India's cellcos to balk at mandatory switch to solar-powered equipment?

Solar power: mandatory for India's cellcos?

The green credentials of DevelopingTelecomsWatch are pretty weak - this blog has never dedicated an entire article specifically to an examination of the environmental impact of telecoms technology.

Moreover, the only time DTW has discussed 'green' technologies at length, when wind and solar-powered mobile base stations were evaulated more than a year ago, the focus was mainly on cost benefits for operators. Just a cursory mention was made how such solutions compare favourably - in terms of environmental impact - to diesel-powered generators in the vast numbers of sites where electricty distribution infrastructure is inadequate across developing countries.

Even in terms of the narrower arguments about cost control, last April's article was by no means constructed entirely of fulsome praise for wind-powered and solar-powered mobile network infrastructure. It was noted that while running costs can, of course, look very attractive, the costs of investing in new solar panels and wind turbines themselves are not trivial. DTW also reported concerns on the part of the GSM Association about the results of trials of sun and wind-powered base stations.

Mobile operators, then, mindful of these questions, could presumably be resistant to any attempt to make reliance on these green technologies mandatory.

This is precisely the situation which could be facing cellcos in India.

Writing for India's Economic Times earlier this month, Subhash Narayan asserts that the country's government "may ask telecom companies to install solar panels to generate backup power for cellphone towers, a move that could hurt the sector already troubled by a squeeze in margins."

A proposal being finalised by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), writes Narayan, "is aimed at containing the use of polluting diesel gensets to provide back-up power" and "could increase the cost of network expansion significantly"

"The green drive will prevent these engines of development (telecom towers) from becoming grave environmental hazards," said an official with MNRE. "We are discussing the proposal with various stakeholders. A cabinet note is proposed to be finalised thereafter to get the clearance for the scheme," the official said, requesting anonymity

Predicatably, the industry response, as reported by Narayan of the Economic Times, is not terrible enthusiatic. "This could significantly impact the margins of companies already under pressure due to rising spectrum cost and the cut-throat competition in the sector," said 'an executive with a large private telco'.

Narayan asserts that the Indian government is not keen on providing any subsidy for solar power equipment, but says it could offer them soft loans under refinancing schemes of Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency.

This skepticism from India notwithstanding, one can still find evidence of cellcos in developing countries going down the green power route. Chinese vendor, ZTE, for example, seems to have encouraged MTN's Cameroonian opco to take delivery of an unspecified number of solar-powered base stations.

India's cellcos to balk at mandatory switch to solar-powered equipment?

Zain Africa Done Deal Watch

Former Zain CEO Al Barrak - exit from Africa caused his departure?

During 2009 DevelopingTelecomsWatch became somewhat preoccupied with the fate of the African assets of MEA mobile powerhouse Zain. As speculation mounted about whether these operations were up for sale and, if so, who the prospective purchasers might be, DTW managed to churn out no less than thirteen Zain-themed articles, the first of these appearing on 12th June. Scratching away at persistent rumours like a mutt with fleas, this blog was still whining on about the story on 18th August.

The whole series of ramblings rejoiced in the clunky title 'Zain Africa Speculation Watch', which has been revived and paraphrased here with today's offering.

Along the way, a number of potential suitors for Zain's African opcos got a mention. These included France Telecom and Vivendi plus Indian operators Reliance Communications and BSNL.

All these months later, it seems fairly safe to assert that the speculation stage is finally over, with shares in another Indian cellco, Bharti Airtel, edging higher on the back of news that it will sign a USD 10.7 billion deal to acquire the Zain's African telecom assets later today.

If, as now appears to be virtually certain, the Indian MNO does manage to conclude this deal, it will be a case of third time lucky, as noted recently by Shalini Singh of the Times of India, who reminds us of Bharti Airtel's two fruitless attempts to engineer a tie-up with South Africa's MTN, another saga which had some coverage here at DTW. As well as observing that the Zain Africa purchase will "catapult Bharti to the rank of the sixth-largest telecom service provider in the world by number of subscribers", Singh feels that it is "an ironic twist of fate" that one of the Indian firm's major competitors in its new markets will be MTN.

With this mega-deal now on the brink of proceeding, perhaps the time is right to ask that Bharti Airtel has to gain (and lose) from competing in so many new markets at once, and to ask what motivated Zain to quit Africa less than five years after entering the continent's mobile arena via the acquisition of Mohamed Ibrahim's Celtel International.

James Middleton of telecoms.com writes that "for Zain, the deal represents a retrenchment of the company's strategy as well as good value." Middleton argues that while the company has succeeded in transforming its brand and in building up an impressive customer base across sub-Saharan Africa, it has struggled to operate profitably.

Quoted in James's article is his fellow Informa Telecoms & Media employee Nick Jotischky, a principal analyst with the firm. "Perhaps it turned to the managed services model too late in the day and failed to leverage its supplier relationships so as to build in sufficient economies of scale", says Jotischky, who suggests that this is where Bharti Airtel will focus its efforts.

"Whilst it will, no doubt, be confident of controlling its costs, Airtel will aim to build up its brand equity characterised by reliability very quickly," says Jotischky. "But reliability alone will not be enough – the newcomer will have to show itself to be innovative as well. In an already competitive marketplace, Bharti will not just be competing with other mobile operators for a share of wallet but with other brands in adjacent consumer goods sectors. This means that Bharti will be under pressure to offer services that are directly relevant to end-users and this will differ from market to market."

James Middleton talks up the chances of the Indian cellco maximising the value of this large new investment. "Bharti has a heritage in making network sharing and outsourcing deals work and will not be afraid of being aggressive on per minute pricing," he writes. "The company is also well versed in addressing the difficulties of serving a largely rural, high-churn, low-revenue market."

Inspired by this transaction, Informa's telecoms.com is currently running a series of articles offering 'ten tips for investing in Africa'.

Informa offer their first tip, that operators need to be innovative on pricing, while noting that mobile tariffs in much of Africa are high compared to those in some other emerging markets. "For example", runs the telecoms.com article, "Zain Kenya’s lowest tariff is about [USD] 0.04 per minute, for on-net calls.. compared to India, where Reliance Communications offers tariffs that are as low as [USD] 0.01 per minute, for both on-net and off-net calls." The article continues by pointing out that the fact that tariffs in Africa are relatively high is reflected in ARPU levels: "In 4Q09 blended monthly ARPU across Africa as a whole was [USD] 10.49 – but in India blended monthly ARPU in 4Q09 was much lower, at just [USD] 2.73, and falling.

However, the article observes that mobile tariffs have already come down in many African markets in the past couple of years as competition has intensified, often because of the market entry of new operators. Usage in Africa, meanwhile,  the article contends, has increased over the past couple of years too. African MoU, however, remains "half that of India's, which does suggest that there is potential for substantial further growth."

This growth opportunity notwithstanding, the gist of Infoma's 'tip' is that "African operators are probably best advised to avoid getting into the kind of price wars that are taking place in the Indian market", where ARPU halved during 2009, creating a big squeeze on  operators' profits.

Rather, Informa advises, "African operators should aim to demonstrate more of the innovation in pricing that is already evident on the continent through plans such as Zain's One Network, which allows subscribers to pay local rates when roaming, and MTN's MTN Zone, a dynamic tariff plan that charges lower rates when the network is not busy."

Let's see whether Bharti Airtel considers this to be sage advice as it embarks on its African adventure.

On a personal note, I will be interested to see whether the Indian cellco will make many changes to the management teams running its numerous newly-acquired opcos - and to listen out for a sense of how far Zain's people around Africa welcome the change of ownership. One opco CEO apparently quite upbeat about all of this is Zain Zambia MD David Holiday:




Presumably less positive about Zain's sales of its African assets is the man who masterminded their acquisition for the Kuwaiti group, former CEO Saad al Barrak, who resigned in February.

At the time, Emeka Obiodu, a senior analyst at Ovum, said: "Al Barrak championed this expansion push – buying Celtel, and aiming to make Zain one of the top ten mobile operators by 2011. But his whole ambition was blown to pieces by the owners who wanted to sell off in Africa."

While Al Barrak and his strategy do appear to have some detractors, Obiodu does not seem to be among them: "He’s taken MTC, this small company from Kuwait and transformed it into Zain, a global mobile powerhouse. He didn't bite of more than he can chew, but his vision diverged from the vision of the owners. When we did some financial analysis on Zain, the company wasn’t doing particularly badly. It wasn’t like he ran the business into the ground, although you have to concede that some of the small markets in Africa were seriously under-performing."

Now we will see whether Bharti Airtel has the patience and vision to stay in these numerous African markets for longer than Al Barrak's former company elected to do.

Zain Africa Done Deal Watch

East African opportunities unclear as cellcos remain coy about data ARPU

Kenyatta Int'l Conference Centre, Nairobi: venue for this year's East Africa Com

Last year I had the pleasure of visiting Nairobi, Kenya for the first time, building meetings around the excellent East Africa Com conference and exhibition.

This year, given that my day-to-day commercial activity now does not give me much exposure to Africa, I will not attending. Were I still more active in Africa, however, I would certainly want to be there - and I would encourage anyone who does business with the telecoms operators of the East Africa region to head for the Kenyatta International Conference Centre on 27th-28th April.

This year's event will be graced by the presence of the Hon. Samuel Poghisio, the host country's Minister for Information & Communications and by Charles J.K Njoroge, Director General of telecoms regulatory agency the CCK (Communications Commission of Kenya). I don't recall the Kenyan Government and authorities being represented at such a high level at the 2009 event, so the organisers are to be congratulated for the upgrade.

Sponsors and exhibitors will doubtless also be impressed by the number of operator CEOs to whom they will have access during the two days of discussions. Of these, two of the biggest hitters are Michael Ghossein, CEO of France Telecom-controlled Telkom Kenya, the country's incumbent fixed-line operator and Michael Joseph, the long-standing CEO of Kenya's dominant (78.8% market share, according to WCIS) mobile operator Safaricom.

This may be one of the final conferences appearances for the latter, Joseph having announced his impending retirement. He joined the Kenyan operator in mid-2000, when Vodafone first invested in the company. Since then, he has guided the company from a subscriber base of fewer than 20,000 to over 15 million today. Along the way, Safaricom has become renowned for its M-Pesa mobile money transfer service, which has brought the advantages of financial services to very large numbers of Kenya's largely 'unbanked' population. Safaricom also attracted praise this week from Alexander Grouet of Mira Networks, a leading provider of connectivity and billing tools between business and mobile networks in Africa.

Grouet asks: "Would you plan a trip to a foreign destination if you didn't know what the place looked like, what there was to see, how much a hotel room cost and what local transportation was available?" Having concluded that most readers would not, Grouet then invites us to imagine that what we’re talking about is not your vacation, but your business. "Well that’s pretty much what it’s like for most content providers wanting to penetrate the SSA [sub-Saharan Africa] market", he continues. "Despite the hype, the market metrics WASPs crucially need in order to make the next step, such as data ARPU or WAP traffic, are virtually inaccessible. Even traditional market data resellers don't offer it, as optimistically named Africa VAS reports almost exclusively include blended indicators rather than content-specific ones." I don't recall if this is a fair accusation to direct towards the good folks at the reports business of Informa Telecoms & Media, the organisers of East Africa Com.

Even if it is, Grouet suggests that the fault for the scarcity of these vital data lies with operators. "Out of the 26 operators in the 5 countries I worked on last year (Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire) only 2 to my knowledge," he writes, "publicly released their data ARPU." The two cellcos in Mr. Grouet's good books are Safaricom and Starcomms, a Nigerian CDMA carrier.

"The most likely explanation for this", ventures Grouet, "is that the data figures are still so low on most networks that operators simply don’t want to release them at this stage." According to Grouet, even Safaricom's data ARPU, including M-Pesa, stands at just USD 1 monthly, while the figure for Starcomms, including EV-DO dongles, is just under USD 2 per month. "But at least, we know where they stand, and we will be able to measure their progress when they next update those figures," Grouet continues.

Grouet hopes that other African operators will break their silence on the topic of data revenues, not least because that unwillingness to share data "only has the counter-productive effect of making it harder for international content companies, who precisely could help operators boost their data traffic, penetrate their markets."

Let's see how many cellco attending East Africa Com agree with these sentiments. Were I to attend this year, I would probably like to pursue that line of questioning, not least because I have received marketing emails from Informa which suggests that the region's operators are somewhat focused on data services.

A speaker likely to turn in an entertaining presentation is Noel Herrity, CEO of Tanzania's Zantel, an operator in which the UAE's Etisalat owns a 51% stake. Mr. Herrity delivered a compelling, nicely paced talk at the 2009 iteration of the conference and delegates will be hoping for more of the same. Perhaps we can be optimistic about that - Herrity may be in buoyant mood in light of recent reports indicating that the operator has begun recording net customer additions again, following two quarters of net loss.

One speaker for whom it could be challenging to stay 'on message'? Bashar Arafeh, the COO of the East Africa Region for MEA mobile group Zain.

This might arise as a result of delegates' curiosity about the future of Zain's African operations. Subject to takeover speculation for many months now (see DTW articles passim.), these assets could well be the property of giant Indian cellco Bharti Airtel before too long. The most recent developments in this long-running saga may soon prompt a revival of the popular mini-series (well, it generated more hits than usual) which appeared here on-and-off for much of 2009, rejoicing in the clunky title 'Zain Africa Speculation Watch' (and variations thereon).

Other CxOs appearing on stage at next months event include:

• Hans Paulsen, CCO, Uganda Telecom
• Themba Khumalo, CEO, MTN Uganda
• Ali Bin Jarsh, CEO, Canartel, Sudan
• Julius Kinyua, CEO, Flashcom, Kenya
• Geoff Goss, CEO, Celsys, Zimbabwe
  

I'm sure this year's event will once again be a useful place to do business, gain market intelligence and enjoy the company of a crowd who always seem very open to networking and making new contacts.

East African opportunities unclear as cellcos remain coy about data ARPU

Something to Grin about for Malawi's mobile users?

Tay Grin - star of the African hip hop scene... and Malawi's mobile sector?

It is not with any pleasure that DevelopingTelecomsWatch sometimes observes a country's mobile market and concludes that one of more of its competing cellcos surely seems doomed to fall by the wayside. All such enterprises are doubtless founded in good faith and with the firm intention to reward investors and employees for providing services to customers who will want them. A somewhat recurrent theme of this blog, however, in its first year, has been to wonder aloud about likely market consolidations around the world, and to speculate a little about which actors might be shaken out in any such eventuality.

In March, DTW picked up comments on this topic from MTN CEO Phuthuma Nhleko, spotted in a Financial Times article. Nhleko was quoted as saying that he believes Africa will see a wave of telco sector consolidation in the next 1-2 years, and the article contended that this will result from both new entrants and more established competitors struggling to maintain healthy margins in increasingly crowded markets.

Shortly after this, DTW took a look at some examples of particularly congested competitive environments in Africa, starting with Benin, the continent's 31st largest country in terms of the size of its population. We noted that five mobile operators now compete in a country of just 8 million people.

In the same month, DTW articles asked about the potential for mobile market consolidation in Burundi and in Gabon. By June, the same questions was being asked of Tanzania. A related post the same month zeroed in on Malawi, which might be something of a different case.

In that piece, it was noted that this under-penetrated market (still only 17.47% mobile penetration as of end-December 2009, according to WCIS) may offer a decent opportunity for a new entrant. At present, a duopoly exists, with the country's mobile subscriber base split between Zain's Malawi operation and Telekom Networks Malawi, a cellco in which the country's incumbent fixed line operator Malawi Telecommunications owns a 44% stake. Market share now (as of end-Dec 2009) is as follows: Zain 71.34%; TNM 28.66% (estimated figures, again from WCIS).

The June article on Malawi noted that country's telecoms regulator felt that the services offered by these two operators were at a price point which did not offer a fair deal to consumers. Zain responded by blaming high tariffs on high taxes. The market-leading operator also claimed that as the overall mobile market grows in Malawi, it will be able to lower prices. Zain Malawi's Managing Director Fayaz King explained: "Imagine at Zain, we have mounted a network that could take up to 5 million users but we currently have only 1.5 million customers. We believe that if at least 3 million people started using the Zain network, we could start enjoying the benefits of economies of scale."

The regulatory agency apparently remains unmoved by this line of argument. Aiming to bring down prices and extend service availability to the wider population, the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority felt that the best course of action was to open the market to a third entrant. As early as April this year, press reports were naming this third entrant - Globally Advanced Integrated Networks, the holder of the G-Mobile brand name.

Does Malawi, then, really offer a good prospect for this third entrant? As discussed back in June, there are reasons to suppose that while there are certainly numerous European countries with populations smaller than that of Malawi sustaining three or more mobile operators, the landlocked southeast African nation might nevertheless offer insufficiently attractive returns for prospective new entrants. While its high population density suggests that mobile coverage could be built out relatively cost-effectively, Malawi is, however, among the world's least developed countries, with a heavily agriculture-dependent economy and with GDP per capita of less than USD 320. Low life expectancy, high infant mortality and a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS all blight the country, with the latter draining the labour force and expected to impact further on GDP in the near future.

However, even in this context, mobile penetration is very low, as we have seen, even when compared with other underdeveloped African economies. So there could be room for one more MNO.

Is GAIN/G-Mobile, though, a likely candidate for success as a third entrant in this environment? Perhaps not. Due to the economic factors mentioned above, DTW suggested back in June that Malawi might be the kind of market where only MNOs able to leverage the scale and best practices of large groups can prevail and prosper in the long term.

G-Mobile, seemingly not aligned to any such major international telecoms group, certainly does not fit that description.

Who, then, is behind this latecomer to the Malawian mobile scene? The only person connect with the business whom I have seen quoted in the press is one Limbani Kalilani, the company's Vice Chairman. Mr Kalilani appears to be something of a celebrity in Malawi - and is working to become more well known across and beyond Africa. Although he has some track record in the telecoms industry, having set up a wireless payphone company called Phone Yanu, it is in the music world that Kalilani has made his real impact. Better known to his fans as Tay Grin, Mr Kalilani has established himself as a hip hop artist. Here he is in action:





It would be truly admirable if Tay Grin can succeed as both an international music phenomenon and a domestic business success story - more admirable still if it is his indigenous Malawian company that manages to bring the benefits of mobile communications to a larger number of his compatriots than can currently afford the services offered by the two established cellcos. DTW would be instinctively in favour of this form of African empowerment.

Are there already signs, however, that the going will prove as tough as DTW fears? Perhaps.

TeleGeography has recently reported that G-Mobile has admitted it will not be able to meet the 31st December 2009 deadline for the rollout of its network as stipulated by its licence. Instead the company plans to request an extension to the deadline from the regulator, and will make up for the delay by combining rollout phases outlined by the concession. Let's wait and see.

G-Mobile's rivals, meanwhile, are making progress of their own. TNM has launched its W-CDMA/HSDPA network, with Charles Kamoto, head of the cellco's Commercial Services division, saying that the service is initially only available to post-paid subscribers but that prepaid customers will soon have access 3G. Kamoto added: "Most less developed nations do not have this service on board for their customers but in Malawi we are very aggressive, we believe that our customers need quality, they need top-notch services and that is why we had to bring this 3.5G technology."

Something to Grin about for Malawi's mobile users?

South Africa's Telkom: a fighting chance?

Telkom Direct stores: a vital channel to market as the company faces challenging times?

DevelopingTelecomsWatch is picking up lots of chatter today about Telkom, the incumbent wireline operator of South Africa. This started when this morning's daily roundup from TeleGeography included the news that the company is planning to re-enter the mobile space in 2010 after only a brief period with no cellular presence.

Until almost exactly one year ago, Telkom and Vodafone had each owned 50% of Vodacom, the pan-African mobile operator with 35 million customers in South Africa, Tanzania, Lesotho, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Earlier this year, the UK-headquartered mobile giant secured a controlling interest in Vodacom with the purchase of an additional 15% stake from Telkom. The remaining 35% owned by the South African incumbent was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and unbundled to the company's shareholders.

When plans for this transaction were first announced late last year, Lloyd Gedye of South Africa's Mail & Guardian reported the stated rationale for Telkom's sale of its stake in Vodacom and noted that many analysts "had expressed skepticism at Telkom's ability to make a success of going it alone in the mobile space and have questioned how Telkom will survive without the Vodacom cash cow."

Back in November 2008, then, Gedye wrote that Telkom CEO Reuben September was arguing that the deal would unlock significant value for the company's shareholders because its fixed-line business had "been undervalued while it clung on to its 50% stake in Vodacom".

How much validity is there in that notion of Telkom's wireline property being undervalued? The notion is, at the very least, open to question according to An Ovum note issued this week in response to Telkom's announced plans to roll out its own mobile services. Ovum examine the background to this strategy and observe that fixed-line penetration (currently under 9%) is continuing to fall in South Africa so "mobile is clearly the communication mode of choice, and this is where [Telkom] needs to be for its customers."

However, the note continues, establishing a new mobile operation in South Africa won't be easy, as mobile penetration is already above the 100% mark and because Telkom will be competing with two large, well-established players in Vodacom and MTN.

A third mobile operator, Cell C, has achieved a 15.57% share (according to WCIS) of the country's mobile market since its commercial launch in late 2001. For other mobile service providers, South Africa has offered a very challenging competitive environment. Back in March, in an article on the prospects for MVNOs in both Africa and India, DevelopingTelecomsWatch noted that Virgin Mobile South Africa had failed to capture even 1% of the country's mobile subscriptions by the end of 2008. The significance of the recently-launched CDMA mobile offering from Neotel, Telkom's principal challenger in the fixed-line arena, remains to be seen.

While Ovum's note politely points out the level of challenge facing Telkom's proposed new mobile offering, others have responded with far less restrained language. An article by Tiisetso Motsoeneng of Reuters today quotes one analyst who certainly pulls no punches.

"To be targeting the retail market in that industry, I think it will be suicide for Telkom," Jan Meintjes, an analyst at Gryphon Asset Management said. "I fail to see how a converged strategy of fixed and mobile is going to be earning significant margins," Meintjes said. "Unless they can show to the market that there's a specific niche that they're targeting and how they can exploit that in terms of earning margins on that business that will give them an accepted ROE on their capital expenditure, I don't see how that can be value enhancing."

The Ovum note, however, reminds us that in South Africa, Telkom claims not to be starting a mobile network operation from scratch. The note points out that the group already has fixed core network assets, which are used by both Vodacom and MTN for backhaul, and an established channel to market through over 134 Telkom Direct shops. Ovum contend that Telkom can choose to "develop a new brand and associated lifestyle concept to target some of the high-spending customers". Also, the Ovum note continues, Telkom could potentially have greater appeal to enterprise customers due to an ability to bundle services across fixed and mobile networks.

Lloyd Gedye's article late last year indicated that another use of the Telkom's Vodacom windfall might be to acquire a number of new mobile licences in numerous African countries. These would be in addition to the company's existing interest in Nigeria. According to Candice Jones of ITWeb, however, Multi-Links, the Nigerian telco in which Telkom has had a controlling interest since 2006, "is in dire straits, knocking Telkom's annual results set with a R1.7 billion net loss."

Let's see if this difficult experience discourages Telkom from further international expansion. My sense all this year is that African mobile markets are more likely to consolidate than they are to offer rich opportunities for new entrants.

While mobility in South Africa offers a new source of revenue for Telkom, Ovum argue that any new revenue streams from mobile - or from enhanced ICT services currently being developed - "are unlikely to significantly bolster its financials in the near term." Of more immediate concern, Ovum contend, is Telkom's rising cost base. Ovum's note expresses the belief that by implementing best-practice approaches in its own transformation, Telkom is giving itself a fighting chance in the challenging times ahead of it.

South Africa's Telkom: a fighting chance?

India: cut-price tariffs squeezing margins and causing telecoms stocks to tumble

A number of articles here have wrestled with the question of optimum pricing for mobile operators in emerging markets. Some of these have focused on the case of Millicom International Cellular selling its three Asian operations, having cited, in the case of Cambodia, the challenges of maintaining healthy profitability in the face of the highly aggressive market entry strategies of new entrants.

This week a price war fought amongst telcos elsewhere in Asia has cause a slide in the value of their stocks:

The lady speaking in this clip contends that the first shots in this Indian tariff war were fired by Aircel (India's seventh largest cellco by market share) and Tata DoCoMo, the recently-launched GSM proposition from CDMA operator Tata Teleservices, arising out of its strategic alliance with Japanese mobile giant NTT DoCoMo.

In August, Tata DoCoMo made waves by becoming the first Indian mobile brand to offer per-second billing. Some media sources contend that impressive subscriber additions for the operator since then have been largely driven by the attractiveness of this innovation. Surya R Kannoth of the Economic Times, writing today, says that the most aggressive response to this yet has been from Reliance Communications, which on Monday announced a flat, cheap per-minute lifetime tariff for all calls - local, NLD, on-net, offnet, inbound/outbound roaming - made by both CDMA and GSM prepaid users. All this comes for no monthly fixed charge, but with a one-time set up fee of Rs48 (around one US Dollar).

The commentator speaking in the video clip above argues that this tariff causes the spread between cost per minute and revenue per minute to become very narrow, "and that would hurt profitability going forward." She goes on to quote analysts who say that the tariff is "disruptive" and will put pressure on major players such as Vodafone, Idea Cellular and Bharti Airtel, whose Chairman said today that prices in India have hit rock bottom. In light of the damage to share prices seen this week, investors in the various mobile operators will doubtless be hoping that this really is the case.

Bharti Airtel is getting consecutive mentions at DTW, having been the subject of the most recent article here, which was about how India's market-leading cellco has been disappointed by a second failed attempt to create a merger with the Africa and Middle East cellular powerhouse MTN of South Africa. In that article I mentioned, not for the first time, that there exists the belief that competitive pressures in its home market will continue to make the exploration of foreign investment opportunities very compelling for Bharti Airtel. I take today's news of a price war and tumbling telecoms stocks to be a pretty solid plank for that argument. I also reported the opinion that the Indian cellco might want to take a good look into acquiring some or all of the assets of Zain, the availability of which has been talked up for months now, not least here at DTW, where we ran a whole series of articles on speculation around the Kuwaiti group's possible exit from Africa.

A Business Standard article run on Saturday contends that not only is this a likely scenario, but that the Indian operator may need to take on its one-time suitor in a battle to take control of Zain. This idea seems to be drawn from the fact that last month, MTN CEO Phutuma Nhleko told journalists that his company would consider buying the African assets of Zain if the deal with Bharti Airtel did not go through.

India: cut-price tariffs squeezing margins and causing telecoms stocks to tumble

What next for Bharti Airtel in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

Sunil Bharti Mittal: looking to new opportunities in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

Will they? Won't they? Will they? Won't they?

No. Not now - and maybe not ever.

Of the two big telecoms M&A deals discussed by this blog over the last few months, one has definitely stalled, seemingly not to be revived again this year.

We've been here before. Giant Indian cellco Bharti Airtel and South Africa's multinational mobile group MTN failed to come together last year. Now, after months of discussions and a repeatedly extended deadline for those talks, the two firms have once again failed to find a way to combine their assets into one giant emerging markets player which would have been the third largest telecoms company in the world, according to the Indian MNO's statement about the scrapped merger plans.

Bharti Airtel maintains that the planned alliance "was a vision based on solid fundamentals" and that "substantial synergies could have been captured" with the proposed transaction. The Indian firm's statement indicates that much thought was given to the "the sensibilities and sensitivities of both companies and both their countries" and contends that "the proposed deal structure took into account their leadership in their respective geographies to ensure continuity of business - including listing, tax residencies, management, brand etc." With what sounds like a note of regret about a missed opportunity, the statement expresses the opinion that "the deal would have been a significant step in promoting South-South cooperation - a vision of the two countries."

So what's gone wrong this time? The Bharti Airtel statement indicates that failure to gain the approval of the South African Government is what has caused both companies to take the decision to disengage from discussion. James Middleton of Informa Telecoms & Media also describes the aborted transaction as a case of both firms failing to convince the Zuma Government, which is MTN's biggest shareholder via the Public Investment Corporation (a pension fund), of the value of the deal.

Another Informa scribe, the shadowy 'Informer', in his usual playful manner, reaches for the fairly obvious metaphor of a cancelled wedding and has some fun with it. Writing yesterday, the mystery man of Mortimer House jokes that that "the parents of the bride-to-be" were "clearly unimpressed by the quality of her suitor."

While the Indian firm expresses the hope that "the South African government will review its position in the future and allow both companies an opportunity to re-engage," it's probably legitimate to wonder if there will be the appetite to revisit this again for a third time. I'm all in favour of persistence - God loves a tryer and all that. I've also learned, though, that 'no' often means... 'no'. Happily, I've not had the chastening experience of asking several times for a lady's hand in marriage and being repeatedly spurned. My guess, though, is that I'd probably start to take the hint at the second knock-back. If Sunil Bharti Mittal and his management team feel at all like that, then this recent disappointment begs a new question: What next?

In its statement about the failed tie-up with MTN, Bharti Airtel stated that the company "will continue to explore international expansion opportunities that are consistent with its vision and bring value to its shareholders." I would expect that to be the case, having expressed the view back in February that competitive pressures on home turf might force the Indian operator to identify investment targets around the world.

As the year has unfolded since then, some of these pressures have not proven to be as strong as might have been feared. For example, one threat my February article identified was state-owned operators (i.e. BSNL and MTNL) stealing a march in the 3G space and in the WiMAX services arena. As we have seen here since, however, it now appears that the two big public sector telcos have failed to make much of this this first-mover advantage.

Other pressures do continue to exist, though, even in a massively booming market. Since that February article, India's mobile operators have added almost 100 million subscriptions. Bharti Airtel's share of the vast subscriber base, however, has slipped a little, with ground conceded to a strongly performing Reliance Communications and to smaller players whose market share has improved a bit, notably Aircel and Russian-owned MTS India.

Where, then, will the giant MNO seek new growth opportunities outside its home territory? Back in February, I aired the view that Bharti Airtel may be almost uniquely well suited to the challenges of African markets, noting that the Indian operator has to cope with the lowest tariffs in the world while sustaining growth. More than once, when reporting the rumoured sale of a set of African mobile operators, this blog has noted that those operations are rather less profitable than the parent company's properties in the Middle East. Bharti Airtel, then, might be the most obvious fit to purchase those assets. The group being referred to here is, of course, Zain.

So, could the failure to tie-up with MTN now put the Indian operator in the frame as a suitor either for Zain's African portfolio or for a stake in the entire Kuwaiti-headquartered group? Maybe. Consider this from the chuckling 'Informer':

"You shouldn’t stick around where you’re not wanted... there are, after all, plenty more fish in the sea. The Informer suggests that Bharti has a look at Zain, instead. Zain gives the impression of being a little more, how shall we say… available."

If this were to happen, I'd guess that a link-up with MTN would be permanently off the cards, due to the significant overlapping of the Zain and MTN footprints.

What next for Bharti Airtel in the wake of scuppered MTN deal?

MTN-Bharti Airtel tie-up: yay or nay?

India's PM: supports Bharti Airtel-MTN tie-up

More than once I have warmly recommended articles written by Matthew Reed, the editor of the Informa Telecoms & Media Mobile Middle East & Africa Intelligence Centre. The latest interesting discussion from Matt, with whom I had the pleasure of working towards the end of my own stint as an Informa person, concerns confusion surrounding major telecoms M&A deals across the MEA region which he covers.

Anyone who watches these markets - or indeed who reads this blog on a regular basis - will not be surprised to learn which two potentially huge and seemingly stalled deals are the focus of Matt's article:

• the prospective sale of a stake in MEA mobile group Zain, or perhaps just the sale of its African operations
  
• the long-mooted cash and share-swap tie-up between giant Indian cellco Bharti Airtel and South Africa's multinational telecoms group MTN

I only propose to spend time on the latter here today.

Matt Reed notes that talks between Bharti Airtel and MTN, which began in May and have been extended twice, most recently to a deadline of end-September, seem to be heading toward the wire once again without resolution. Matt's article is dated 22nd September, so we are now four days closer to that wire.

So what's holding up the mooted mega-merger? A significant problem, reports Mary Lennighan, writing for Total Telecom yesterday, is the effect of a recent tightening of India's takeover rules. This move apparently means that MTN could be forced to make an open offer for an additional 20% of Bharti Airtel, which in turn would create financial and regulatory problems. The first of these is the business of finding a large quantity of cash to fund the open offer - Lennighan reports esitmates of up to USD 9.35 billion.

Secondly, the proposed deal would put Bharti Airtel well over India's 74% foreign direct investment cap - MTN would hold 25% of the Indian MNO directly, and its shareholders would have an additional 11%. The extra 20% stake would give the South African company a 56% chunk of its new partner. SingTel already hold 30.4% of Bharti Airtel - hence the FDI cap problem.

This is not the only potential legal problem faced by the deal makers. The other, writes Lennighan, concerns the insistence of the South African Government that the merged entity should be listed on both the Johannesburg and Bombay stock exchanges. Indian law prohibits Bharti Airtel from any such dual listing.

These problems may be surmountable, however, at least if the deal is supported at the highest levels, which does seem to be the case. According to an article in yesterday's Economic Times, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has admitted to discussing the merger at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh with South African president Jacob Zuma. Singh expressed support for the deal and also stated India's willingness to discuss any outstanding issues.

This looks encouraging for proponents of the deal, but should either party be approaching this marriage with caution? An editorial piece in South Africa's Financial Mail this week suggests that this might be the case for MTN and its many shareholders - the telecoms giant apparently appears in the portfolios of dozens of unit trusts, and many retirement funds have significant stakes, including the Public Investment Corp., which holds an 11.2% stake on behalf of members of Government pension funds. The opinion piece warns that shareholders will have to evaluate the proposals carefully, and ask whether the expected benefits will compensate for the risk. The article commends MTN for an exceptional international growth record, comparing this favourably with Bharti Airtel's more limited career as an international player. The writer also refers to the Indian cellco being part of the wider Bharti conglomerate, with its "different culture." Without saying much about what might go wrong, the Financial Mail opines that "institutional investors should be concerned that the huge value that has been created in MTN - and which may come in the future - is not frittered away by an unwise deal."

Matt Reed, writing about the 2008 failure of these two giant telecoms companies to come together, notes that reportedly, a factor in that failure was South Africa’s worry that control of MTN, which is perceived as a national champion, could pass into foreign hands. This, at least, is something that the Financial Mail does not consider as a legitimate reason for a 2009 deal hitting the rocks. Government should avoid taking decisions based on national pride, ideology or an aspiration to protect or create a national champion, says the editorial piece. "Those would be the wrong reasons, and could lead to poor judgments with bad results. There are no grounds so far for assuming jobs [in South Africa] would be at risk because of an MTN deal with Bharti Airtel."

There may be reasons, then, to believe that this deal will get done reasonably soon. Or will be be discussing deadline extensions throughout the next few months?

MTN-Bharti Airtel tie-up: yay or nay?

Sri Lankan mobile market: one way or another, consolidation looks likely

Sri Lankans queue to get their hands on Airtel 's low price offers earlier this year

When Bharti Airtel's Sri Lanka operation Airtel Lanka launched its cut price services in January this year, the new cellco became the fifth operator competing for a share of the country's mobile market. The number of mobile service providers in the island nation, however, may soon be set to fall back to four. This will depend, though, on which party comes forward to snap up one operator currently sporting a 'for sale' sign.

Up for grabs is Tigo Sri Lanka, one of the Asian operations that Millicom International Cellular is keen to sell. When this blog first commented on Millicom's planned withdrawal the three Asian markets in which it has done business, Axiata (formerly Telekom Malaysia International) was mentioned as a possible purchaser of two of these operations - Tigo Sri Lanka and Cambodia's Cellcard. In both cases this would lead to market consolidation - in Sri Lanka, Axiata has a controlling stake in market-leading cellco Dialog Telekom; Cambodian MNO Hello is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Malaysian group. As discussed in the most recent DTW article, however, it was another existing shareholder in the Cambodian cellco (the Royal Group) which eventually relieved Millicom of its stake in Cellcard. Given that other organisations have been more recently and more regularly touted as potential purchasers of Tigo Sri Lanka, Malaysia's Axiata also seems to be out of the running with regard to that opportunity.

One potential suitor mentioned very recently is state-owned Indian operator BSNL, whose management committee approved a proposal to submit a bid to acquire the Sri Lankan operator company last week, according to Manoj Gairola of the Hindustan Times.

The public sector telco seems to have attracted considerable criticism of late, some of which has been reported here. Quite striking was the August 12th article written by Kunal Kumar Kundu, who feels that BSNL is crippled by political interference, poor demand forecasting, lack of effective budgetary control and a bloated payroll. This blog has also reported the very modest take-up of BSNL's wireless broadband offerings and negative feedback about the company's preferred franchisee business model for the development of both 3G mobile and WiMAX services. Almost as often, however, the state-owned operator has been linked here with possible overseas investments. Perhaps the competitive pressure from India's numerous private sector mobile players is felt so keenly by BSNL's management that foreign opportunities are seen as a much better bet in terms of realistic growth opportunities. This may explain the fact that in the few months since the inception of this blog, the Indian operator has been mentioned in connection with a stake in pan-MEA mobile group Zain and with a new telecoms licence in Tunisia. BSNL's interest in Tigo Sri Lanka, then, is perhaps not very surprising.

Also connected in media reports with the sale of Tigo Sri Lanka is the UAE's Etisalat, which in August was reported to be considering an investment in the country now that the long civil war seems to have finally reached a conclusion. Priyantha Kariyapperuma, Director General of Sri Lanka's telecoms regulator, reportedly met with a visiting official from Etisalat last month and told journalists that "with the war over in May, there is ample scope for investments into telecom services and infrastructure facilities, especially in the north and east," referring to the area of the island that was most affected by the conflict. Few of the reports on Etisalat's possible interest in Sri Lanka have stated explicitly that the UAE company's route into the country's market would be via the acquisition of the Tigo-branded MNO. All of these reports, however, mention the availability of Millicom's Sri Lankan operation, so perhaps it's not unreasonable to infer that the Emirati company might have had Tigo Sri Lanka in its sights.

The most recent name floated in connection with the opportunity, however, is one from India rather than from the Middle East. As with an Axiata purchase, this move would also lead to market consolidation - because the company concerned is Bharti Airtel, already present in the Sri Lanka market since January, as we noted at the top of this article.

It seems, then, that the management of the giant Indian telecoms firm is not completely absorbed by the ongoing negotiations about the proposed mega-merger with South Africa's MTN. That saga has been notable for the repeatedly-extended deadline for concluding the talks and for various parties weighing in with opinions about the desirability of the mooted deal. One recently expressed opion comes from South Africa's Communications Minister, Siphiwe Nyanda, who voiced caution over the proposed tie-up in an interview yesterday. The Minister told the Sunday Times that any deal should take into account that MTN was a "South African company with a footprint in Africa." I take this to mean that there exists concern over MTN potentially losing its identity as a telecoms group with its roots - and the bulk of its business - in Africa. The Minister's comments are certainly of relevance given that South Africa's Government-owned Public Investment Corporation holds a 21% stake in MTN.

Bharti Airtel's interest in Tigo Sri Lanka came to my attention earlier this week, when R. Jai Krishna of the Wall Street Journal reported comments from an unnamed person close to the development. Suggesting that any deal would be worth USD 100-120 million, the mystery source said "in Sri Lanka, if you need to be a significant player in the market, you need to do an acquisition... greenfield, you will not be successful," by way of explaining the rationale behind Bharti Airtel's rumoured move.

A strengthened presence in Sri Lanka on the part of the Indian cellco could be welcomed by consumers - certainly if the company continues to compete aggressively on price, a strategy that has yielded impressive subscriber growth. Since going to market in January, the new entrant had 900,000 subs by the end of June, according to WCIS market intelligence. Another Informa Telecoms & Media service, Global Mobile Daily, reported in late July that Airtel Lanka claimed to have reached the one million subs mark.

The Bharti-owned cellco, however, has seen some of its competitors crying foul over its tariffs. Late last month, for example, Duruthu Edirimuni Chandrasekera of Sri Lanka's Sunday Times, reported that some operators have threatened to cut their interconnection with Airtel Lanka to retaliate for the the Indian-owned company failling to withdraw tariffs not approved by the country's telecoms regulator.

This sounds oddly familiar - the most recent article here covered a very similar wrangle over tariffs and interconnect agreements in Cambodia. Competition in Asia's mobile markets, then, certainly seems to be brutally fierce right now. Again I find myself voicing the view that there may well be casualties when the going gets this tough.

What price on mobile market consolidation in Sri Lanka then?

Sri Lankan mobile market: one way or another, consolidation looks likely

Mobile industry nicely balances profit motive with improving lives: not everyone agrees...

It has been a tendency of this blog to eulogise the ways in which telecoms companies with business units in developing countries are able to reconcile efforts to alleviate poverty and misery with their need to turn a profit and grow shareholder value.

I therefore tend to be very encouraged when I read articles such as that written in April by Rohit Singh of the Overseas Development Agency (ODI), a British think tank focused on international development and humanitarian issues. Singh writes about the numerous studies which support the idea that a rapid increase in mobile penetration contributes significantly to economic growth. He discusses the incremental, tranformational and production benefits brought by mobile phones:

• Incremental benefits: improving what people already do – offering them faster and cheaper communication, often substituting for costly and risky journeys.
• Transformational benefits: offering something new such mobile banking, enabling the unbanked to store value.
• Production benefits: resulting from the creation of new livelihoods, not only through professional telecommunications jobs but also through activities like re-selling airtime or phone cards.
  

Much praise, then, has been directed by DevelopingTelecomsWatch at the efforts of mobile operators worldwide, notably in Africa. None of what has been written here suggests that there might be a possible downside to the rapid growth of mobile infrastructure and services in the places where the world's least affluent people live their lives.

There are those, however, who voice precisely that concern. Notable, I think, is Steve Song, who spent ten years working on ICT for Development issues at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), a Canadian state-owned enterprise whose role is to help developing countries use science and technology to find practical, long-term solutions to the social, economic, and environmental problems they face. Song is now based in Cape Town, where he has taken up a fellowship with the Shuttleworth Foundation, an organisation which works to drive social and policy innovation in the fields of education and technology through policy dialogue and practical projects.

I was very interested in Steve Song's reaction to Kenyan cellco Safaricom winning a UN-HABITAT award for its M-Pesa mobile money services. This got a mention in the recent discussion here about whether mobile banking and money transfer services branded and run by cellular operators in developing countries might be vulnerable to a competitive threat from apparently operator-neutral solutions such as the one recently announced by Monitise. My own reaction to a cellco being lauded for how its services improve the lives of poor people is always very positive - it makes me pleased to make my living in and around an industry whose technologies can be a force for good. On hearing about Safaricom's award, Steve Song, however, was prompted to consider, not for the first time, "the effective monopolies/oligopolies" that mobile operators in Africa have become.

While Song acknowledges "the miracle that mobile phones are" and says that "there can't be many people who still doubt the direct value that mobile phones provide to people", he is concerned that the wealth that is being generated by cellcos in Africa is being distributed too unevenly. To support this assertion, he cites the case of South Africa's MTN apparently acknowledging that is subsidises 3G data traffic with revenue from its core voice and SMS business. This means, says Song, that when it comes to communication, "the poor in South Africa are effectively subsidising the wealthy".

Song also invites us to consider "the microeconomics of the edge cases of mobile access" - the case of a remote village served by a single cell tower. He contends that in this scenario, the majority of calls made would be to other users in the same area, i.e. local calls. Song also asserts that people in Africa "are spending substantial amounts of their disposable income on access." So, he argues, if, say 50% of the phone calls made in a remote village are local and if people are spending 50% of their disposable income on mobile access, "that means that 25% of their disposable income is being siphoned out of that village."

Perhaps with my own mobile bill in mind, I initially wondered whether it could really be true that even very poor people could possibly be spending as much as 50% of their disposable income on voice and SMS. Apparently so, according to a 2008 report from Research ICT Africa, a twenty-country network hosted by the EDGE Institute in Johannesburg and funded by Steve Song's former employers, the IDRC.

We can see from the table below that the report has indeed identifed African countries where consumers spend more than 50% of their disposable income on mobile services. These include Kenya (52.5%), Nigeria (52.4%) and Zambia (60.3%). According to this study, for the same three countries, the percentage of disposable cash spent on cellular services for the bottom 75% of the population by disposable income rises to 63.6%, 60.9% and 73.9% respectively.
Is this phenomenon - people spending such a major chunk of their incomes on mobile phone charges - purely an unavoidable consequence of how poor these people are? Or might more competitive mobile markets deliver considerably lower prices, thereby freeing up African consumers' cash to be spent on other items?

Several times, a DevelopingTelecomsWatch piece has focused on a particular country and voiced the idea that perhaps that state's mobile market is currently contested by too many cellcos - too many in the sense of not all of them being able to turn a profit and justify further investment. In the few months since this blog's inception, that question has been raised about Cambodia and Sri Lanka and about Tanzania, Burundi and Gabon.

Along the way, I've sometimes been quite critical of operators with aggressively low pricing. Metfone (the Cambodian subsidiary of Vietnamese MNO Viettel) is one example. I have expressed the view that Metfone's distribution of free SIMs and airtime is a "disruptive" market entry strategy which is "very nice for quickly building a subscriber base, but taken to its logical conclusion this can seriously erode overall market value for all players."

What I've had in mind is an idea I've heard articulated countless times at many, many telecoms industry conferences - that telecoms groups will only invest in and improve the communications infrastructure of those countries where good profits can be earned; that most operators naturally settle around a band of prices which enable profitable operation and happy shareholders for all competitors; that operators which sell their services below the lowest end of that band of prices can be accused of destroying martket value and threatening the ability of others to keep investing; that regulators/governments which allow any market actors to do this are not acting responsibly.

Steve Song would presumably not sympathise with these sentiments because he rails against the failure of telecoms regulators in Africa either to license enough new market entrants or to curb the excesses of incumbent players with significant market power. He feels that this has led to a situation where existing operators "collude to maintain high profits", citing the global price of SMS per byte vs. the true cost of delivering text messages.

The ODI's Rohit Singh also deals with the role of telecoms sector regulatory agencies in developing countries. He writes about how governments should oversee such issues as interconnection between the operators, spectrum allocation, and access to the international gateway. He argues that the importance of this role is shown when, in the absence of regulated interconnection tariffs, dominant firms charge high prices for connecting calls from other networks. Singh asserts that this limits effective competition, with dominant firms earning monopoly profits, keeping their prices high, and having little incentive to expand or innovate.

Without effective regulation, Singh continues, ownership of bottleneck infrastructure by dominant firms can diminish the developmental impact of the mobile sector by pushing up prices and restricting coverage.

When Singh reaches for an example of this kind of failure of regulation, he thinks of Zambia, where he says international calls are very expensive because the state-owned fixed-line operator charges high tariffs to private operators to access the international gateway. This distortion, he argues, then affects the domestic calls market, because private operators have to subsidise their international calls to compete with the public sector firm. In this characterisation, private sector mobile operators are the good guys of the piece, forced rather than inclined to charge high prices for their services. My feeling, then, is that Rohit Singh and Steve Song have quite different views of the optimally desirable interplay between telecoms operators and regulators.

Going beyond the issue of pricing, in an earlier blog post, Song expresses concern about how mobile operators in developing countries might conceivably take advantage of the ways in which cellphones have become indispensable in people's lives. Drawing on a March 2009 presentation by Nathan Eagle, the developer of crowdsourcing application txteagle, Song observes that no one in Kenya can afford not to have a mobile phone because "even if you are digging a ditch by the side of the road, day labour is now organised via SMS." Song feels that this means that mobile operators have Kenyans by the throat. To support this argument, he discusses another anecdote from Nathan Eagle's talk, which concerns a water pump manufacturer in Kenya that, by combining an M-Pesa-enabled, solar-powered metering system with their water pumps, has completely changed its business model. This company is apparently now giving water pumps away for free and then making a profit by selling access to water through the M-Pesa service. In his presentation, Eagle observes that Michael Joseph, the CEO of Safaricom, "loves this because you have to have a Safaricom account to get water."

Steve Song ask whether he is alone in finding this a little disturbing and feels that there is something wrong about a single mobile operator acting as the gatekeeper to water supply. Song argues that "for any village in this situation, Safaricom can charge whatever they like".

When I stumbled upon Steve Song's blog, I felt it would be interesting to draw attention to the uncomfortable questions which he raises. After all, DevelopingTelecomsWatch was never intended as a cheerleader for a particular view of the role of the communications sector in developing countries and emerging markets. So, for anyone else who has so far been unaware of Song's writing, I hope it has been refreshing to consider the ideas of someone who observes the actions of mobile operators with a critical eye. What I like about Song's writing is that his arguments are not weakened by an unattractively shrill tone. However, if you're curious to hear from someone who really doesn't mince his words about cellcos, I'd suggest you read a recent article by Llewellyn Kriel about South African operators and the country's telecoms regulator.

Mobile industry nicely balances profit motive with improving lives: not everyone agrees...