes last find itself out of the game? A Business Times (Tanzania) article of last Friday contends that the answers to these questions are, respectively, 'yes' and 'no'.

In this article, the scene is set with an illustration of the degree to which the current paucity of connectivity impacts upon businesses in the region. The claim is made that a large corporation in Tanzania can pay about USD 3000 a month just to ensure a reliable Internet connection for its network. According to the article, this figure rises to USD 7000 to cover a megabyte of bandwidth per computer in a medium-sized office in Kenya. "A business connection in an urban center in the US," continues the article, "can cost as little as USD 25 a month".

The article compares the economics of the VSAT and undersea cable industries and adds that "fiber optic cables are low latency: they can carry information more than ten times faster than a VSAT to satellite to cable connection."

When making a comparison between the three submarine cables, the article contends that they all have "roughly the same capacity", but notes that "each connects a different combination of countries and ownership."

The article acknowledges that "there has been much hype in the media about which cables will land first" but makes the argument that "the success of one cable does not render the others useless." The view expressed is that redundancy is needed to ensure the security of broadband supply and to stimulate competition, thereby reducing prices for users. "Tanzania will be able to make room for both the EASSy and the SEACOM cables, as well as any connectivity provided by TEAMS", concludes the piece. Plenty of room for all, then, it seems.

East Africa Com musings: Does it matter which submarine cable lands first?